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105 C. Cls.

Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court October 8, 1945. Petitions for rehearing denied.

THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER, v. HENRY

ERICSSON COMPANY

(No. 44614]

[104 C. Cls. 397; 327 U. S. —] Government contract; delay in furnishing drawings; damages; overhead; idle machinery; heat, etc.

Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari denied March 4, 1946.

CHERRY COTTON MILLS, INC., PETITIONER, v.

THE UNITED STATES

[No. 45885)

[103 C. Cls. 243; 327 U. S. — ]

On writ of certiorari (326 U. S. 705) to review a judgment of the Court of Claims holding that where the plaintiff was admittedly indebted to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a Government agency, for a balance due on the corporation's participation in a bank loan to plaintiff; and where the Government was admittedly indebted to the plaintiff for refund of processing and floor stock taxes paid by it under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the amount due to the plaintiff for such refund was properly set off against the balance due by the plaintiff to the corporation.

The judgment of the Court of Claims was affirmed by the Supreme Court March 25, 1946.

Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court, holding:

1. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine counterclaims on the part of the Government against any claimant is not dependent upon the preliminary intergovernmental steps which precede court action.

2. Where plaintiff's indebtedness to Reconstruction Finance Corporation exceeded the Government's in

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debtedness to plaintiff for taxes illegally collected; and where plaintiff brought action in the Court of Claims to recover the taxes paid, after the General Accounting Office had directed the treasury to pay the tax refund to the RFC instead of to plaintiff ; jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine the Government's counterclaim based on plaintiff's indebtedness to RFC was not dependent upon whether the Comptroller General exceeded his authority in so directing the payment of the tax refund.

3. The purpose of the statute (28 U. S. Code 250) giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine all set-offs and counterclaims or other demands. on the part of the Government against any claimant was to permit the Government to have adjudicated in one suit all controversies between it and those granted permission to sue it, whether the Government's interest had been entrusted to its agencies of one kind or another.

4. An indebtedness owing by the plaintiff to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was a claim or “demand on the part of the Government” against plaintiff which the Government could set up as a counterclaim in the Court of Claims, under the statute, in an action by plaintiff to recover an indebtedness owing by the Government for taxes illegally collected.

697795—46—-Vol. 105---54

INDEX DIGEST

ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.

See Contracts XI.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE.

See Contracts I.
AMENDMENT OF CLAIM.

See Taxes XI, XII.
BONNEVILLE DAM PROJECT.

See Contracts XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX.
BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See Contracts XV, XIX, XX, XLII, LII.
CIVIL SERVICE.

See Suit for Salary II, IV, V, VI, VII.
CLAIM FIRST ACCRUES, WHEN.

I. The provision (28 U. S. C. 262) that a petition on

a claim must be filed “within six years after
the claim first accrues” has been interpreted to
mean “after the right to sue first accrues”; and
the right to sue under a special jurisdictional
act first accrues when the act becomes effective.
Cross v. United States, 4 C. Cls. 271; Rice,
Assignee, v. United States, 21 C. Cls. 413;
affirmed 122 U. S. 611, 617; Delaware Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 84 C. Cls. 535, 538.

Hubard, Receiver, 395.
II. The date that a claim is filed does not as such set

the date at which the claim first accrues under

the statute. Myers Co., 459
III. A claim arising out of a Government contract first

accrues when it can be definitely ascertained
and set up, when all that is required of the con-
tractor by the terms of the contract has been
fulfilled, enabling him to meet any pleas of

neglect to perform. Id.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

See Taxes V.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT, EXCEPTIONS TO.

See Rule 46 I, II.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW.

See Taxes V, VI, VII, VIII.
COMPLETION PERIOD.
See Patents I, II, III, IV.

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105 C. Als.

CONCURRENT DELAY.

See Contracts XVII.
CONTRACTING OFFICER.

I. Where contractor on Government contract was

delayed by a strike on another contract job; and
where the contracting officer failed to make find-
ings of fact upon contractor's application for an
extension of time on account of the delay, as the
.contracting officer was obligated to do under the
provision of the contract; it is held that the
contracting officer's failure to do so was a breach
of the contract and plaintiff, surety on contrac-
toi's payment and performance bond, is entitled
to recover the liquidated damages deducted to
the extent of any extension of time that should
have been granted by the contracting officer.

Manufacturers' Casualty Insurance Co., 342.
II. Where contractor asked for written instructions

but the project engineer advised that he had no
written instructions to give other than what was
in the contract; and where no appeal was taken
by the contractor from this decision of the con-
tracting officer; and where it was provided in the
specifications, which became a part of the con-
tract, that an appeal might be taken by the
contractor not only on instructions and deci-
sions of the contracting officer but also on "any
claim otherwise arising under the contract”; it is
held that the contracting officer's refusal of the
request for written instructions constituted a
“decision” from which the contractor was en-
entitled to appeal. Albrecht Company, (No.

45579), 353.
See also Contracts I, II, XXIV, XXVII, XLVI,

LXV.
CONTRACTS.

I. Where it was provided in the contract in suit

(Article 15) that all disputes, except as to labor
issues, “concerning questions arising under this
contract shall be decided by the contracting
officer or his duly authorized representative,
subject to written appeal by the contractor
within 30 days to the head of the department or
his duly authorized representative, whose de-
cision shall be final and conclusive upon the
parties thereto as to such questions”; and where
it is found, upon the evidence adduced, that the
plaintiffs abandoned, without justification, this

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