taken, and the reasonable use to which the property must necessarily be put. Thus where a policy insures a stock of goods as contained in a specified place and "nowhere else to wit," the policy will be held to cover this property only while located in the described building, and the insurance will not follow the property if removed to another locality. If, on the contrary, however, the property is of such a character that it must necessarily be moved from place to place, the presumption is made in many states that the exact location of the property is a matter of subordinate importance which must be viewed in the light of existing circumstances.

As an instance, where the section of the policy concerning the location of the property was interpreted leniently with reference to the character of the property, we might mention the case of McClure vs. Girard Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 43 Iowa, 349. The property destroyed was a vehicle which was insured along with other property described in the policy as contained in a certain building and "nowhere else to wit." The vehicle in question, however, had been removed to a carriage shop for repairs, and while in this new location was destroyed by fire. The company denied the claim on the ground that the property had been moved, and that its removal had increased the risk because the danger of fire to property while contained in the repair shop was greater than in the building specified in the policy. The court, however, viewed the policy with reference to the character of the property and rendered a decision favorable to the insured in the following words: "It may be conceded that the situation of the property is mentioned in the policy as a fact affecting the risk. The words describing the situation must be regarded as a warranty, not only that the property was contained in the building but would continue so, and if at the time of the loss the carriage was not contained in the building within the meaning of the policy we do not see how the plaintiff can recover. . . But what is meant by the

term? The material fact was that the carriage when not in use was kept in the building described as its ordinary place of deposit. The words which are used must be construed with reference to the property to which they applied. Carriages which are kept for sale and are insured as contained in a single warehouse could not be removed to a different warehouse without voiding the policy. There is nothing in the nature of the property to indicate that they will be removed and the insurance is not made with reference to such facts. But where a person procures a policy (as in this case) on horses, harnesses, and carriages as contained in a certain place, the presumption must be that they are in use and that the policy is issued with reference to such use. ... Each policy must be construed according to the intention of the parties as manifested by all its terms. We are of the opinion, therefore, that while the words 'contained in a specific place' are words relating to the risk and constituted a warrant that the carriage would continue to be contained in the place designated, they mean only that the specific place described was their place of deposit when not absent therefrom for temporary purposes incident to the ordinary uses and employment of the property."

As representing the other view may be mentioned the case of Village of L'Anse vs. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 119 Mich., 427. Here the village had insured all its fireextinguishing apparatus under a standard fire policy. The property was insured in a given building and "not elsewhere to wit." While being used to extinguish a fire the apparatus was completely destroyed, and the company denied the claim on the ground that the property according to the terms of the policy was covered only while located in the specified building. In deciding the case the court took a view opposite to that given by the Iowa court, and held that the words of the standard fire policy are unambiguous and not susceptible to a construction other than that which the words them

selves impart. In other words, the court declined to take into account the fact that the property insured would temporarily be removed from its usual place of location in the course of its ordinary employment. Since the policy expressly covered the property only while in a particular building, it was held not to cover it when situated in any other location.

2. Lines 7 to 10 of the standard fire policy provide that: "This entire policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or misrepresented, in writing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstances concerning this insurance or the subject thereof; or if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated herein; or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after a loss." Following this clause many other acts are mentioned which, unless provided for by agreement indorsed on the policy, will make the entire policy void. This section of the policy draws attention to the importance of furnishing the company with a correct statement of the description of the property either before or after a loss as well as a true statement of the insurable interest which the insured possesses in the property covered. As stated before, the fire-insurance contract must be viewed strictly as a personal contract which insures the owner of the property rather than the property itself. In fact there is no contract in which one party, the company, is so absolutely at the mercy of the other party as in fire insurance. For this reason the entire policy is justly held to be null and void in the case of misrepresentation or fraud.

Aside from this phase, however, the above clauses also direct attention to an important doctrine in fire insurance, usually designated the doctrine of the "entirety or inseparability of the contract." This doctrine applies in cases where more than one item of property is insured in the same policy. It is a very frequent occurrence that several items of property, such as several buildings, or the building and the stock of

goods within the building, are covered by the same policy. Where this is done, it has been held by the courts in the great majority of states that if the premium is paid in one sum the policy is to be considered as a unit and inseparable. This means that if a policy covering several items of property is violated as regards one of the items the policy will also become null and void as regards all the other items.

Numerous cases may be cited to illustrate the operation of this doctrine. One of the most important cases upholding the doctrine is that of McQueeny vs. Phoenix Insurance Company, 52 Arkansas, 257. According to the facts of this case the Phoenix Insurance Company insured two buildings under one policy, the policy containing a clause that if during the term of the insurance the above mentioned premises should become vacant or unoccupied, except as specifically agreed in writing upon the policy, then the policy shall cease during the period of vacancy or unoccupancy. At the time of the fire one of the dwellings was occupied, whereas in the other no one was living. Both properties were destroyed. The insurance company acknowledged its liability on the building that was inhabited and paid the loss, but claimed that the policy was void as regarded the vacated building. The insured, on the other hand, took advantage of the doctrine of the entirety of the contract and maintained that the two dwellings were insured under one indivisible contract, and that if the company acknowledged liability for the loss of one of the buildings it therefore was also liable for the loss of the other. This was the view taken by the court, and, in all probability, if the company had refused payment on either of the buildings, it would have been absolved by virtue of this same doctrine from liability on both risks.

Again, in the case of Gottsman vs. Pennsylvania Insurance Company, 56 Pa., 210, the policy covered two items of property, namely, a building and the personalty within the building. The policy contained a provision to the effect that

the company must be informed of certain incumbrances on the property, and it happened that in this connection the owner of the property had incumbrances on the building unknown to the company, but had not violated the policy with reference to the personalty insured. Both items were destroyed, and the insured, while admitting that he was not entitled to any indemnity for the building, attempted to collect the value of the personalty, arguing that he had not violated the policy with reference to this item. The court, however, did not allow the claim, holding that the contract was a unit, and that if violated in respect to any one item it was also violated as regards all the others.

In recent years certain courts have emphasized the view that a policy of insurance should be interpreted with reference to the purpose of the contract. Thus, in the case of the Connecticut Fire Insurance Company vs. Tilley, 88 Va., 1024, the court did not permit the application of this doctrine. In this instance the policy covered sixteen tenement houses and contained the usual vacancy clause. At the time of the fire eight of the houses were vacant and eight were occupied. The company claimed that, since the policy was inseparable, and since its provisions had been violated as regards some of the items insured, there was a forfeiture of the policy as to all the items. The court thought differently however, and held that the indemnity was good as to those buildings which were occupied and void as to the others. "We think," said the court, "this decision substantially just to both parties, and in nowise conflicting with legal rules. There were sixteen different and distinct risks, all written as a matter of convenience in one policy. Under any other ruling the court would have been obliged to settle one way or the other, and this would have involved a gross injustice to one party or the other, and in no way have given legal effect to the well-understood intention of the fire insurance contract."