THE TEACHINGS OF THE WAR OF 1870.

The contest between the French and German races which has just terminated, will take rank in future times, both in importance and in the magnitude of its results, with the Wars of the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, and the War of the French Revolution. It is too early to prophesy what the results will be, but it is high time to note the lessons it teaches us, and to endeavour to profit by them.

The first and greatest lesson it affords is, that unless people have grown more righteous, virtuous and God fearing in themselves, all their talk about philanthropy, universal peace, and the brotherhood of nations, is a mere sham; and shams must and will have an end, and sometimes a very lamentable one, as we have lately witnessed.

Ever since the great French Revolution, the world has been under the dominion of false pretences. For the hundred years previous to that event, the ruling power was Vice, since then it has been Humbug.

The egg from whence these modern principles proceeded—omne ex ovo-was laid in the United States, though hatched in France. The first named people declared all men to be born free and equal; the first part of which sentence ought to be true, but the latter is a notorious fallacy, apparent as soon as the child is able to speak. The French added to this dogma; proclaiming that not only were men born equal, but that they ought to remain so, and more, that the handicraft's-man, he who got his living by manual labour, was in intelligence, liberality and enlightenment, "primus inter pares," the first among equals. Now my own belief is, that the honest upright workman, who maintains himself and his family by the work of his hands, is morally equal, if not superior, to him who does not work, but lives on the product of the work of his ancestors; but this assertion, that he is intellectually superior, and more fitted to govern himself and others, is one of the most transparent pieces of the humbug of that period, which, however, has been maintained by the so called Liberal party in Europe from that day to the present.

Such a doctrine was not long in bearing fruit. The workman filled with self-conceit, at his asserted superiority, looked around him, and beheld those whom he considered his inferiors in capacity, honesty and liberality of sentiment, in possession of all the power and good things of this world; the sight filled him with envy, jealousy and rage; and he naturally determined to reverse this order of affairs at the earliest opportunity. But while these two pretences were working out their own effects; the so called U. S. MAG. No. 509, APRIL, 1871.

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philosophers, and the rich trading classes came forward with two especial shams of their own-the sham of Universal Fraternity, and the sham of the power for good of Enlightened Self-Interest. The first of these was eagerly seized upon by the Democrats, or Socialists, with whom it means a bond of the working men of the several countries to pull down those who have more than themselves. With the rich, the cant that enlightened selfinterest, generated by commerce, had convinced the nations that they were parts of an universal brotherhood, and that all disputes, should any such arise, could and would be settled by peaceful arbitration, really meant, (except in the case of some sincere enthusiasts), that those who paraded these fine sentiments, intended under cover of them to shirk all duties to their own country which should involve any trouble or self-sacrifice either in purse or person.

But while these false pretences were thus in vogue amongst men, what was the real state of feeling concealed beneath them? It is singular, but nevertheless true, that prior to the entrance of all these fine sayings into the world, the feeling of the different races of Europe towards one another was much more friendly than it has ever been since. Prior to the breaking out of the French Revolution, we in England professed to hate the French, but our hatred was of a very good-humoured sort, and confined itself to a belief that one Englishman could beat three frog-eating Frenchmen.

Again, the French, if we judge by their literature, rather, if anything, admired the English nation and character. Between Germany and France also, no such enmity, as has since existed, was known. The Germans were inclined to copy the French rather than to hate them, and so likewise with the other nations. The great convulsion in France, and the subsequent wars of Napoleon Bonaparte reversed all this; and since the termination of those hostilities, Count Valerian Krasinski, or whoever it was that started the doctrine of Nationalities, has revived enmities of many hundred years standing, and produced the war which we have just witnessed, and which bids fair to be by no means the last of the series. The false pretences to which we have above alluded, are sure, as we now see, to bring down retribution upon their authors. We have ourselves as yet escaped, for our shams have been passive and even paltry; we talked largely about loving our neighbour, when in reality we only felt indifference, and a desire to sell to him in the dearest market. But the shams of France have been active and troublesome, she would persist in thrusting her fraternal nostrums down the throats of her neighbours, with what Béranger proclaimed as, and Michelet, Hugo and Thiers believed to be, her Holy Bayonets, with which they imagined she could defy heaven and earth; but her bayonets have been wrenched from her hands, and her muskets broken, stock, lock, and barrel.

If such have been the consequences of the worship of humbug, there is another fact also which the teaching of this war discloses to us; namely, that it would have been well for the nations, if the modern system of forming armies had never been invented. These wars of enormous hosts, taken from every class of the population, do more mischief, cause more ruin and devastation, and sow the seeds of more undying hatreds in six months than the old wars, waged by professional soldiers, did in twenty years. And after all, the system is a mistake, and will not answer for lengthened hostilities.

Originally forced upon Prussia by the ruthless policy and exactions of Napoleon, its success in burling back the invaders from the country in the great campaign of '13, tempted the government to make its organization permanent; and the event of the two last wars has still further wedded the nation to its use. But in prolonged warfare, this plan of rendering every man liable to be taken from his home and occupation in order to form armies in the field of upwards of half a million of men, will assuredly break down.

