an Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor. After examining voluminous evidence, the Committee concluded that "the system of forced or compulsory labor constitutes an important element in the economy of the country." However, the Committee could not arrive at a definite conclusion as to the number of forced laborers, or the number and location of forced labor camps.37

38

It has been reported that large-scale deportations subsided after Stalin's death in 1953. However, a more subtle form of depopulation is very much in use at the present time. This is the so-called "voluntary" enlistment for work or permanent settlement in Kazakhstan and other places, where development projects are ambitious while working and living conditions are poor. With the whole propaganda machinery thrown behind such undertakings, the notion of "volunteering" becomes problematic. So does the return of the "volunteers" after completing the hitch. In the final analysis, the recruitment turns out to be another kind of deportation.

40

The earliest Soviet hint that not all was well with the population in Lithuania was given in 1957. It transpired from an estimate by the Statistical Administration of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic that its population on April 1, 1956, numbered 2,673,000. The authoritative Great Soviet Encyclopedia also accepted this figure. Assuming that the population in 1946 numbered 2,685,000-2,690,000, as stated in the foregoing, and that the natural increase rate was 1.1 percent per year, the population in 10 years should have grown to about 3,000,000. The loss of over 300,000 in 10 years of peacetime was a shock. Yet as further, though more refined, depopulation continued, an increase of only 38,000-instead of nearly 90,000-occurred in 1956-58. This means that the annual natural increase rate has lately been of the order of 0.5 percent rather than 1.1 percent, as claimed for the earlier years. Another disquieting factor is a drop in school enrollment. Taking the enrollment in grades 1 through 4, where attendance is compulsory for all children of 7 to 11, the picture was as follows:"

Thus, despite a larger territory and 17 years' span between 1940 and 1956, the number of pupils in elementary schools declined to 77 percent by 1954-55, and slipped further to 74 percent by 1956-57. Hence, not only is the real natural increase in Lithuania now much lower than before World War II, but the population consists of elderly people, with its cream taken off.

Since it was impossible to conceal or deny such hugh losses, Soviet authorities began looking for someone to put the blame on. The Germans appeared the most logical choice. An early report, prepared by the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Committed by the German-Fascist Invaders and Their Associates, accused the "German scoundrels" of having shot, burned alive, and tortured to death "over 300,000 civilians" in Lithuania. This, however, covered also "citizens of France, Austria, and Czechoslovakia" as well as other "foreigners." Characteristically, the elaborate Soviet report, reproducing names, places, and minute details, did not mention that the "civilians" were mostly Jews. The fact of extermination of local and foreign Jews in Lithuania under German occupation was also confirmed by an authoritative Jewish study of the problem. Lithuania's second-largest town, Kaunas, "was turned into one of the monstrous Jewish mass graves in Eastern Europe," the study pointed out.

43

continued after the war, too, the Germans again were made responsible. Already in 1946, the Germans were blamed for having "murdered" 436,000 persons and "deported to German slavery" 36,000. Such an estimate was given an American writer and newspaperman, A. Bimba, who visited Lithuania in 1946 and described in glowing colors all he saw there." Broken down by counties, the revised estimate looked quite authentic. More interesting is the fact that the addition of 136,000 victims of German occupation coincided astonishingly closely with the claim made by the Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation, that about the same number of Lithuanians were massacred or deported in 1944-46.45

For some strange reason, the revised Soviet estimate was not made public in Lithuania. Here the Extraordinary Commission's figure of 300,000 remained in currency until 1957. Even as late as the spring of 1957, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Lithuania, A. Sniečkus, blamed the "fascists" for having shot, burnt, and annihiliated more than 300,000 inhabitants. The change occurred late in 1957. It was initiated by the publication of a 112-page pamphlet under the title "Hitlerite Crimes in the Baltic Countries." This pamphlet was based on the proceedings of the Soviet Military Tribunal in Riga between January 26 and February 2, 1946. Speaking of Lithuania, the Tribunal said: "In the Lithuanian Soviet Republic, German invaders killed some 700,000 peaceful Soviet citizens and war prisoners and drove more than 36,000 Soviet citizens into slavery in Germany." " The figure of 700,000-withheld from publication for more than 10 years-has been accepted by both the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and, of course, the Communist Party of Lithuania."

