Admiral LAND. The Maritime Commission and those of us in the War Shipping Administration are definitely opposed to Government operation, and we expect, easily and quickly, to turn back those ships that are owned by the industry to the industry; and we shall use our best endeavors to sell them part of the war-built fleet, so that they will be in a position immediately to take their places on the 21 to 30 routes, lines, and services that are approved by the Maritime Commission as well as those routes, and so forth, that do not require Commission approval.

That is very easy for me to say; it is going to be difficult to implement in the near future because of the war. I would think it pertinent to say here that the operating personnel of the American merchant marine will be pretty busy on the ships we own for anywhere from 6 months to 2 years after the fall of Japan. I will go one step further and state that Lord Leathers, head of the British Ministry of War Transport, says that it will take 3 years to get back on an even keel. When you consider the mandated areas and the occupied areas, with an indefinite number of troops and many civilians throughout the world who have been on the job for years, who want to be repatriated, who want to come home to live; when you consider U. N. R. R. A., the liberated areas, the rotation of troops, and other things of that general character, a very busy time is indicated for the merchant marines of the world, even after the fall of Japan.

It is a guess whether it will be 6 months or 3 years; but we have to guess, because we do not know whether we are going to have trusteeships or mandates or ownership; nor do we know how many troops we will have in the enemy territory or the territory we have captured. So it is an intangible problem.

But I think it is a safe assertion that we will not have in shipping the serious unemployment that will take place in shipbuilding and aviation building immediately after the cessation of hostilities. That will give us a chance to taper off gradually and, I hope, hold a proper American merchant marine for posterity.

Mr. LUDLOW. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Taber?

MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Mr. TABER. Admiral Land, there are two or three things here that I cannot quite understand. Maybe there is something the matter with me. But I am looking at charts 13 and 14. I am looking also at table C-1, page 185, of your justifications.

Now, on chart 13 it appears that in 1944 you recruited 25,000 experienced seamen. On chart 14 it appears that you trained 76,200. On table C-1 it appears that your requirements for additions to the maritime set-up were 92,860. That is the sum of 47,000 and 45,000 that appear on table

Mr. JOHNSON. The table on page 185 represents the calendar year, you see, whereas these charts are built on a fiscal year basis. That is the only discrepancy.

Mr. TABER. I see. Well, then, it should be 153,145 instead of 92,860; is that it?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir. The first 6 months of the fiscal year 1944 are not shown on the table C-1.

Mr. TABER. I see.

That is all right. Now, we will get into 1945.

Charts 13 and 14 are for the fiscal year?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. TABER. We will go into 1945. That shows estimated recruitments of 37,500. That is on chart 13.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. TABER. On chart 14 it shows the training of 96,440.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. TABER. In the fiscal year 1945, on the basis of table C-1, it shows 107,412. Now, there may be something the matter with me, but I just do not understand the way we reconcile them or whether we do or not. I just do not understand those figures. Can you tell us about them?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I can. The figures included on chart 14, as you will note, include up-grade training, which does not represent any men added to the fleet. Do you see the cross-hatched section of chart 14?

Admiral LAND. Those are men already in; we are merely grading them up.

Mr. TABER. For instance, the original, the primary, training would be in the neighborhood of 60,000?

Mr. JOHNSON. Fifty-one thousand. May I refer you, Mr. Taber, to page 187, which gives a comprehensive analysis of the training program for 1945 and the recruiting program for 1945; in other words a break-down of the 107,000?

Mr. TABER. That shows a total, over here, of 99,000.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the number to be trained; yes.
Mr. TABER. In 1945?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. TABER. The other place shows 96,400. That is not much difference. But the difference between those trained, if I read this chart 14 correctly--the number trained would seem to be about 60,000?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct; and that is shown, Mr. Taber, in the number to be supplied from basic courses, on page 187: 51,712 additional men to be supplied from basic courses.

Mr. TABER. That is only a little less than 10,000. Then, the number to be recruited is 37,500, according to chart 13.

Mr. JOHNSON. You will note that 37,020 is shown in the second column on page 187.

