in Austria and Prussia, and also in France until the introduction of the Napoleon 12-pounder shell-gun, a short time before the Crimean war; our position batteries have usually been gun or howitzer batteries; the Belgians, Prussians, and Russians, had both howitzer and gun batteries. The reasons for uniting guns and howitzers in the same battery were, that such a battery is independent as far as possible, and adapted to all kinds of ground and every circumstance of combat; there are however serious objections, viz., that the effective range of the howitzer and gun differing greatly, as also the objects for which their respective projectiles, common sheli and solid shot, are used, the fire of the gun may under many circumstances produce great effect when that of the howitzer is nearly useless, and vice versa, so that one nature of the piece must be sacrificed for the other; also that the equipment of a mixed battery is very complicated. Since the general adaption of rifled field-guns, the principle of the Napoleon 12-pounder (canon-obusier) field-batteries has been followed; batteries have consisted of pieces of one calibre and therefore of the same power, the equipment and service being also thus simplified."

The armaments of our different service batteries in December, 1870, were as follows:

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"As before stated, a muzzle-loading rifled 16-pounder will probably be shortly introduced as a heavy field-battery gun. Most of the Continental Powers have a few heavy field-batteries attached to their reserve artillery? they are merely light positionguns, equipped and horsed like other field-batteries, and therefore possessing sufficient mobility to accompany an army in its operations. Experience has shewn the superiority of heavy over light armaments, in the field, but it may be as well to point out here that there are two necessary elements to be considered in deciding upon the armaments of batteries, viz., lowness of trajectory, and shell-power, the first dependant upon a large proportional charge* and small calibre, and the second upon large calibre, and consequent great capacity of shell.

"The first has been secured in the 9-pounder gun for India, and is due to the high charge (one-fifth of shell) with which it is fired. Foreign rifled guns fire charges of one-seventh to oneeleventh, and our breech-loading rifled guns one-eighth ; but in *For long ranges; for very short ranges, large calibre give highest velocity. U. S. MAG. No. 508, MARCH, 1871.

BB

the muzzle-loading rifled 16-pounder, both elements will be combined so as to produce a very formidable gun. Flatness of trajectory alone will not render a gun formidable at the present day, owing to the increased accuracy and rapidity of fire of both small-arms and ordnance; troops will often shelter themselves as much as possible by either natural or artificial cover, from whence they could not be dislodged but by common shell fired in some cases with low charges."

English horse artillery and field batteries take into action on the gun-carriages and battery waggons 124 rounds per gun in the following proportions:

Besides these are three reserves: the first of 90 rounds per waggon, carried in six waggons attached to each field battery, and five to each battery of horse artillery; 40 rounds per gun, as a second reserve, carried by what is called the ammunition reserve; and 346 rounds per gun in charge of the Store department within two days' march of the army.

Speaking of the new machine guns, or mitrailleurs, Colonel Owen observes that they have been employed by the French, latterly in batteries of 10 guns, with unquestionably very destructive effects. It must however be remembered in comparing them with ordnance, that these weapons cannot throw large shells; they are not effective on material; nor are they of use against troops posted behind cover, either natural or artificial. Three sizes of these guns are made:

1. The largest having six barrels of 1 inch calibre, throwing lead bullets of lb. weight.

2. Ten barrels, calibre 75 inch, lead bullets of 4 oz.

3. Ten barrels, calibre to suit the small-arm cartridges of different governments.

For our own service the calibre will probably be of the MartiniHenry rifle, 45 inch; the feeding cases will contain 380 bullets, which will be discharged in one minute.

These weapons, it is added, are most formidable in the defence of flanks, bridges, streets, breaches, or open ground; one great advantage being that they do not recoil, and therefore when the range is once obtained, little alteration is required in laying.

Touching the tactics of field artillery, Colonel Owen remarks, "Continental and American wars have recently shown that neither infantry nor cavalry are of less importance than formerly; but both French and Prussians in the struggle now raging, attribute the unprecedented successes of the latter mainly to the skilful and determined employment of a numerous and thoroughly

efficient artillery which has, whenever practicable, been employed in masses. At Wörth sixty guns were massed at Gunstett to cover an overwhelming attack on McMahon; at Sedan ninety guns of the 11th Corps were massed, also those of the Guards."

These artillery masses must not be confused with what Taubert calls an agglomeration of pieces destitute of mobility, such as was employed before the formation of light or field artillery, and which may still be used in the defence of positions. Artillery masses of the present day should combine great mobility with powerful fire, which may be concentrated upon some definite point of the enemy's line to be broken through strong forces of cavalry and infantry being ready to complete what has been effected by an overwhelming fire. The strongest objections to their employment is afforded by the great extent of ground required for large masses at full intervals. Taubert holds that two batteries should be the minimum and six the maximum of an artillery mass, and that if a still more numerous artillery is available, it should be organized into separate masses under the orders of independent commanders.

A variety of examples of successful modes of handling field artillery in action are given for the guidance of officers under the various circumstances which may arise on service.

