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render an annual report in connection with all Government corporations. It is further provided that the audit shall be in accordance with the principles and procedures applicable to commercial corporate transactions.
In response to the request of your committee for elucidation on this point, I have informally discussed the matter with representatives of the General Accounting Office. Time has not been permitted for a formal decision. On the basis of the discussions indicated, it is our opinion that the appropriation language and the George bill are neither in duplication nor conflict. As to the General Accounting Office, the George Act relates only to a post-audit and factors pertinent thereto. The implications of the language in the appropriation bill before you are considerably broader and, I think, more important. The effect of the appropriation language is to repose in the General Accounting Office an accounting as well as an auditing control. The practical effect of this is to have the administrative accounts and procedures of the Smaller War Plants Corporation entirely consistent with the administrative fiscal practices of the rest of the Government service-certain large corporations being exceptions. Without the support of the appropriation language, it might be impossible for the fiscal administrative financial offices of the Corporation to resist pressure to adopt specialized account classificatons at variance with those generally used in the Government and to engage upon improper and undesirable intermingling of administrative and corporate transaction.
The administrative accounts of this Corporation have been built up for 3 consecutive years on the authority of the appropriation language which you have before you. Since our accounts are established and maintained under the provisions of General Accounting Office Regulations No. 100, which are of Government-wide application, we are able to develop interagency comparisons for budget purposes and to deal generally more effectively with administrative finance.
In summary, the provisions of the George bill would seem to extend auditing powers to the General Accounting Office in regard to transactions, whether corporate or administrative, to which audit access had been previously denied. The appropriation language in our bill has no direct effect upon such provision. Competent authority in the General Accounting Office concurs in the view that it would be a wise course to leave the appropriation language as stated.
Mr. MAVERICK. I just want to make here a 1-minute statement.
I want to thank you gentlemen for your patience and working as hard as you do on this, and I do not want to make any lecture on this but I hope you will consider the fact that we are going into an era that is probably going to be more dangerous from a domestic viewpoint than it has been for the past 4 years.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you.
MONDAY, APRIL 30, 1945.
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
STATEMENTS OF DR. VANNEVAR BUSH, DIRECTOR; DR. IRVIN STEWART, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND CLEVELAND NORCROSS, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; DR. E. L. MORELAND, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE; DR. A. N. RICHARDS, CHAIRMAN, AND DR. CHESTER S. KEEFER, MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL RESEARCH, AND DR. KARL T. COMPTON, CHIEF, OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
Mr. CANNON. Dr. Bush, we have had some very pleasing information from the Bureau of the Budget this morning. Your original budget was for $90,700,000, and we have a further estimate here this morning indicating a reduction by $13,200,000, which makes the net estimate to be considered $77,500,000.
In view of the fact that the budget before us was submitted on the basis of the amount of $90,700,000 will you submit a revised budget for the first page or two showing just where this reduction takes place?
Dr. Bush. I will be glad to do that. I think you will get the information, Mr. Chairman, as we take up the items in detail, showing how these figures have been arrived at. There has been considerable change in the language.
First, with your permission I would like to introduce to you Dr. A. N. Richards, chairman of our Committee on Medical Research; Dr. Chester S. Keefer, medical administrative officer of the Committee on Medical Research.
Mr. WOODRUM. Who has done such a grand job on penicillin.
Dr. Bush. Yes, he has done a very remarkable job, and let me say, gentlemen, that during its whole history the handling of our penicillin program was very difficult, particularly in apportioning the small amount that was available for experimental purposes. There were a great many people who have made requests who could not be supplied, but I never had a single final protest from them when the matter was explained.
Mr. WOODRUM. That is fine.
Dr. Bush. Dr. Karl T. Compton is chief of our Office of Field Service. Dr. Conant was not able to be here. Dean Moreland is executive officer of the National Defense Research Committee, Dr. Stewart is executive secretary of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.
SUBMITTED STATEMENT ON ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Mr. Chairman, I have a statement here for the record, which as usual, outlines the form of our organization. It also recites some of our accomplishments. It is devoted to things that have already been published in one way or another, and I would like to submit it
to you for the record, and I will not take the time to read it unless you wish me to do so.
Mr. CANNON. It will be included in the record at this point. (The statement referred to follows:)
SUBMITTED STATEMENT FOR HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS The Office of Scientific Research and Development, established by Executive Order No. 8807 dated June 28, 1941, is charged with the initiation and support of scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of warfare, and on medical problems affecting the national defense. It consists of the National Defense Research Committee which had been created on June 20, 1940, by an order of the Council of National Defense, and the Committee on Medical Research which was established by Executive Order No. 8807, and an Office of Field Service which was established October 15, 1943.
