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When blood itself is not available for surgical cases various blood substitutes have been developed. A method for purifying gelatin so as to use it in place of blood plasma has been worked out and some gelatin solution is now being produced. Work is still going on to try to develop still better blood substitutes than gelatin. Penicillin.

The study of penicillin, which was originally initiated in this country by the Committee on Medical Research, has been continued as the supply of the material has increased through the production program instituted as a result of the Committee on Medical Research research by the War Production Board has borne results. One of the most valuable extensions of knowledge of the use of this versatile drug to come out of the recent researches has been the demonstration that it is the most effective remedy for both gonorrhea and the early stages of syphilis. These diseases, which are of great concern to the Army and Navy, can now be cured in their initial stages by penicillin in a matter of a few days.

This is one of the many findings that has come out of the military medical studies which might make an important contribution to the country's health in peacetime. It is too early to know whether a permanent cure of syphilis is effected by penicillin, and studies are continuing to determine this fact as well as other matters relating to the proper application of the drug. However, the indications are that between the sulfa drugs and penicillin the venereal diseases could now be eradicated if these cures could be applied on a wide enough scale.

Intensive studies are being directed to the synthesis of penicillin under cooperative arrangements with research laboratories in universities and in industry Production of penicillin by synthesis not only holds promise of lower cost material, but may also lead to the discovery of analogous compounds of even greater usefulness than penicillin itself. Tuberculosis.

Tuberculosis is another important disease in the Army which has been studied by the Division of Medicine of the Committee on Medical Research. Extensive studies have been initiated to determine the conditions which lead to development of tuberculosis among soldiers so that these can be reduced or eliminated as much as possible. Work is also going on upon the treatment of tuberculosis with the newer drugs, including penicillin and some of the synthetic curative agents. This work is to be pressed aggressively during the next year.

Dr. Bush. There are one or two points in the statement that we may want to get clearance on before it is published.

Mr. CANNON. You will have that opportunity when the transcript comes to you.

Dr. Bush. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have here a second document, which is a secret document, which gives the entire story of our performances during the past year and goes into all the matters that are confidential and secret.

Mr. WOODRUM. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Dr. Bush retain that in his custody.

Mr. Cannon. Without objection, it will remain in Dr. Bush's custody subject to request by the committee.

REDUCTION IN AMOUNT OF ORIGINAL ESTIMATE FOR 1946

Dr. Bush. Now, on the estimates: The basis on which we have handled these estimates has been very strange this year, as you will note. We originally made the estimates as instructed on the assumption that the war would continue on both fronts until July 1, 1946, and *the original estimates which are still here in detail, were made on that basis.

Only recently we were instructed to make the changes in that to adapt it to the one-front war.

We made the best rapid estimate possible, working on it here for about 2 weeks, and we have it available.

What we have done is to estimate what we think is probably going to occur in the progress of the war, and what we will be called upon to do. Now, that is a very difficult thing to do. Previously, when we have come before you with estimates, we have had one thing that was always a limitation, namely, the number of scientific men that we could put to work. There have been plenty of problems, and the limitation has been scientific manpower, and we have been able on that basis to estimate fairly accurately, but this estimate of what we ought to do when we are cutting back is much harder, and hence I plan to go into a little detail, if you will allow me, in telling you how we have gone at that; and I would say right now that we would not put the weight of these estimates that we would on our previous ones. If they are too low we will have to come back later and ask for more. If they are too high we just will not spend whatever you allocate to us. I would like to present it in that way and tell you what our thinking has been.

Mr. Ludlow. How much of a cut-back did you make, Doctor?

Mr. Cannon. It was cut back from $113,500,000 to $90,700,000 first. That was the original cut, and then there is this additional cut of $13.200,000 which brings it down to about $77,500,000, of which $65,000,000 is proposed for the N. D. R. C.