Mr. TABER. Well, that would mean that about five-eighths of those who were trained went into the service. Would that be what we could infer?

Mr. JOHNSON. They would be new men.

Mr. TABER. Is not this bloc here of 60,000, that appears on chart 14, new men?

Mr. JOHNSON. That figure corresponds to the total additional men to be supplied from training, 68,231, shown on page 187.

Mr. TABER. I just do not understand the figure of 37,000 that appears on chart 13. I do not understand what that means.

Mr. JOHNSON. That means direct recruitment by the R. M. O. recruitment organization, as shown in the second column of page 187. Mr. TABER. Are they separate from the other group? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; these are experienced men.

Admiral LAND. We train new men and recruit men who have had experience. The R. M. O. gets men with experience, and the training system takes them in new.

Mr. TABER. Does that mean reenlistments in the service? These people go out, I suppose, and enlist for a voyage?

Admiral LAND. Yes.

Mr. TABER. Then, after the voyage they would be rated as experienced; is that the idea?

Admiral LAND. Not necessarily on one voyage. They are required, in order to get a rating, to have varied experiences, starting with ordinary seaman or apprentices and working up until they get to be licensed officers. They have to take examinations just as is done in the military services. They can go all the way up from able seaman to master of a ship.

Mr. TABER. Do these charts, 13 and 14, have any relation to each other?

Admiral LAND. I do not think they have exact relationship because the tables are on a calendar-year basis, and the charts are on a fiscalyear basis, and they both can be explained.

Mr. TABER. One is on a fiscal-year basis, and the other on a calendar-year basis?

Admiral LAND. That is true. They have relationship, but they are not directly comparable unless you break them down and explain the details and then you get into difficulties right away on the up-grade training, when you try to match it up with recruitment and training, because in up-grading a man is already in the show.

Mr. TABER. I see. You have given up these tables as to the numbers of men in the service. I assume these figures are actual down as far, perhaps, as the 1st of March, or something like that? Might or would that be too far?

Admiral LAND. They are actual up to a certain date, but I have forgotten what that date is. After that date they are estimated. Mr. TABER. What date would that be, would you say? Mr. JOHNSON. These are actual, to January 1 of this year.

Mr. TABER. Your attrition seems to be on a basis of about 3,300 as of the last actual date per month. Does that mean largely the expiration of enlistments?

Admiral LAND. No, sir; that means probably men we have lost either through death, disability, hospitalization, rest homes, attrition. and just tired of the show.

Mr. TABER. How many of those do you get back later on?

Admiral LAND. Well, those that desert, and they are very few, we usually get back. Those who try to get more favorable employment in shore industry we get back after a certain amount of diligent search; those, of course, who are killed or wounded are gone.

Mr. TABER. What percentage would there be in that group?

Admiral LAND. Oh, I think we get, of those attritions, anywher from 30 to 50 percent back, if they are all added together in due course, because under present conditions we keep pretty good tab on them through the Immigration Service, the F. B. L. shipping pools, and the United States Employment Service.

Mr. TABER. They are not required to reenlist if their term is up" Admiral LAND. Oh, no; it is all voluntary.

Mr. TABER. The only way a man can be forced back is if he is a deserter; is that it?

Admiral LAND. Well, I do not know that he could be forced back even then. He can be punished. But the way we get some of them back is that we get the United States Employment Service and the draft boards on their backs, and then they either shoot or give up the gun; they are drafted or they come back to us.

SHIPS UNDER CHARTER HIRE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES

Mr. TABER. How many of the ships that you have had under charter hire from foreign sources do you still have? How many did you have under charter hire the first of this year?

Admiral LAND. I am not sure but I have a complete dissertation under the following headings:

"International shipping control"; "Charter agreements covering foreign-flag vessels chartered to the War Shipping Administration for employment in the war effort"; "Fleets chartered from foreign governments"; "Individual foreign-flag vessels chartered from their owners"; "Lend-lease arrangements covering transfer of vessels to the United Kingdom"; "Bareboat out, time-charter back' arrangements with China, Belgium, Greece, Poland, the Netherlands, and Norway"; and the total number of ships that have been loaned and allocated from United States flag to foreign flag without transfer of title. It is a long document, but it gives a fairly complete history. Mr. TABER. Have we a copy of that?

