probation of the Diet of the Empire. In this affembly, every SECT. III. fovereign Prince and State of the Germanick body had a right to

be present, to deliberate, and to vote. The decrees or Receffes of the Diet were the laws of the Empire, which the Emperor was bound to ratify and enforce.

Peculiarities

in the nature

of this affo

ciation.

UNDER this afpect the conftitution of the Empire appears a regular confederacy, fimilar to the Achæan league in ancient Greece, or to that of the United Provinces and of the Swifs cantons in modern times. But if viewed in another light, ftriking peculiarities in its political state present themselves. The Germanick body was not formed by the union of members altogether distinct and independant. All the Princes and States joined in this affociation, were originally subject to the Emperors, and acknowledged them as fovereigns. Befides this, they originally held their lands as Imperial fiefs, and in confequence of this tenure owed the Emperors all thofe fervices which feudal vaffals are bound to perform to their liege lord. But though this political fubjection was entirely at an end, and the influence of the feudal relation much diminished, the ancient forms and inftitutions introduced when the Emperors governed Germany with authority, not inferior to that which the other monarchs of Europe poffeffed, ftill remained. Thus an oppofition was established between the genius of the government, and the forms of administration in the German Empire. The former confidered the Emperor only as the head of a confederacy, the members of which, by their voluntary choice, have raised him to that dignity; the latter feemed to imply, that he is really invested with fovereign power. By this circumftance, fuch principles of The defects hoftility and discord were interwoven in the frame of the Ger-itution of the Empire manick

in the conti.

SECT. III. manick body, as affected each of its members, rendering their interior union incomplete, and their external efforts feeble and irregular. The effects of this vice or diforder inherent in the conftitution of the Empire are fo confiderable, that, without attending to them, it is impoffible to comprehend many transactions in the reign of Charles V. or to form just ideas concerning the genius of the German government,

Arifing from the limited

power of the Emperors.

any

THE Emperors of Germany, at the beginning of the fixteenth century, were distinguished by the most pompous titles, and by fuch enfigns of dignity as intimated their authority to be fuperior to that of all other monarchs. The greatest Princes of the Empire attended and ferved them on fome occafions, as the officers of their houfhold. They exercised prerogatives which no other fovereign ever claimed. They retained pretenfions to all the extensive powers which their predeceffors had enjoyed in former age. But at the fame time, inftead of poffeffing that ample domain which had belonged to the ancient Emperors of Germany, and which ftretched from Bafil to Cologne, along both banks of the Rhine", they were ftript of all territorial property, and had not a fingle city, a fingle castle, a single foot of land, that pertained to them as heads of the Empire. As their domain was alienated, their ftated revenues reduced almost to nothing; and the extraordinary aids which on a few occafions they obtained, were granted fparingly, and paid with reluctance. The Princes and States of the Empire, though they feemed to recognize the Imperial authority, were fubjects only in name, each of them poffeffing a compleat municipal jurifdiction within the precincts of his own territo

ries.

Pfeffel. Abrege, &c. p. 241.

were

FROM

titles and pre

FROM this ill-compacted frame of government, effects that SECT. III. were unavoidable refulted. The Emperors, dazzled with the From the nasplendour of their titles, and the exterior figns of vaft authority, ture of their were apt to imagine themselves to be the real fovereigns of Ger- tenfions. many, and were led to aim continually at recovering the exercife of those powers and prerogatives which the forms of the conftitution seemed to vest in them, and which their predeceffors Charlemagne and the Otho's had actually enjoyed. The Princes and States, aware of the nature as well as extent of their pretenfions, were perpetually on their guard, in order to watch all the motions of the Imperial court, and to circumfcribe its power within limits ftill more narrow. The Emperors, in fupport of their claims, appealed to ancient forms and inftitutions, which the States held to be obfolete. The States founded their rights on recent practice and modern privileges, which the Emperors confidered as ufurpations.

manner in

which they

were elected.

THIS jealousy of the Imperial authority, together with the oppo- From the fition between it and the rights of the States, increased confiderably from the time that the Emperors were elected, not by the collective body of German nobles, but by a few Princes of chief dignity. During a long period, all the members of the Germanick body affembled, and made choice of the person whom they appointed to be their head. But amidst the violence and anarchy, which prevailed for several centuries in the Empire, seven Princes who poffeffed the most extenfive territories, and who had obtained a hereditary title to the great offices of the State, acquired the exclusive privilege of nominating the Emperor. This right was confirmed to them by the Golden Bull; the mode of exercifing it was ascertained, and they were dignified with the appellation of Electors. The nobility and free-cities being thus

ftripped

SECT. II. ftripped of a privilege which they had once enjoyed, were lefs connected with a Prince, towards whofe elevation they had not contributed by their fuffrages, and came to be more apprehenfive of his authority. The Electors, by their extenfive power, and the diftinguishing privileges which they poffeffed, became formidable to the Emperors, with whom they were placed almost on a level in several acts of jurisdiction. Thus the introduction of the Electoral college into the Empire, and the authority which it acquired, inftead of diminishing, contributed to ftrengthen the principles of hoftility and difcord in the Germanick conftitution.

From the dif

ferent forms

of government efla

blifhed in the

States which

compofed the Germanick body.

THESE were further augmented by the various and repugnant forms of civil policy in the feveral States which compofed the Germanick body. It is no eafy matter to render the union of independant States perfect and entire, even when the genius and forms of their respective governments happen to be altogether fimilar. But in the German Empire, which was a confederacy of Princes, of Ecclefiafticks, and of free-cities, it was impoffible that they could incorporate thoroughly. The free-cities were small republicks, in which the maxims and spirit peculiar to that species of government prevailed. The Princes and nobles to whom fupreme jurifdiction belonged, poffeffed a fort of monarchical within their own territories, and the forms of power their interior administration nearly resembled those of the great feudal kingdoms. The interefts, the ideas, the objects of States fo differently conftituted, cannot be the fame. Nor could their common deliberations be carried on with the fame spirit, while the love of liberty and attention to commerce were the reigning principles in the cities; together with the defire of power and ardour for

military

military glory, were the governing paffions of the Princes and SECT. III. nobility.

From the op

pofition be tween the fe

cular and ec

THE fecular and ecclefiaftical members of the Empire were as little fitted for union as the free-cities and the nobility. Vaft territories were annexed to feveral of the German bishopricks clefiaftical and abbeys, and the dignified ecclefiafticks held fome of the members. highest offices in the Empire by hereditary right. The younger fons of noblemen of the second order, who had devoted themfelves to the church, were commonly promoted to these stations of eminence and power; and it was no small mortification to the Princes and great nobility to see persons raised from an inferior rank to the fame level with themselves, or even exalted to fuperior dignity. The education of these churchmen, the genius of their profeffion, and their connection with the court of Rome, rendered their character as well as intereft different from those of the other members of the Germanick body, with whom they were called to act in concert. Thus another source of jealousy and variance was opened, which ought not to be overlooked when we are searching into the nature of the German conftitution.

From the fribution of

unequal di

wealth and power among

To all these causes of diffention may be added one more, arifing from the unequal diftribution of power and wealth among the States of the Empire. The electors, and other nobles of the highest rank, not only poffeffed fovereign jurifdiction, but the members. governed fuch extensive, populous, and rich countries, as rendered them great Princes. Many of the other members, though they enjoyed all the rights of fovereignty, ruled over fuch petty domains, that their real power bore no proportion to this high prerogative. A well-compacted and vigorous confederacy could

VOL. I.

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not