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE
The National Defense Research Committee was made responsible for the development of mechanisms and devices of warfare but it did not attempt to preempt this fild. Rather it sought to supplement the activities within the War and Navy Departments so as to insure an adequate over-all program and particularly to assume the responsibility for research and development work in those new fields which would require, in any case, the setting up of additional research facilities and organizations. In similar manner the Committee on Medical Research has taken the responsibility for doing those things which could not be done more effectively by the permanent establishments of the Army and the Navy. The Office of Field Service is charged with the responsibility of furnishing scientific and technical assistance to theater and higher echelon commanders of the Army and the Navy, particularly with a view to insuring the most effective use of weapons developed by the National Défense Research Committee.
The field of activity of the National Defense Research Committee is so broad and its problems are so varied that a large part of the responsibility for detailed planning and administration of research and development projects is assigned to 19 separate divisions and 2 panels. Each division or panel operates in a separate field, but through the central organization there is provision for coordination of activities where desirable, without at the same time losing the desired compartmentalization of secret and confidential information. This organization further simplifies liaison with the Army and the Navy. A very important responsibility of the administrative staff is to insure the smooth flow of information and exchange of ideas between the research and develop ment groups of the National Defense Research Committee and the Service personnel who will take the new information or equipment and use them against the enemy.
The personnel of the divisions and panels has been selected to insure a group which will be at the same time broad in range of experience and specialized enough to pass intelligently on problems in the assigned field of war research. of the total of 505 currently in the organization of National Defense Research Committee, about one-fourth are paid scientific employees. The rest serve without compensation, although many of them devote essentially full time to this war work.
Likewise the work of the Committee on Medical Research is handled by five divisions, divided in turn into sections. The total personnel is about 61, of which roughly one-fourth are paid scientific employees.
In addition there is a far larger number of scientists and engineers who are employees of universities and industrial organizations working on contracts with the Office of Scientific Research and Development.
It is quite natural that during the first years of the program which began with the creation of the National Defense Research Committee in 1940, the civilian scientists should work somewhat apart from the military organizations. They were at that time devoting principal attention to the study of possible new types of weapons, and to the building of a firm scientific foundation on which to develop new weapons of war. As their ideas and the basic information took shape, liaison with Army and Navy personnel became closer until today a large part of the program is of such character that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign the origin of many projects to the civilian group or the military group. The spirit has become one of getting the job done and letting the credit fall where it may.
It is sometimes asked what new weapons we have developed that the enemy does not have. Considerations of security prevent the release of such information, until the enemy have learned the answer through bitter experience the experience which becomes not only more bitter but more broadly based with each month of the war. Some day most, if not all, of the story can be told but already the main outlines can be sketched. Radar,
Public attention has often been called to radar as one of the outstanding new developments first used in this war. Radar is not a thing that we alone have, for the enemy has it. And it would not be revealing secrets to the enemy to say that our radar is better, by and large, than his radar.
Probably the first public announcement of the role of radar was made by the British when they acknowledged the debt they feel they owe to radar for the part it played in the Battle of Britain. There it was used to detect the approach, by night or by day, of enemy bombers so that fighters might be sent on the proper course to intercept them. In this way the effectiveness of each fighter was multiplied severalfold and it became possible for Britain's pitifully small Royal Air Force to hold the Luftwaffe at bay.
From our own country has come the outlines of the story of new automatie directors or computers which, combined with radar, send to antiaircraft guns the necessary information for their accurate control; from England have come stories of the effectiveness of these combinations shooting down buzz bombs. In some areas as many as three-quarters of the bombs approaching England were shot down before they reached their target.
There is reason to believe the Japanese counted, at the outset of the war, on having advantage over our naval forces in night fighting. Ship-borne radar quite upset these calculations, and the night actions on Cape Esperance and Guadalcanal proved to be costly defeats for the Japanese when our cruisers opened fire without first disclosing their positions through the use of star shells and flares. These were stories to be repeated many times.
In the air, radar and related devices have permitted bombers to operate with a disregard of weather that would have been considered impossible 10 years ago. It is no longer necessary that the bombardier be able literally to spe his target. We have become accustomed to reports that “the effects of the bombing could not be observed immediately because of clouds,” and we expeet, with confidence, to read in the next day's official reports that photographic reconnaissance had disclosed results of a highly successful raid. In the air, too, radar permits the night fighter, such as the deadly Black Widow, to find its victim. The darkness of night no longer gives the bomber protec tion from fighter attack.