Since there were 156,000 war prisoners among those allegedly annihilated, the number of other "Soviet citizens" in the total number of victims was 544,000. The term of "Soviet citizens" not necessarily being identical with the term of "inhabitants" of Lithuania, the country's Communist Party clarified this point in 1960 and 1961. This was done by declaring, through one of its leading members, that "Hitlerites and their henchmen * * * annihilated physically about 500,000 persons, this being more than one-sixth of the Lithuanian population."50 The same figure also appeared in the official Soviet-Lithuanian study of the Hitlerite occupation of Lithuania, published by the State Publishing House for Political and Scientific Literature in Vilnius.51

Although the Germans could not be blamed, by any stretch of imagination, for killing even half as many persons as 500,000, the identification of the victims as determined by the Soviet authorities with the inhabitants of Lithuania made it much easier to explain why only 2,711,000 persons were found in the area where 3,034,000 used to live in 1940. Placing 250,000-300,000 Sovietown victims on the German doorstep and adding 36,000 slave laborers to the roster of German victims theoretically reduced the estimated population to 2,498,000 by 1945. A swift calculation with the pencil shows however, that the population of this size should have grown under normal conditions to about 2,850,000 by 1959, i.e., 137,000 more than the census showed.

Thereupon the wheels began grinding again. The official study of the Hitlerite occupation of Lithuania came out with a categorical assertion that the number of those deported to slave labor in Germany was 200,000 rather than 36,000 as originally estimated. The authors of the study blamed the absence of complete data in the beginning for the original underestimation and added that a great number of deportees perished from bombs and hunger. This, in turn, implied that the total number of victims to the German occupation was as high as 700.000; in other words, the Germans annihilated better than every fourth man, woman, and child in Lithuania.

47 Hitlerininku piktadarybés Pabaltijyje (Vilnius, 1957). The speed of the Riga Military Tribunal is truly amazing when compared with the protracted proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

48 Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2nd ed., XXV, 260.

49 Tiesa, 1959. No. 125

50 Izvestija, December 25, 1960.

61 M. Ioffe, ed.. Hitlerine okupacija Lietuvoje (Vilnius, 1961). p. 15 f. In their zeal to ascribe to the Germans as many victims as possible. particularly prominent ones, the authors listed by name and rank individuals and families who died of natural causes or even were deported to the Soviet Union in 1940-41.

52 Ibid., p. 16.

Whatever the credibility of this juggling and rejuggling of completely unsubstantiated statistics, the Soviets outdid themselves by resorting to a sheer reducio ad absurdum of their arguments. Let the figures speak for themselves:

This writer inquired twice at the Soviet Academy of Sciences seeking to ascertain the Soviet explanation of the discrepancies. No reply has been received. This could hardly be expected, for a plausible explanation, devoid of all propaganda overtones, would call for the admission of the heinous crime of genocide.5

WASHINGTON, D.C.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, ON THE CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS, FEBRUARY 9, 1962

Madam Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to commend your subcommittee for your current inquiry into the conditions in the captive European nations.

To my mind, this subject warrants our closest consideration. I say this for a number of reasons.

In the first place, the captive nations of Europe-including Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia-have a combined population of 87 million. This population is heterogeneous and, by and large, has not been absorbed into the pulse of the Communist system. The people of those countries are predominantly, and strongly, anti-Communist. The fact that they are forced to live today under Communist bondage does not, in any sense, negate that statement.

The people of the captive nations want to be free. They want to work out their destinies in the framework of freedom, and of individual national identities. They do not want to be absorbed into the oppressive, totalitarian system of international communism.