The chapters upon siege artillery, and artillery for garrison and coast defence also are replete with interesting matter. We may observe that Colonel Owen, like every other artillery officer of experience, whilst he acknowledges the importance of field artillery, emphatically condemns the popular notion that any deficiency in garrison artillery can be supplied by militia or volunteer troops. "It is," he says, "hardly necessary to point out that, for garrison service a far greater knowledge of gunnery and stores is required than for field service; and that although valuable assistance may be given by reserve forces, a strong body of thoroughly trained gunners, commanded by well-instructed officers is absolutely needed to deal effectively with the complicated material now used, not only in garrisons and batteries, but in sieges-operations in which the British Army is specially liable to be engaged."

* At Malplaquet, Marlborough employed forty pieces in this manner in advance of his centre; and the mobility attained by his opponent's artillery is proved by the small numbers captured in the entrenchments, although they kept up their fire to the moment of the assault.

A FEW WORDS ON FRANCE AND GERMANY,
RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN QUESTION.

BY AN EX-DIPLOMATIST.

At a moment of so much excitement as the present, when events of the deepest interest to the whole of Europe are rapidly succeeding each other, it is not surprising that in a great commercial peace-loving country like England, there should be found a large party maintaining the opinion that the world was again about to be visited by that curse of humanity-the lust of war and conquest. How was it possible, they argued, that a people, who by force of arms had gained for themselves the highest place among the great military powers of the world, could settle down as quiet citizens, and be content to earn their daily bread by the work of their hands. No; nothing could be more certain than that before six months had passed over we should find ourselves engaged in a war of life and death with those terrible warriors of Germany, and perhaps England herself invaded. But so it is and has ever been, our alarmists, let what will happen, must have their bête noir. Previous to the present war, France was the object of their fear, she had only to add an ironclad ship to her navy, or enrol in her army a few thousand conscripts, when it was loudly proclaimed by a hundred voices and a hundred pens, that England was about to be invaded by her old enemy the Gaul, and now that poor France is crippled for many a long day to come, the whole of their indignant animadversions are hurled against the Germans yet of all the great Powers in Europe, Germany is the only one whose interests at home, or abroad, could not by any possibility clash with ours, nor is there any other from her position and the character of her inhabitants, that a far seeing statesman, in the event of a war, would not at once select as a faithful and effective ally, for he could then avail himself of the services of a powerful army, and an equally powerful navy.

It is true, in a free country like England, where every man, of whatever class or calling in life, is at full liberty to express his unbiassed convictions, we are certain never to want for supporters of this or that opinion, however absurd it may be. But when we see men of education, men of a superior walk in life re-echo the cry of the alarmists, we can only say that they ought to remember it was France and not Germany that sent an unprovoked challenge. France and not Germany that long threatened, long desired an accession of territory. If there is any doubt about this we have only to consult the entire press of the country, the almost unanimous vote of the Corps Législatif, to say nothing of

the frantic cries of "au Rhin! au Rhin!" which were at that time echoed and re-echoed thoughout the length and breadth of France. In short, everybody in France and out of France knew that the stake about to be played for was the long coveted left bank of the Rhine, and its territory of four millions of inhabitants. In this at least there was no concealment, and may be regarded as the bona fide object of a struggle which was only to terminate in the event of victory with the dismemberment of Prussia, and the prevention of the incipient reunion of all Germany. If we turn to the Germans, we shall find them equally explicit in the expression of their opinions, and although their rulers were more reticent, the entire press of the country openly declared that as the French had forced them into a war, not of their seeking, the guerdon they would have to pay to Germany, in the event of success, would be the cession of the old German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. In this view of the case we cannot compare the war that ensued to anything else than a struggle between two prize fighters, which was to be carried on until one or the other found himself unable to continue the combat any longer.

Without any especial partiality for either one or the other of the combatants, it is almost a repetition to say that the whole policy of France since the peace of 1815, had for its object territorial aggrandisement. No matter who might be the ruler, whether a Bonaparte or a Bourbon, the end and aim was the same, and they knew with such a people as they had to govern, that success in this was the only chance they had of prolonging the continuance of their dynasty. For this purpose Charles X effected the conquest of Algiers. With the same intent Louis Phillipe managed to separate Belgium from Holland, feeling assured that after the lapse of a few years it would only require a little intrigue, and a few well directed bribes to accomplish its annexation to the Grande Nation. It was the same greed for territorial aggrandisement, accompanied with dynastic views, that induced Louis Napoleon to declare war against Austria in 1860, and to remain a passive spectator of the struggle between the latter power and Prussia in 1866. In the one the prize bargained for was Savoy and Nice, and in the other the promise, or something to that effect, of the left bank of the Rhine as a boundary. In a word, we might fill a volume were we to record the numerous intrigues carried on by the French Government and its agents, even during our own time, the object of all being how or by what means they could acquire some portion, be it ever so small, of their neighbour's territory, how or by what means they could prevent the progress of every country lying on their frontier, whose future they would not permit of having any higher aim than that of playing the satellite around a luminary that would admit of no equal, much less a rival within its own particular sphere of action.