crimination the increase was 95 percent. Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to other countries increased at the same time by 79 percent. THE PROBLEM OF ORES Failure to consult published statistical data is at the core of the erroneous notion in the West that while the metallurgical industry of the captive countries is aided by the Soviet Union which supplies them with large quantities of ores, the captive countries' return shipments of ores to the Soviet Union, if any, constitute a small fraction of Soviet shipments to them, and therefore cannot be classified as "aid." In fact, during the years 1956-60, the captive European countries have delivered more ores and metal concentrates to the Soviet Union than vice versa. During these years the Soviet Union imported ores and metal concentrates to the total value of $1,876.4 million, and exported $962.6 million worth, with a $913.8 balance of imports over exports. These amounts have been arrived at by adding up yearly totals of Soviet ore trade in the chapters of Soviet yearbooks dealing with trade by commodities only. Out of the 67 countries on which the Soviet foreign trade yearbooks present data by commodities and countries, 19 countries are shown as having received ores from the Soviet Union; 5 of them are captive European countries. Added up by countries, the Soviet exports of ores amount, during the years 1956-60 to $958.1 million. This total is only $4.5 million (or less than 0.5 percent) lower than the value of total Soviet exports of ores indicated above, and points at a fairly complete listing of countries to which Soviet ores were shipped. The picture is entirely different with regard to Soviet ore imports. Nine countries, including three captive European countries, are shown as having supplied ores to the Soviet Union. Added up by individual countries, the Soviet imports of ores amount to $1,347.8 million instead of a total of $1,876.4 million shown in other parts of the yearbooks. This leaves the origin of $528.6 million worth of ores, or 28 percent, unexplained. The Soviet foreign trade yearbooks are not always that casual about the import figures. For example, of Soviet total imports from 17 West European countries all but 1.4 percent are specified as to the commodities in the 1959 data, and 2 percent in the 1960 data. Still smaller are the unspecified parts in Soviet imports from the seven major oversea suppliers: only 0.1 percent in 1959, and 0.7 percent in 1960. Somewhat larger are the unspecified parts of Soviet imports from three captive European countries, the commodity specifications of which do contain the item "ores and metal concentrates," viz, Bulgaria, Czecho slovakia and Poland. In 1959, the unexplained residue of Soviet imports from these countries amounted to 6.1 percent, and in 1960 to 4 percent of all Soviet imports from these countries. The unspecified part increases sharply in Soviet imports from three other major captive countries-Hungary, East Germany, and Rumania. With regard to them, the Soviet import statistics fail to mention the item or ores and metal concentrates, although they are also known to supply the Soviet Union, among others, with uranium ores or their concentrates. In 1960, out of a total of $1,457 million Soviet imports from these countries, $188 million worth, or 12.9 percent, are not specified as to the commodities; in 1959, $182 million worth, or 13.5 percent. For the 5 years 1956-60, the unspecified parts of Soviet imports from Hungary, East Germany, and Rumania add up to $957 million and constitute 15.8 percent of all Soviet imports from these countries. . In these circumstances there can be but little doubt that possibly all, and at least the overwhelming majority, of $528.6 million worth of Soviet imports of ores from unspecified sources have been delivered during the years 1956-60 by Hungary, East Germany, and Rumania. Together with Soviet imports of ores from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the overall Soviet imports of ores and metal concentrates from the captive European countries must have reached about $1,350 million, as against Soviet exports to the captive countries valued at $817.6 million (plus, possibly, a fraction of $4.5 million worth of ores the Soviet Union may have exported to Albania and/or Bulgaria). SUMMARY The information contained in this report offers the conclusion that the foreign trade volume of the captive European countries exceeds considerably the foreign trade volume of the Soviet Union and constitutes an appreciable part of the world trade. It also seems that, in spite of a considerable progress in the development of exports of the European Economic Community during the last 3 years, the exports of the captive European countries during that period have grown at a still more rapid rate, and considerably faster than the trade turnover of the Soviet Union. Therefore, and since foreign trade is also used by the Soviet Union as an instrument to implement its foreign policy which the satellite regimes in the captive countries must follow, the foreign trade of the captive countries deserves even closer attention by the free world than the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. The still more rapid growth of the foreign trade of the captive European countries than that of the European Economic Community indicates an urgent need to speed up the rate of economic integration of Western Europe. The available information also indicates that, at least until 1961, it has not been the policy of the Soviet Union to increase its trade primarily with the captive countries; nor has it been the primary objective of the satellite regimes to promote trade between the captive countries. Trade with the four Asian