This brings me to my second point:

The aspirations and loyalties of these people are ultimately going to play an important part in the outcome of the global, long-range struggle between communism and freedom. I am certain of this. I am confident that no amount of repression, Communist indoctrination, and isolation from the West is going to change this. The people of the captive nations will remain true to their heritage and to themselves.

And this brings me to my third point:

The captive nations of Europe represent the most vulnerable sector of the Communist monolith. They are, in a sense, the Achilles' heel of the Communist

53 After completing this paper, the writer received a memorandum on the situation in the Baltic States in 1960. prepared by Mme von Lowzow for the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Doc. 1173, Sept. 14, 1960: Rapport sur la situation des pays baltes à l'occasion du 20ème anniversaire de leur incorporation forcée dans l'Union soviétique. In the part dealing with Lithuanian, the memorandum also reviewed demographic changes in the last 20 years (p. 30 f.). The following estimates were given for 1959: hypothetical population under normal conditions-3,900,000; autochthonous population found 2.400,000; hypothetical losses 1,500,000, subdivided into these categories; put to death by the Nazis-300.000: evacuated to the east-60,000: died as anti-Soviet guerrillas50,000; expatriated to Poland-180,000; deported to the Soviet Union-350,000; sent to the Soviet Union for slave labor ["volunteers"] -100,000: combined actual losses1,040,000: Soviet-caused drop in natural increase 460.000. While some figures seem exaggerated (Nazi victims) or based on pure guesswork (number of guerrillas), other definite losses are not considered (expatriation to Germany, DP's).

monster. Today, not by choice, they constitute a part of the Communist bloc. Tomorrow, they may prove to be the stumbling block which will trip and bring down the entire Communist empire.

It is vital to our national interest, and to the cause of peace and freedom in the world, that we keep close check on developments behind the Iron Curtain, that we focus world attention on the peoples of the captive nations, and that we forcefully expose Soviet colonialism practiced in those lands.

Your subcommittee is attending to this task. I commend you for it, and I will follow your activities with keen interest. Your objectives have my wholehearted support.

I submit herewith for the record two excerpts from my Report of the Special Study Mission to Poland (1961):

EXCERPTS FROM REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO POLAND (1961)

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH POLAND

On an overall basis United States-Polish economic relations have been significantly extended during the past 4 years. The basis for a continued expansion of such relations has been established. As in the past, however, changes of policy flowing from Poland's membership in the Communist bloc may at any time seriously affect the outlook for the future.

I believe that the course of United States-Polish economic relations during recent years has served to open new contacts between Poland and the West, and to reduce that country's dependence on her Communist neighbors. This has been heartening to many of the Poles whose contact with the West was severely curtailed prior to 1957. The tangible evidence of U.S. interest in the people of Poland has tended in our opinion to strengthen the bonds of friendship which have long existed between the peoples of our two countries.

During its stay in Poland, the study mission found warm and appreciative regard for the United States among the direct recipients of our assistance as well as among the people of Poland in general. We noted, however, that the regime-controlled communications media in Poland are not giving the United States due credit for our assistance, and present a distorted and unfavorable picture of social and economic conditions in the United States and of the foreign policy of our country. It is imperative that this state of affairs be remedied if the United States is to provide any further aid to Poland.

With respect to the utilization of zlotys accruing to the account of the United States from the sale of agricultural commodities under Public Law 480, the following guides are recommended for the consideration of the appropriate authorities in our Government:

1. U.S. sponsorship of aid projects financed with such funds must be clearly identified in Poland.

2. Projects selected must emphasize the importance of self-help on the part of the Poles.

3. U.S. assistance should be given in such form, and under such conditions, that it would directly benefit the people of Poland. Our aid must not provide the Polish Government with the means for advancing its programs of collectivization, or tightening its control over every aspect of human life in Poland. With this in mind, humanitarian projects, designed to improve the basic welfare of the people, should receive first consideration.

