Its effects were no less considerable than its fuccefs had been SECT. II. aftonishing. The Italians, unable to refift the impression of the enemy which broke in upon them, permitted him to hold on his courfe undisturbed. They quickly perceived that no fingle power, which they could rouze to action, was an equal match for a monarch, who ruled over fuch extensive territories, and was at the head of fuch a martial people; but that a confede-racy might accomplish what the feparate members of it durft not attempt. To this expedient, the only one that remained to deliver or to preserve them from the yoke, they had recourfe.. While Charles inconfiderately wafted his time at Naples, in festivals and triumphs on account of his paft fucceffes, or was fondly dreaming of future conquefts in the East, to the empire of which he now afpired, they formed against him a powerful combination of almost all the Italian ftates, fupported by the Emperor Maximilian, and Ferdinand King of Aragon. The union of so many powers, who fufpended or forgot all their particular animofities, that they might act with concert against an enemy who had become formidable to them all, awakened Charles from his thoughtless fecurity. He faw now no profpect of fafety but in returning to France. An army of thirty thousand men, affembled by the allies, was ready to obstruct his. march; and though the French, with a daring courage, which more than counterbalanced their inferiority in number, broke through that great body, and gained a victory, which opened to their monarch a fafe paffage into his own territories, he was ftripped of all his conquefts in Italy in as fhort a time as it had coft him to acquire them; and the political fyftem in that country resumed the fame appearance as before his invafion. THE SECT. II. This becomes the great ob. ject of policy, firft in Italy, and then in · Europe. The wars in Italy render standing ar THE fudden and decifive effect of this confederacy feems to have inftructed the Princes and statesmen of Italy as much, as the irruption of the French had disconcerted and alarmed them. They had now extended to the affairs of Europe, the maxims of that political science which had hitherto been applied only to regulate the operations of the petty states in their own country. They had discovered the method of preventing any monarch from rifing to fuch a degree of power, as was inconfiftent with the general liberty; and had manifefted the importance of attending to that great fecret in modern policy, the prefervation of a proper diftribution of power among all the members of the fyftem into which the ftates of Europe are formed. During all the wars of which Italy now became the theatre, and amidst the hoftile, operations which the imprudence of Louis XII. and the ambition of Ferdinand of Aragon, carried on in that country, with little interruption, from the close of the fifteenth century, to that period at which the fubfequent history commences, the maintaining a proper balance of power between the contending parties became the great object of attention to the statesmen of Italy. Nor was the idea confined to them. Self-prefervation taught other powers to adopt it. It grew to be fashionable and univerfal. From this æra we can trace the progrefs of that intercourse between nations, which has linked the powers of Europe so closely together; and can difcern the operations of that provident policy, which, during peace, guards against remote and contingent dangers; which, in war, hath prevented rapid and deftructive conquefts. THIS was not the only effect of the operations which the great powers of Europe carried on in Italy. They contributed to mies general. render such a change, as the French had begun to make in the 6 ftate ftate of their troops, general; and obliged all the Princes, who SECT. II. appeared on this new theatre of action, to establish the military force of their kingdoms on the fame footing with that of France. When the feat of war came to be remote from the countries which maintained the conteft, the fervice of the feudal vaffals ceased to be of any ufe; and the neceflity of employing troops regularly trained to arms, and kept in conftant pay, came at once to be evident. When Charles marched into Italy, his cavalry was entirely compofed of thofe companies of Gendarmes, embodied by Charles VII. and continued by Louis XI. his infantry consisted partly of Swiss, hired of the cantons, and partly of Gafcons, armed and difciplined after the Swiss model. To these Louis XII. added a body of Germans, well known in the wars of Italy by the name of the Black Bands. But neither of these monarchs made any account of the feudal militia, or ever had recourfe to that military force which they might have commanded, in virtue of the ancient inftitutions in their kingdom. Maximilian and Ferdinand, as foon as they began to act in Italy, employed the fame inftruments, and trusted the execution of their plans entirely to mercenary troops. Teach the Europeans the fuperior infantry in importance of THIS innovation in the military fyftem was quickly followed by another, which the cuftom of employing Swifs in the Italian wars, was the occafion of introducing. The arms and difcipline of the Swiss were different from thofe of other European na- war. tions. During their long and violent ftruggles in defence of their liberties against the houfe of Auftria, whofe armies, like those of other confiderable Princes, confifted chiefly of heavy armed cavalry, the Swifs found that their poverty, and the fmall number of gentlemen refiding in their country, at that time barren and uncultivated, put it out of their power to bring VOL. I. into SECT. II. into the field any body of horse capable of facing the enemy. Neceffity compelled them to place all their confidence in infantry; and in order to render it capable of withstanding the fhock of cavalry, they gave the foldiers breaft-plates and helmets as defenfive armour; together with long spears, halberts, and heavy fwords as weapons of offence. They formed them into large battalions, ranged in deep and close array, so as to prefent on every fide a formidable front to the enemy". The men at arms could make no impreffion on the solid strength of such a body. It repulfed the Austrians in all their attempts to conquer Swifferland. It broke the Burgundian Gendarmerie, which was scarce inferior to that of France, either in number or reputation: And when first called to act in Italy, it bore down by its irresistible force every enemy that attempted to oppofe it. These repeated proofs of the decifive effect of infantry, exhibited on fuch confpicuous. occafions, reftored that fervice to reputation, and gradually reestablished the opinion, which had been long exploded, of its fuperior importance in the operations of war. But the glory which the Swifs had acquired, having inspired them with such high ideas of their own prowefs and confequence, as rendered them mutinous and infolent, the Princes who employed them became weary of depending on the caprice of foreign mercenaries, and began to turn their attention towards the improvement of their national infantry. National in. fantry established in Germany. THE German powers having the command of men, whom nature has endowed with that fteady courage, and perfevering ftrength, which forms them to be foldiers, foon modelled their troops in fuch a manner, that they vied with the Swiss both in difcipline and valour. ▸ Machiavel Art of War, b. ii. chap. ii. p. 451. THE THE French monarchs, though more flowly, and with greater SECT. 11. difficulty, accustomed the impetuous fpirit of their people to fub- In France. ordination and discipline; and were at fuch pains to render their national infantry refpectable, that as early as the reign of Louis XII. feveral gentlemen of high rank had so far abandoned their ancient ideas, as to condefcend to enter into that service'. THE Spaniards, whofe fituation made it difficult to employ any In Spain. other than their national troops, in the fouthern parts of Italy, which was the chief scene of their operations in that country, not only adopted the Swifs difcipline, but improved upon it, by mingling a proper number of foldiers armed with heavy mufkets in their battalions; and thus formed that famous body of infantry, which, during a century and a half, was the admiration and terror of all Europe. The Italian ftates gradually diminished the number of their cavalry, and, in imitation of their more powerful neighbours, brought the ftrength of their armies to confift in foot foldiers. From this period the nations of Europe have carried on war with forces more adapted to every species of fervice, more capable of acting in every country, and better fitted both for making conquefts, and for preferving them. The Italian wars occafion an increase of the publick revenues in As their efforts in Italy led the people of Europe to thefe improvements in the art of war, they gave them likewise the first idea of the expence which accompanies great and continued operations, and accustomed them to the burden of thofe impofi- Europe. tions, which are neceffary for fupporting them. While the feudal policy fubfifted in full vigour, while armies were compofed of military vaffals called forth to attack fome neighbour i Brantome, tom. x. p. 18. Mem. de Fleuranges, 143. Q 2 ing |