Admiral LAND. No, sir. I brought it up. It was asked for by a Representative in Congress; and we went to so much trouble to get complete data that I thought it was worth while to bring it up. I will be very happy to put it into the record, because it answers a great many questions that people ask, very intelligent questions.

Mr. TABER. Would it appear from that how many ships of different foreign registries were under charter in different ways to us? Admiral LAND. Yes. We have all that data.

Mr. TABER. Is that information in the regular justifications?
Admiral LAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is given on page 67 of the justifications. It is not in full list form, but summarized.

Admiral LAND. We gave to the Appropriations Committee handling the Maritime Commission appropriation the complete details with the amounts involved as to every country concerned.

I think this ought to go into the record, even though it is rather long. NOTE.-Insert will be found on p. 366.

Mr. TABER. What are the British ships that are under charter to you of one kind or another engaged in hauling? Are they largely engaged in hauling things to the British that we are sending over, or what?

Admiral LAND. They are engaged in all the activities of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. They would be engaged primarily in military requirements, or in protocol with liberated areas, or they may ultimately be engaged in U. N. R. R. A. business. They are all jointly controlled. Frankly, those under the British flag, in London; those under the American flag, in Washington, and those

under United Nations flags distributed between London and Washington in various stages and conditions. They might have all of the activities from a straight military to a straight commercial, all of which has to be approved by the Policy and Allocation Committee of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. As you know, it is cont olled at home. Imports are controlled by the War Production Board; exports by the F. E. A.; with consultation of the State Department and the Food Administrator But the operation is all under control and all under a license system and a warrant system, and they might run the whole gamut, or they might run a specific one and be maintained and retained. A collier, for example, may be maintained in the coal trade, an ore boat in the ore trade; and if emergency required we would shift those to the wheat trade.

Mr. TABER. You have there a statement which you have indicated gives a considerable picture with reference to the foreign-owned ships and their operations?

Admiral LAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. TABER. Will you put that into the record, please?

Admiral LAND. Yes, sir.

You asked concerning transfers or charters of United States vessels to foreign governments under lend-lease. I made a rather full statement on the modus operandi of these arragnements before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 16, 1945, which is printed in the hearings on the recent legislation to extend the life of the LendLease Act. I have also supplied a long memorandum covering chartering arrangements of United States vessels to foreign governments under lend-lease and also the acquisition of foreign-flag vessels by the United States for employment in the war effort to the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries and to the Senate Committee on Commerce for their confidential use in connection wit their consideration of the Merchant Ship Sales Act. The material is as follows:

MEMORANDUM IN RESPECT OF CHARTERING ARRANGEMENTS COVERING THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN FLAG VESSELS BY THE WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE WAR EFFORT: THE TRANSFER ON A BAREBOA BASIS UNDER LEND-LEASE OF MERCHANT VESSELS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE MAKING AVAILABLE TO ALLIED GOVERNMENTS OF VESSELS ON "BAREBOAT OUT, TIME CHARTER BACK" BASIS FOR OPERATION BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT UNDER WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION CONTROL

1. INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CONTROL

While this heading appears to be outside the scope of this memorandum, we believe it would be not unwise to discuss at the outset the recent arrangements agreed upon by the principal maritime nations in respect of shipping control for the reason that these arrangements are often misunderstood as having some bearing on United States policy in respect of the transfer or sale of vessels. In August 1944, the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway. Poland, United Kingdom and the United States declared in an "Agreement Principles" that they accept as a common responsibility the provision of shipping for all military tasks necessary for and arising out of the completion of the war in Europe and the Far East and for the supplying of all liberated areas as well as the United Nations generally and territories under their control. This agreeme provided for the adjustment of existing machinery for control of ships' employ

1 Present shipping controls are exercised through the Combined Shipping Boards established by tr President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain on January 26, 1943. (See exhi3 : I, p. 341, Document 55A.)