4. Projects with a military application potential should not be selected for U.S. support. We must also avoid participation in projects capable of strengthening the industrial military potential of other Communist and Communistdominated nations.

5. The United States should not become involved in Poland in supporting any grandiose, long-term projects. We should channel our assistance to useful, immediate-impact undertakings.

6. According to some estimates, as much as 60 percent of families in some areas of Poland live in one-room apartments. Privacy and facilities for study are extremely limited. For these reasons, assistance for the construction of college dormitories, international student centers where exchange students could live and study with Polish students, and college reading and study rooms would be greatly welcomed by students in Poland.

7. In the field of agriculture, high-grade seed, fertilizer, improved farming methods, basic hand implements as well as light machinery suitable for a family-size farm, are sorely needed in Poland. Such requirements offer a suitable area for further investigation and consideration. Under all circumstances, direct delivery to the individual farmer-rather than distribution through the regime-sponsored agricultural circles or state farms should be made a condition of our assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Traditionally, Poland has been a member of the Western World. Communist domination of Poland since World War II has not changed the traditional leanings of the vast majority of the Polish people. While the Communist regime appears to be in full control in Poland, its policies since October 1956 have favored and achieved wider contacts with the West, particularly the United States.

There is ample evidence that assistance extended to Poland during recent years has benefited the Polish people. It has helped to maintain a bond of friendship and sympathy between the people of Poland and the people of the United States. At the same time, it has tended to lessen Poland's dependence on her Communist neighbors. We believe that these developments are in the interest of the United States and helpful to the attainment of our foreign policy objectives. Policy changes flowing from Poland's membership in the Communist bloc may at any time seriously affect the outlook for the future and influence the course of United States-Polish relations. Nevertheless, basing our conclusions on our observations in Poland, we recommend that careful consideration be given to the possibility of expanding our economic relations with Poland, including the provision of additional economic assistance, primarily through the utilization of zlotys in the Public Law 480 account and further operations under that program. In this respect, and in order to strengthen the hand of the Executive in future negotiations with the Polish Government, we are of the opinion that amendment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act along the lines recommended in H.R. 1130 and in similar bills would serve a useful and constructive purpose.

We wish to emphasize recommendations made earlier in this report (see pp. 9, 10, 11, 12), to the end that any future assistance extended to Poland be given in such a form, and under such conditions, to assure that the aid benefits the people rather than the regime. Aid projects should be selected carefully and on an individual basis, with full consideration of the guides outlined in this report. Emphasis on self-help projects and hard bargaining for reciprocal considerations should provide the framework for future negotiations with the Polish Government.

BY PETR ZENKL, EX-VICE-PREMIER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND LORD MAYOR OF PRAGUE; CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

My native country was lost to the Communists in 1948 without civil war. I bear partial responsibility, for I was there and, as a Vice Premier and Member of Parliament, in a position of some authority. If I, a few of my colleagues, and the free world had known then what we know now, it might not have happened. Czechoslovakia might still be free.

I do not know when I shall see my country free again, or even what I can do to hasten that day. But there's one thing I can do to help keep the same thing from happening to other free nations.

I can warn you with all the urgency at my command-of an amazing new publication in which the Communists reveal a new strategy of conquest. Step by step they have developed exact techniques to undermine free governments without the use of military force. The dress rehearsal was in my country. Now the Communists have produced a how-to-do-it handbook showing Communist conspirators in Latin America, Africa and Asia how to proceed in capturing from within any country anywhere. It is a systematic program aimed at the undermining of every free parliamentary assembly, local legislature, national congress, and even the "world parliament" of the United Nations.

The author, Jan Kozak, knows what he is talking about, for he is a Communist and a Czech. Thirteen years ago, representatives of the democratic parties and the Communists were members of the last free Czech Parliament. While debating and sometimes voting with us on economic and social issues, the Communists were then plotting to capture the Parliament and the Cabinet.