I have told you before of the hard usage that the Bavarians were experiencing between our forces on the one side, and their Prussian taskmasters on the other. Four months of these combined causes have pretty well used them up, so that their discontent is no longer formidable. They entered on the campaign more than 30,000 strong, and in fighting capacity they are at least the equals of the North Germans, and their General, Von der Tann is an experienced officer; so that it is not their own fault that they have suffered so fearfully. Those of them who are prisoners among us declare with one voice that they have always been wantonly pushed forward, and have never received the timely succour that was afforded to other corps. The consequence is, that the 30,000 is reduced to 3,000, and the Bavarian contingent will gain no more victories, though a few of them may still be kept in the field as the scapegoats of the rest, upon whom the odium of any particularly atrocions act can be cast, as has been systematically done hitherto. The prisoners complain bitterly of this, and any of them who may eventually return to Germany will do more to spread distrust and hatred of Count Bismarck than anything that the Ultramontanes could ever accomplish.

The removal of the government here has certainly been a very wise step, even though the personal wishes of M. Gambetta may have been the main cause. Supplies of every kind are ample, with all the untouched South before us, and, though a seaport, no fear of a visit from the German navy. In all probability a swift and direct steam communication will be at once established not only with England (say Falmouth or Dartmouth), but also with our western sea-board. You may remember what the late Admiral Napier did with a steamer or two on the Syrian coast, carrying bodies of troops from one place to another, say 100 miles in a single night, and we shall do the same, without any possibility of interruption from the enemy, who, if they venture near the coast, will be liable at any time to attacks from troops of whose very existence their Uhlans can give them no information.

I see the English papers are all pretty well agreed that the sorties from Paris of the last days of November and the beginning of this month have done a very great deal of damage to the besieging force; but they are hardly so candid as to the efforts of the Army of the Loire. Yet these, though always ending in defeats according to the Prussians, will be found not inferior in importance. In some cases, no doubt we lose more men than the enemy, though I warn you not to believe all "our own correspondents" wonderful tales about our losses, which put me in mind of the terrific slaughter, on paper, of the American War, when every fighting man on both sides was killed three times over. But we can spare more men than the Germans, and renew the fight again and again till it is won,

and yet at the end not have near so many widows and orphans on our hands as their wretched system of bringing forward married men without necessity entails on them. In good truth, the hurling of a whole nation on to the battle-field is a barbarism worthy only Jenghis Khan, and the Prussian mode of making war has converted what might have been an honourable contest into a war of extermination, and now we shall see who can play the terrible game out the longest. Horrible as it is to have to say it, a spirit has been aroused in France that will retaliate all we now suffer, with interest, and we shall see some day whether Berlin can make as stout a defence as Paris. You will remember that soon after the war began, the German and English papers were filled with accounts of the superhuman tenderness of the Germans towards their captives. We never believed the stories, and now we know their absolute falsehood, not only from the accounts of escaped prisoners, which of course are not to be taken as literally exact, but from the avowal of the Prussian Government that the prisoners are to be vigilantly guarded by veteran battalions specially raised for the service, which could hardly be necessary if our men had such a very pleasant time of it. No doubt 300,000 prisoners are troublesome to manage, but we look on the rumour in the German papers that they are known to be combining for an attempt to escape, as a base, lying excuse for imposing fresh severities on them. But the Germans must remember that we have some thousands of their men prisoners, and that anything too much removed from the ordinary treatment will be retaliated, though we scorn to spread lies about their behaviour.

I see that Prussia is offering herself to the world in the very novel character of a peacemaker in the Treaty of Paris affair. What a pity that she should discredit her amiable intentions, by making, just at the same time, a fierce attack on poor little Luxembourg, which reads very like the newest version of the old fable of the Wolf and the Lamb. She gives thus an idea of what a quiet, unaggressive Power Prussia, calling herself United Germany, will be likely to be.

Bordeaux I find far better supplied with newspapers than Tours was, and consequently there is no occasion to confine one's attention entirely te France, particularly as her affairs are now mending. Looking to Italy, I see the old "non possumus" of the Papacy apparently as formidable as ever. The Pope, it is true, is, pro tem. reduced to "the Vatican," though whether with or without "the Garden" that was to accompany it is neither certain, nor very material. But what is both certain and material is, that the question is as far off a solution as ever. The Italian Government keeps putting off the day of Victor Emmanuel's entry of Rome, and at the same time makes offers to the Pope, the very liberality of which provokes the suspicion that they are

never intended to be kept, if accepted. But the Pope and his advisers know too well the strength of their position to think of accepting them; they wisely prefer to rely on the Peter's pence of half the civilized world, in preference to the promises, or oaths, or any other obligations of a Government that is already on the verge of bankruptcy, and which has shewn a bright example to the Russian and Prussian Cabinets of what waste paper the most solemn treaties become when "expediency" condemns them. Now we know, that the deficit of the Italian budget is fearful already, and is it to be supposed that it would be found "expedient" to continue for any length of time such an extra burden as the proposed "retiring pension" to the Pope? And it is also to be considered that a new demand on the Italian finances may arise, from the grand prize of the Crown of Spain just drawn by Prince Amadeus. The debate, last month, in the Cortes was as tumultuous as any that ever occurred in the old National Convention of France, and the decision that it at last came to, in favour of the young Italian, has been, I see, already challenged as illegal, not without open intimations of the fate of Maximilian. It is certain that the Prince will only be received by a certain clique, and if the various parties can only have the wisdom to follow the example here of coalescing against the foreigner, his reign may come to an end almost as soon as it has begun. Even Italy could hardly suffer this without an attempt at an avenging expedition," which would cost money; and hence she has no superfluous cash to force on the Pope whether he will take it or no.