It will doubtless be held by many, that no war, in the future, will last for more than a few months, that it will be as they term it, short, sharp, and decisive; for that one of the parties must speedily, as we have lately seen, be overwhelmed and crushed by the other. To this I would answer, that there are nations, outside the circle of France and Germany, who are capable of carrying on long wars; England is so capable, and Russia is so capable. Even France, were it not that all military qualities-thanks to that envy, jealousy, and indiscipline, both in the nation and in the army, of which we have spoken above— appear to have become extinct within her, might have held the Prussians at bay for an indefinite period. Had the Emperor taken up a position, like the line of the Moselle, such as common sense and true military science would have dictated; or if that was not carried into execution, had Bazaine formed one entrenched camp in the Argonne, with with Metz and Thionville in his front; and McMahon another on the Loire, with supplementary camps formed by the local forces in rear of them both; what prospect would the Prussians have had of concluding the war in six months, or even six years.

Nothing but the evident want of all military skill in their enemies, could have justified the German commanders in the very bold strategy and tactics they pursued. They themselves soon showed, when necessity compelled them, what entrenched lines and batteries skillfully disposed can do against very superior forces. With their adversaries forces disposed as I have said, how would they have kept their communications open? And if they might hope to live on a rich country like France, how will it be when the war comes to be waged in Poland or Lithuania ?

Count Bismark knows-none better that the next war will be against the head of a nationality (thanks to Count Krasinki for the interesting term), of eighty or ninety millions of men, with the addition, as auxiliaries, of the tribes who followed Zingis Khan and Tamerlane. The German cavalry has done great things in this war; but here they would have an opponent to whose disciplined cavalry could be added hundreds of thousands of light Asiatic horsemen, who although not competent to meet regular troops in close fight, would sweep a country clear of everything that existed on the face of the ground.

Such is the prospect that looms in the future, and it is, without doubt, at the bottom of the determination of the Prussian generals and statesmen to secure themselves, as far as possible, on the side of France, by reducing her powers of vengeance to the lowest ebb. But it behoves them to look well and thoroughly into their organization. That to which we have alluded would be no six months' war. It might be waged in Bohemia or Brandenburg, when of course every Prussian and Austrian would be called out to defend his country; but it might be carried on in Poland or Hungary, where it would not be quite so pleasant to the burghers of Berlin or Hamburg to be out for some six or seven campaigns.

Here let us learn a third lesson and not attempt to assimilate our own national forces to any of the Continental types. Voluntary our system has ever been, and voluntary let it remain. We require neither universal armament nor compulsory service. Mr. Cardwell has said, and it is the most sensible remark ever made by a minister of war in this country, that the minimum force which ought to be maintained at home is 400,000 men. Let us therefore have an army of half that strength composed of Regulars, Militia, and Reserves, and an equal number of Volunteers, the constant passage through whose ranks of the young men of the country, will gradually accustom, and has accustomed, the population to the use of arms; and on an invasion of the country would fill the ranks with men who had some knowledge of keeping line and handling their weapons.

A great deal has been both written and said by laborious amateurs on this and other military topics; but I think they have failed to regard the object in all its aspects.

A few of the facts which go to make up the situation are these: 1st. That England is surrounded by sea.

2nd. That she at present commands that sea.

3rd. That should she temporarily lose the command, she will still be able, by means of her ironclads, to make the landing of an invading army a rather unpleasant operation.

4th. When an enemy has landed he will have the sea for his base, an uncertain medium of communication.

5th. He will have no provision but what he can obtain in the country.

6th. He will have little or no cavalry. We shall be great fools if we allow him to mount himself at our expense.

7th. We shall have the command of all the railroads. He can bring neither locomotives or carriages with him.

8th. England is a difficult and enclosed country, abounding in strong positions.

9th. English infantry are just the men to hold entrenchmentsbeing of the ninety rounds in an hour and forty-five minutes type —and English navigators are just the men to make them.

Therefore if the Government keep them well supplied with something to eat and ammunition to fire away, provided also that the General in command is equal to his position, knows the advantages of the defensive, and how, by making rapid flank movements always to place himself in front of the enemy; the campaign ought not to last above three months.

And this brings us to the fourth lesson this war has given us, i.e., the inestimable advantage of having a highly educated body of officers, such as Prussia possesses. Nothing shows the wonderful state of perfection to which of perfection to which the superior training of the officers had brought every department of the German army, more than the movements of that body after the battle of Sedan. That battle was fought and won on the 2nd of September; by the 4th the Royal head-quarters were at Rheims; on the 14th the different corps, according to their orders, were in a circle of ten leagues distant round Paris; and on the 19th the investment of the city was completed, and the entrenchments commenced. Like the moveable towers of Demetrius Poliarcetes, which moved forward with a stately, uniform motion without check, delay or vibration, so did the German army advance without let or hindrance from mistakes or deficiencies in any one single department. All this excellence is undoubtedly due in chief part to the officers of the several branches of the service; for let the modern theorists say what they will, the soldier of one or two years standing cannot compete in military aptitude with the veteran of seven of eight campaigns; else is the judgement of Hannibal, Wellington, Cæsar and Napoleon. inferior to that of Mr. Trevelyan. Moreover the old soldiers of the Landwehr must have become somewhat rusty from long return to civilian life.

No effort has ever been made by the State in this country to form a body of officers such as the one I have mentioned. During my own military service, extending over a very considerable period, I do not think I have met a dozen officers who had received, or cared to acquire, a complete scientific military education. The body generally were well acquainted with regi. mental duty, and up in barrack-yard manoeuvres, but beyond that they did not pretend.* They were a gallant, hearty and gentle* As I have said the officers were well acquainted with ordinary battalion drill in