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Citation

A-25746, January 30, 1929; A-44741, Uctober 3, 1932

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General held that a military officer who was ordered from a station within the United States to his home to await further orders

did not make a permanent change of station within the meaning of section 12 of the Act of May 18, 1920, 41 Stat. 604, as amended by the Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 631.

In response to a query by the Secretary of the Navy, the Attorney General held that such an order does constitute a permanent change of station within the meaning of the statute. 38 Op. Atty Gen. 176 (1933); See also, 34 Op. Atty Gen. 346 (1924); Bullard v. United States, 66 Ct. C1. 264 (1928).

The Attorney General instructed the Secretary of the Navy to accept his opinion as controlling, stating that:

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"'***the Comptroller General, who is clearly an admin-
istrative officer of the Government, is likewise bound as
a matter of law by the construction placed upon the statute
by the Attorney General and the Court of Claims." 38 Op.
Atty Gen. 176, 179 (1935).

Citation

14 Comp. Gen. 443 (1934)

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General held that in the absence of a statutory authorization, the Federal Government could not pay cash to an employee of the Panama Canal Service upon separation from the Service, in lieu of leave accrued but not taken.

The Attorney General disagreed with the Comptroller General's decision, stating that an Executive order allowing such cash payments was a valid exercise of Presidential authority. 38 Op. Atty Gen. 300.

On February 20, 1936, the Comptroller General reaffirmed his prior decision. A-57620, February 20, 1936.

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Citation

A-68974, February 12, 1936, May 16, 1936

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General advised the Secretary of War that he could not use appropriated funds for payment under a contract since the Secretary of War had wrongly rejected a bid as not being responsive to the invitation.

The Attorney General stated that the award made by the Secretary of War was proper and legal, and that the Comptroller General's decision had no basis in law. 38 Op. Atty Gen. 555 (1937).

Original award made by Secretary of War was eventually upheld. Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 232 (1940).

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Citation

A-67068, February 19, 1936, June 13, 1936

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General held that award of a contract by the Department of War to Douglas Aircraft Company was unlawful since there had been insufficient competition as to price. The Secretary of War requested the Attorney General's opinion after Douglas had fully performed its part of the

contract.

The Attorney General stated that since the contractor had fully and satisfactorily performed the contract, it would be manifestly unfair and unjust to hold the contract invalid. 39 Op. Atty Gen. 23 (1937).

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Citation

A-44016, July 5, 1938

Nature of Dispute

The Acting Comptroller General held that the Treasury Department practice of disposing of useless papers was not in accord with existing law.

The Attorney General advised the Secretary of the Treasury that the Acting Comptroller General was in error, because the practice of the Treasury Department was in accord with existing law. 39 Op. Atty Gen. 249 (1939).

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Citation

18 Comp. Gen. 508 (1938)

Nature of Dispute

The Acting Comptroller General held that loan agreements entered to by the Department of Agriculture with cooperative associations at rural rehabilitation projects were not authorized by existing statutes.

Attorney General disagreed with Acting Comptroller General, holding that the loan agreements were legal and that a properly designated officer of the Farm Security Administration could continue to countersign properly drawn checks. 39 Op. Atty Gen. 254 (1939).

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Citation

B-23881, March 5, 1942

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General declared illegal loans made by Farm Security Administration from funds appropriated for rural rehabilitation to corporations for purpose of financing purchases of land on which farm families were to be relocated after having been displaced due to the acquisitions of land for defense purposes. The Attorney General stated that the expenditures were authorized by statute and otherwise legal. 40 Op. Atty Gen. 193 (1942).

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Citation

B-143777, December 8, 1960

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General, at the request of a congressional subcommittee, advised the Secretary of State that unless certain documents were furnished to the subcommittee, pursuant to section 533(A) (d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, funds would no longer be available for expenses of the Office of the Inspector General and Comptroller.

The Attorney General concluded that the Comptroller General's view that section 533 (A) (d) operated to cut off funds was an erroneous interpretation of the statute. But, if the Comptroller General's view was correct, the proviso was unconstitutional. Furthermore, according to the Attorney General, despite the Comptroller General's letter giving notice of the cutoff in funds, Mutual Security Funds were still available for expenditure. Gen. 507 (1960).

41 Op. Atty

In response to the Attorney General's opinion, Comptroller General again wrote the Secretary of State (May 16, 1961), stating that he found no sound basis for altering his initial conclusion. However, by then, a compromise had been worked out between the State Department and the subcommittee.

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Citation

B-156192, December 8, 1966

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General directed that a claim be returned to Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals to determine the amount due a claimant in connection with a contract.

the

The Attorney General informed the Secretary of the Air Force that he was not required to comply with the Comptroller's request. The Attorney General stated that the question raised "fundamental issues as to the legal relationship between GAO and executive branch agencies in resolution of disputes arising under Government procurement contracts. I therefore consider the question appropriate for an opinion of the Attorney General." 42 Op. Atty Gen. No. 33 (1969)

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Citation

49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969)

Nature of Dispute

The Comptroller General advised the Secretary of Labor that the revised Philadelphia Plan, requiring contractors to commit themselves to making race a factor for consideration in hiring employees, was contrary to law.

The Attorney General concluded that Philadelphia Plan was legal. His summary stated in part that:

"Views expressed in formal opinion of the Attorney
General may be relied on by executive departments
and agencies and their accountable officers, notwith-
standing contrary views expressed by the Comptroller
General." 42 Op. Atty Gen. No. 37 (1969)

The Federal courts upheld the validity of the plan.

Contractors

Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D.Pa. 1970), aff'd 442 F.2d 159; cert. denied 404 U.S. 854 (1971).

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