Communist-dominated countries, in particular with the three smaller of these countries as a group, has been neglected by the Soviet Union. The Soviet efforts appear to have been concentrated mainly on gaining new ground on the markets of the free world. Soviet official information also indicates that the captive countries have not only been supplying about three times more machinery and equipment to the Soviet Union than the highly industrialized Western countries, but also that their exports of ores and metal concentrates to the Soviet Union exceeded by far the Soviet exports of ores and metal concentrates to the captive countries. Since the completion of the above report a high-level conference of the CEMA countries was held in Moscow on June 6-7, 1962. The communique issued after the termination of the conference, as published by Pravda of June 9, 1962, indicates an intention to strengthen the economic cooperation of the CEMA countries. At the same time the conference expressed its wish for further development of foreign trade with capitalist countries and declared itself for the convocation of a respective international conference. The ultimate objectives of such overall increased cooperation appear to be summarized in the following two sentences of the communique: "The more fully and effectively all the resources of the socialist countries will be utilized, the sooner the historical aims of construction of socialism and communism will be achieved, and a decisive victory of the world's socialist system in the economic competition with capitalism obtained.", and "The successes of Socialist countries in the world development of economy *** demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism, and will create the most favorable conditions for revolutionary and national-liberation movement * * *" Mr. KUTT. Should I read that statement? Mr. MONAGAN. I am afraid we won't have time to do that and since it applies to the countries generally, we will put it in the record as having been submitted by you at this time. Mr. Kurr. May I submit, also, a booklet which supplies more detailed data concerning my statement on conditions in Estonia? Mr. MONAGAN. We have a booklet entitled "Estonia, Independent, and a Soviet Colony," New York, 1961. We are very happy to have that for the files of the committee. Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Dr. Dimitrov and Mr. Kutt. We certainly appreciate the contribution that you have made, and we will be happy to carry your words in mind. Now, we have with us Mr. Vasil Germenji of the Free Albania Committee. We will be glad to have you come up, sir, and give us such testimony as you may wish to present. Would you begin by giving us a brief sketch. STATEMENT OF VASIL GERMENJI, REPRESENTING THE FREE ALBANIA COMMITTEE Mr. GERMENJI. Well, Mr. Chairman, I was born in Albania some 53 years ago. I attended primary school in Albania and I graduated from the Albanian French Lycee-high school-in Albania. After that I studied engineering in Marseille, France, where I graduated in 1933. I returned to Albania. I was named lecturer, and afterward professor in the Technical Institute of Tirane, where I taught for 5 years until 1939. My activity in Albanian political and social life was in the youth movements at the time, because I was a young man and I left Albania when Fascist Italy occupied it, because of my opposition to every or any kind of totalitarianism and because of my anti-Fascist feelings. I went in exile in France, where I took part in the resistance against German occupation. I intended to return to Albania. I was asked to return after the Communist takeover, but I didn't. I didn't, and I began again to take part in all Albanian movements against communism. I used to publish two newspapers in France. And since 1953 I am a member of the Free Albania Committee. I came to the United States in 1956. I am still a member of Free Albania Committee, and at this moment I am also vice chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations. I have the question, Mr. Chairman, in which you are interested, in possible changes in the communistic part of Europe, and maybe Albania is giving the best example of some changes, some spectacular changes, but they have changed nothing in reality. In reality they are still in the communistic world. I have made some statements here, and I believe that to understand the actual Albanian stand it is good to know what was the situation just before these changes and why these changes occurred. If you will allow me, I will read it. Now, I ask your indulgence because my English is not very good. Mr. MONAGAN. No; it is fine. We can understand it. Mr. GERMENJI. And I typed this paper myself, so there are some mistakes I have done and some other mistakes I couldn't help because I didn't know better. I have put in here some statements about myself. I already spoke about my biography. Mr. MONAGAN. Yes. Mr. GERMENJI. Let's skip them. Before World War II, Albania was a constitutional monarchy, trying to build up a modern state. She had shown a considerable progress toward westernization of the country and well-being of the people, after 500 years of Turkish domination. During the last war, the Albanians, whose country was occupied by Fascist Italy, did their part in fighting for the Allied and democracy's cause, and I am proud to state that, taking in consideration the number of people, our efforts have been evaluated important and noticeable to the common cause of freedom. This struggle against the Axis Powers was purely nationalistic and most of the burden and responsibility fell on the shoulders of distinguished and venerated leaders whose main aim and goal was the liberation from Fascist and Nazi oppressors