It is difficult for anyone not intimately familiar with radar to appreciate fully the magnitude of the task that has been accomplished-a task that would ba large in peacetime if spread over 15 years, but is far greater when compressed into the brief period of the war. The National Defense Research Committee has taken the leading role in this program which forms the largest single segment in its activities. The Radiation Laboratory, established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a monument to American ability to ofzanize for research and development work in an extremely difficult field. Yet this has by no means been a single effort and it could not have been done at all except with the very fine cooperation between many agencies and with our British allies. Kelection and training.
Ar this point it may be helpful to refer briefly to one of the broad problems that has received much attention. It will be discussed in more detail in connection with the activities of the Office of Field Service. Merely devising a new weapon is not, of itself, a sufficient end for wartime research. The weapon will be useless mtil put into the hands of a fighting man who knows how to use it intelligently. However, the chain begins even earlier; the development engineer must have "nformption as to what operations he can expect a soldier to be able to perform under battle conditions. What operations can he perform when fitted with a beated flying suit, body armor, oxygen mask, earphones, and other accouterments? How accurately can he set a range finder or interpret a radar picture? Close liaison with the services, supplemented by extensive tests of individuals, serves to provide many of the needed answers. After the weapon has been developed to the point where the preliminary tests have been completed, there usually follows an intensive period of training personnel in its use and perfecting the tractical doctrine. During this phase the aid of the research scientists remains important, for the scientist and the fighter must determine together the possibilities and the limitations of the equipment. Finally, as the new weapon is issued to the combat forces, and as experience is gained in use againt the enemy, still further analysis of the performance may be necessary. This is a function of operational analysis and will be discussed later. All of this applies with particular force to radar for it is so new in concept that we began with almost no foundation of experience on which to build. Radar countermeasures.
Discusson of radar has emphasized its use as an aid in offensive tactics. A very important counterpart of the research directed to the development of radar was the discovery of means by which radar could be confused or made ineffective. "Window," or small strips or ribbons of aluminum foil, has long since become a common sight in the skies over Europe—first introduced by the British. It confuses the enemy radar operators by giving false signals or obscuring our planes. A few bombers with suitable equipment or fitted to spread window through skies can produce in enemy radar a quite realistic lusion of a whole fleet of bombers. The deception has long been recognized as a useful military aid to defense. Many other protective devices have been developed to jam or deceive enemy radar and communications. Subsurface warfare.
Even before the National Defense Research Committee was organized, the German submarine had become a menace to the freedom of the seas; and when we entered the war it was clear that our ability to carry the war to Germany depended upon our ability to clear the Atlantic convoy routes. No problem of the war has exceeded this in difficulty or importance. And in no other field have the scientific contributions proved of greater value, though they cannot even be omitted for reasons of security. It is obvious that we do not wish the Japanese to reduce the unbearable attrition imposed by our submarines on their shrinking merchant and war fleets by applying any of the techniques we have devised to curb the U-boats. It has been the privilege of the National Defense Research Committee, through its contractors, to play an important role in this unrelenting warfare, devising new means for detecting and destroying underwater craft. In learning how to hunt effectively, we have also developed methods of eluding the hunter. The techniques that were devised for the antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic, with small changes, now protect our submarines in the Pacific. The research teams that have so well carried out this program include scientists trained in the fields of acoustics, optics, electronics, oceanography. magnetism, geophysical prospecting, and others, with a liberal sprinkling of engeneral use until the present war. Both the Allies and the Axis are now using is necessary to handle the scientific problems of warfare. Rockets.
Although historically one of the oldest weapons, rockets did not come into general use until the present war. Both the Allies and the Axis are now using rockets of many types and sizes, and new ones are constantly being added to meet new tactical needs. The obvious advantages are freedom from recoil and greatly reduced weight of the gun or launcher.
The bazooka, which was aptly described in a recent article in Army Ordnance as "a cooperatively developed weapon, in which military, naval, and civilian agencies all played a part,” is a well-known example. It gives a foot soldier or paratrooper a weapon which is comparable, in effectiveness against a tank at moderate ranges, with a conventional gun that can be moved only by a squad or more of men.
Rocket-firing planes have been used with devastating effect against many types of target. An article in the New York Times of November 3, 1944, carries a War Department report that one Ninth Air Force unit operating in the European theater, firing 1,117 rockets in a 2-month period, destroyed 35 locomotives, 85 tanks, 15 armored cars, 164 motor transports, 19 gun positions, 9 hangars, 6 warehouses, factories, etc., 36 cars, and 2 ships, not counting targets receiving lesser damage.