The famous Russian note is, it seems, to be the subject of a Conference in London early in the new year, and little as Prussia may like it, the French Government is invited to take a part. Judging from history, I greatly doubt the efficacy of Conferences to prevent the peace being broken; on the contrary, they have often heralded in a war, and in all probability will do so again. Some of your English papers, I see, are going rather extensively into the statistics of the military strength of the three Powers more immediately concerned in the Eastern Question, Russia, Turkey and Austria, and they seem to prove, to their own satisfaction at least, that the two latter are more powerful, and the first far less so, than is generally supposed. I believe, as I said some time ago, that Turkey is "the sick man" no longer -at least, he is braced up for the present, but as to the couleur de rose picture of Austria, I have very serious doubts. She suffered so severely in the Seven Weeks' War, that I imagine she must have peace at any price. And then as to Russia, the miserable failure of the attempt to carry out the Cobden gasconade, of "crumpling up the empire of the Czar like a sheet of paper," ought to make men look very doubtingly at stories of her weakness. It is not likely that any newspaper writer can

find out how many of her " 618,000 men" are veritable flesh and blood, and how many exist only on paper, and it is decidedly unpleasant to find out your mistake on the field. Then it is also to be considered, that Russia had only 400 miles of railway at the time of the Crimean war, and now she has 7000 miles, all, as may be seen by a glance at the map, planned rather for military and strategic, than commercial purposes; and 2000 miles more, which are now in hand, are all of the same character, forming often duplicate lines, which would be most useful in war, but a mere waste of money, if only viewed commercially. Prussia is carrying on her war in the hope of making France pay the bill, and you may depend on it, Russia looks to be repaid for her railways by Turkey, and perhaps India, at the first convenient season; and that either the meeting, or the abandonment of the proposed Conference may give her sooner than your "economical Liberal Government" is willing to allow. In the meantime, Russia goes quietly on in the East, adding a province here and a province there, and coming nearer and nearer to the Caubul that you went to war about some thirty years ago. Their last acquisition, that I have heard of, was a tract to the south of Samarkand, called Shehr-i-Seetz, an independent Khanate, and a very fertile tract of country. The proceeding was quite à la Russe. A strong fort was built on the Khan's land, without permission either asked or given; the Khan was unwise enough to remonstrate, on which his capital was stormed on August 14, the rest of the country submitted without a blow, and the whole was turned over to the King of Bokhara, who is to hold it along with his own States as long as it seems good to the Russians to keep their puppet on the throne, which it is supposed will not be long.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR,

NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

That the fortunes of France are improving is by this time abundantly evident to most people; but if proof should still be wanting by any one, it will be found in the wonderfully changed tone of a large part of the English Press. Only a few weeks ago, its inquiry was, "What has France left to fight for ?-granted that she hates her German masters, still her masters they are U. S. MAG No. 506, JAN., 1871.

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and it is a struggle against Fate to attempt to hold out." Since that time, a crop of armed men has sprung out of the ground, the mythical Army of the Loire has fought a dozen battles, and the sorties that were never to take place from Paris have actually occurred whilst the bombardment that was so long delayed by the "humane scruples" of King William, has not occurred, for the attempt on Fort Avron is merely pour passer le temps. Indeed, it is owned now that it cannot occur, for the simple reason that Germany cannot produce guns that would not infallibly be silenced by the French forts. On the other hand, these forts have been so strengthened, and under their shelter new works have been pushed so forward, that it has become very possible the besiegers may in turn find themselves besieged, or at least obliged to fix their Royal Head-Quarters somewhat further off than Versailles.

The simple truth is, that the prolonged resistance of Paris has deranged all the calculations of Count Bismarck and Count Moltke, and they find themselves committed to a course in which the chances of success become fainter every day-with Bazeilles to answer for, if they fail. Until the perpetration of that atrocity, there was nothing to make the war different from any other; but now how changed the feeling! Manteuffel may roam about in the north, and extract a few millions of francs from rich towns, but he evidently does not attempt to hold one of them; the Duke of Mecklenburg may wander between the Loire and the Eure, and after fighting a battle a day, come back to the spot whence he started a month ago; and the "Red Prince" (a name given by "Specials," who seem to consider William Rufus as the model of their extra-civilized hero,) may march and countermarch, like the famous Major Sturgeon, "from Acton to Ealing, and from Ealing to Acton;" but the fact remains patent to all, that each one holds himself ready, at a moment, to quit his so-called conquests, and hasten to the assistance of the force around Paris.

Here we have the reason for the sudden exhibition of much exbellent moralizing by the Press. Whilst the Prussians were carried on by the high tide of success, nothing could be more uncompromising than the support that they received from the journals in question, but now they begin to be lectured as to the dangers that flow from immoderate ambition, and both they and the French are treated to homilies on the beauties of peace and