and occupiers. Communism was almost unknown at that time in Albania and only a handful of professional agitators with less than 0.05 percent of the population following them tried vainly to advocate their cause, unnoticed and unsupported. This small minority didn't cooperate at all with the Albanian patriotic fighters until Hitler's armies attacked Soviet Russia in 1941. Even when Communists-very small groups-began to fight-more against patriotic groups than the occupiers-they had to hide themselves and their communistic aims under the name of "national liberation movement." Thus they tried to fool some of the Albanian patriots, who followed them only for patriotism. They could never afford to present themselves as Communists. All this I am saying, I am putting here, is to show that before the war there was no communism in Albania; during the war Communists did nothing to help the liberation of Albania, and they came to light only because there was a general tendency to favorize communistic movements in that part of the world. As war progressed in the Allies' favor and victory neared, Albanian Communists with Tito's help and advice started to show themselves a little more, and by pure intrigues, intimidations, terror, and plain murder and fratricide, tried to take over the country. If it was not for deals behind the scene that placed Albania in the Soviet sphere of influence, they would have never succeeded. This abandonment, or to put it more bluntly this sellout, plunged the Albanian people in a pathos that even now, after 18 years of slavery and Communist yoke, is felt with wonder. And they can still not understand why they were sold out. Let me point out, however, that the Albanian people now as in the past have looked upon the United States as a dear friend and as a great, peace-loving country and as the natural protector of the weak. Long years of vicious Soviet inspired and directed anti-American propaganda have not managed to soil this image or to destroy the abiding friendship that Albanians in Albania and elsewhere feel toward the United States. Their friendship is understandable for Albania, because Albanians and most of those from south Albania used to come to the United States for economic reasons, and that is why we still have here in America from Albania a big Albanian community, mostly in Massachusetts, in the northeastern part of the United States. All those people used to return to Albania with the wealth they had gained here in America, and they showed to the Albanian people what was the progress of this country, what this country was doing for people, and everything; and this created this friendship and this trust of Albania in America, and this trust is still living now. Since the Communist takeover, end of 1944, the country has been ruled with an iron hand by police terror and from time to time mounted trials and summary executions. Tens of thousands have been liquidated, interned in concentration and labor camps, and constantly deported from one corner of the land to the other. The situation is exactly the same today. The proletariat dictatorship imposed upon Albania has suppressed all political opposition and abolished all fundamental human rights. The whole social life is axed by a perpetual class struggle. Tradition is fought with extreme severity. All former well-to-do people and skillful and professional Albanians who do not approve the regime are excluded from any form of welfare and social security benefits, although entitled to them by law. Even modest jobs are refused to them. Most of them have a Western culture. During these years, the Albania Red regime made every effort to destroy and annihilate any religious life. There are three religions in Albania: Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic, who used to live in very good relations. The regime has imprisoned, interned, expelled, and executed all religious leaders. Their primary anger fell on the Catholic Church, and now there is no bishop or any hierarchy in function in the country. All the seminaries were suppressed, and we can say there is no freedom of religion in Albania. And the same fate for the other two religions. Mosques and churches have been destroyed or changed into public offices, merchandise stores and even into animal stables. I took the liberty to bring here, and I would appreciate it if you would put it in the file, some pictures a German journalist has taken recently in Albania showing a mosque turned into a stable, and a church turned into a restaurant. Nothing can show much better than these pictures what is happening there. Mr. MONAGAN. Yes; we will be glad to receive that. Mr. GERMENJI. Thank you. Mr. MONAGAN. Without objection they may be received. Mr. MONAGAN. May I ask a question? Is this your newspaper? (Submitted for files.) Mr. GERMENJI. Yes; this is our newspaper. It is in Albanian. But the picture is just as good. Mr. MONAGAN. Yes. It was taken, you say, by a German photographer? Mr. GERMENJI. By a German journalist who was in Albania lately-1961. Mr. MONAGAN. 1961? Mr. GERMENJI. Yes. I don't know how he did it, but he did it. Mr. MONAGAN. Do you know where these buildings are? Mr. GERMENJI. In Shkoder, in North Albania. Mr. MONAGAN. One is a mosque? Mr. GERMENJI. One is a mosque turned into a stable, and the other is an Orthodox church turned into a restaurant. Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you. Mr. GERMENJI. And this is more this shows much better the real situation of religion in Albania than everything I could say. And I had only one fact to add, that despite the danger of being punished, people attend the churches and they attend churches not only to pray to God but also to show their dissatisfaction of the regime. |