OPERATION POLICY OF COMMITTEE

Dr. Bush. As to our policy, this policy was definitely adopted this last fall. It was approved by President Roosevelt, and unless it is changed in some way, it is the policy that we propose to follow :

First, that we go ahead full speed until VE-day with no slackening of effort at any point until the final collapse of Germany.

Secondly, after that date that we continue at full speed any project that could be reasonably expected to come into actual use against Japan.

Third, that we would not do post-war research. All of the research that we do has post-war implications, of course, but we would not, as an organization, carry on a project which was on its face a post-war project. Now, consistent with that we would transfer to the services, at

appropriate times, any program which should continue in the peace in their estimation, whenever we could thus transfer it without loss of momentum. Finally that we would terminate everything that did not come into the category either for use against Japan or for transfer for permanent handling by the services, with, of course, final reports in every case, and with the opportunity to preserve the values already attained.

Now, that policy is the one that we have been working on as we made these estimates.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING ESTIMATES

There are a few considerations that affect these estimates that I think it is well to keep in mind. On weapons there is a lag between

research and development and application in the field. In peacetime it is as much as 5 years between research and application. Under war conditions we have crowded it back to a year, in some circumstances, but there is always a lag, so that research and development should be cut back ahead of many other war activities. It would be consistent for us to cease research and development before the end of the war if we could tell when the end of the war was coming.

Now, that is not true, however, of field activities, and on modifications of existing equipment it is not true. Those things can continue effectively right up until the last gun is fired, but research and development should go out first, and the other things should continue to the end.

POST-WAR MILITARY RESEARCH Now, on the post-war military research matter, we feel that post-war research is essential on military matters on a reasonable scale, which will ultimately be determined by Congress, in order to preserve the strength of this country, and not fall into the fallacy that we fell into between the wars of doing too little. There should be a smooth transition from war research to peacetime military research and we ought to have, for example, very full reports of everything that we do so that nothing will be lost during transition. No loss of momentum should be allowed on anything which should continue into the peace.

0. S. R. D. is a war agency, and it depends on the voluntary service of a large number of scientific men, and it ought to go out of existence at the

proper time and give way to whatever may be constructed for peacetime purposes. We have planned on that basis a transfer at some appropriate time to the Services or some agency specifically constructed for the purpose.

Mr. WOODRUM. You have such a committee, have you not, Doctor! What is the name of that committee?

Dr. Bush. The Research Board for National Security. Dr. Compton is chairman of it. It has already been set up at the request of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, by the National Academy of Sciences, and at the appropriate time will be ready to take over such part of this work as is appropriate for its handling. Some of the work that we are doing will undoubtedly be such that the Serv. ices themselves should take it over, several of the things that should be continued.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. What is the character of that committee?

Dr. Bush. That committee was set up at the request of the Secre tary of War and Navy, that request being made to the National Acad emy of Sciences, and it arose by reason of a report of the Wilson com mittee. The Wilson committee, with Mr. Charles E. Wilson as it chairman, studied this matter, and made two recommendations, on that this Board be set up primarily so that it would be available t carry on into the peace such things as ought to continue, so that ther would not be a hiatus, and, secondly, they recommended that the mat ter be rexamined when conditions indicate that this is desirable, s that legislation may set up a permanent body for that purpose eithe inside or outside of the Academy.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. What is the membership, it is scientific, and military and naval personnel ?

Dr. Bush. Dr. Compton had better answer that.

Dr. COMPTON. It has equal numbers of both, Mr. Wigglesworth, and the idea was to operate it as a partnership between civilian scientists and the military. It is composed of 10 naval officers of flag rank, 10 Army officers of general rank, and 20 civilians which constitute the board.

Then there is an executive committee of five, made up as follows: three civilians, one of whom is chairman, one Army and one Navy officer, each an officer who has responsibility for coordinating research in his service.

COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR MILITARY POLICY Mr. WOODRUM. The Committee on Post-War Military Policy, of which I am chairman, and which is composed of members of

the House Naval Affairs Committee, and the House Military Affairs Committee, and several other members of the House-at-large, has had rather exhaustive hearings on the subject of scientific research and development in the post-war period. Those hearings are available, and the committee will, in the next few days, make a report to the House, in which the committee concurs in the establishment of the National Research Board for National Security as set up under Executive order, pursuant to the recommendations of the Wilson board.

Dr. Bush. Set up, sir, I think, by simple request of the Secretaries.
Mr. WOODRUM. Set up by request of the joint Secretaries?
Dr. Bush. That is right.

Mr. WOODRUM. This report will further recommend the passage of appropriate legislation, which will enable the Congress to make direct appropriations to this board, just as it made direct appropriations to the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and anyone who may be interested in the subject will find in those hearings a very full statement by all of your gentlemen and others besides.

Dr. BUSH. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You may complete your statement, Doctor.

Dr. BUSH. That board is not at the present time operating. It is forming its organization, but it will be available to take over at the appropriate time the things within its compass which should continue into the peace, so that we have made our plans with the realization that such an organization will be present.

WAR WITH GERMANY FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT Now, in thinking of our plans, we have to recognize this: The war with Germany has been tough technically, and a very serious and dangerous war where we have been in competition with a highly qualified enemy from a technical and scientific standpoint. It has been a war where a great deal has depended upon scientific progress. I believe that history will show a very important thing, that the best way to fight a war, if it is going to be a highly scientific and technical war, is under a democratic form of government.

I feel quite convinced that history will show that Britain and the United States, with democratic forms of government, have done better in this race by and large than has Germany under her totalitarian set-up, because we have drawn on the great reservoir of scientific attainment in peacetimes, which was built up under free initiative, and during wartime we preserved the independence of our scientific groups just as fully as was consistent with bringing them to bear on the proper and important problems.

Mr. CANNON. The gentleman realizes that he is challenging an axiom which has been conceded practically for many years, that dietatorship produces the best leadership for war purposes?

Dr. Bush. In this field I intend to challenge it. I think it will be thoroughly demonstrated when the full story is told, that the democratic form of government is more efficient in fighting a scientific war, and I think we will prove it before we get through, when we make our full comparisons with Germany. My point here is that it has been a very serious race.

Now, we have been at it for 5 years, and some of the men that have been at it are getting tired, and it is not strange that they should, because it has been a very intense matter.

Now, we look forward to the collapse of Germany and the continuation of the war against Japan. The war against Japan has its elements of danger and seriousness.

SUICIDE BOMBERS

Certainly the threat of the suicide bombers is a really serious threat from scientific and technical standpoints, and there are others, but by and large the war against Japan differs, for the end result is not in doubt.

Therefore, we look upon our responsibility this way in connection with the war against Japan: We should certainly do everything that is needed, everything that can go into effective and actual use in the field against Japan, that will reduce casualties or that will shorten the war, but we do not feel that this organization, built up in the way that it is constructed as a temporary organization, should attempt to do more than that in view of the responsibilities of its individuals toward reconversion and the reeducation of returning veterans and other matters that need the attention of scientific men.

So, we have built this budget on the basis that we would do against Japan all of the things which, in our estimation, and those of the services, are of such a nature that they can have a real effect on the war, but we do not plan that this organization will do research that is of a post-war nature.

MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM

Now, there is one exception to this, the medical research program which is quite different, and it is different for a number of reasons.

For one thing, the lag is not present that is present on weapons between the development and the use. The medical result can normally go into use immediately, and also a great deal of our medical program today has to do with the health of returning veterans.

Our malaria program, for example, is under way with the realization that we have, perhaps, 750,000 men in the field who must be cured of malaria. Moreover, the medical research program is not too much of an effort for this country in peacetimes, sponsored by the Federal Government, and carried out under private auspices. It amounts to $7,000,000 a year.

Mr. TABER. No; it is a good deal more than that, Doctor.
Dr. BUSH. Our medical program!

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