Acquaintance: New Essays

Front Cover
Jonathan Knowles, Thomas Raleigh
Oxford University Press, Nov 27, 2019 - Philosophy - 288 pages
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description'. For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream 'analytic' philosophy--acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. It is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring chapters from many of the world's leading experts in this area. Opening with an extensive introductory essay, which provides some historical background and summarizes the main debates and issues concerning acquaintance, the remaining thirteen contributions are grouped thematically into four sections: phenomenal consciousness, perceptual experience, reference, and epistemology.
 

Contents

Acknowledgements
1983
Acquaintance Is Consciousness and Consciousness Is Acquaintance
Natural Acquaintance
What Acquaintance Teaches
TwoLevel Accounts of Experience
Acquaintance in an Experience of PerceptioncumAction
Dreaming Phenomenal Character and Acquaintance
Relationalism Berkeleys Puzzle and Phenomenological
Acquaintance Conceptual Capacities and Attention
Acquaintance as Grounded in Joint Attention
Principles of Acquaintance
The Foundation of Knowledge and Thought
Objectual Knowledge
Visual Experience Revelation and the Three
Index
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2019)

Jonathan Knowles is Professor of Philosophy at Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. He has published books and papers on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and pragmatism. He is particularly interested in questions about consciousness, naturalism, representation, and realism. Thomas Raleigh is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp. He has previously held positions at the Ruhr University Bochum, the University of Vienna, the Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU), Concordia University, and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). His research is primarily in philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Bibliographic information