their hereditary animosity against their ancient | four hundred of the other troops. By this vicenemy, and at the instigation of Eteonicus, who tory the Attic commerce was for a time freed was now in command there, began a series of from annoyance; for though Eteonicus still rehostile inroads, which compelled the Athenians mained in Ægina, he had no money to pay the to send a body of heavy-armed infantry under seamen, and therefore could exert no authority. In this emergency Teleutias was sent to take Pamphilus, who occupied a fortified post in the island, while a squadron of ten galleys blocka- the command. His arrival was hailed with deBut Teleutias, who happened light by the men, who had already served under ded the coast. at the same time to be cruising among the isl-him, and expected an immediate supply of pay. ands of the Ægean, levying contributions, hear-He, however, called them together, and informing of the distress of the Æginetans, came to ed them that he had brought no money with their relief, and drove off the blockading squa- him, and that they had no resource to look to dron, though Pamphilus kept possession of the for the relief of their necessities but their own fort. Teleutias was soon after superseded by activity and courage. It was best that they Hierax, the new Spartan admiral, and returned should not depend for subsistence upon the fahome. At his embarcation, he received testi- vour either of Greek or barbarian, but should monies of esteem and affection from his men, provide for themselves at the enemy's expense. which proved that he possessed at least one The men expressed entire confidence in his quality of a great commander. Hierax sailed guidance, and promised to obey all his comto Rhodes, leaving Gorgopas, his vice-admiral, mands. That very night, after they had ended with twelve galleys at Egina. The Athenians their evening meal, he ordered them to embark in the fort were soon reduced to greater straits with a day's provision, and with twelve galleys than the Æginetans in the city; and, in the crossed the gulf towards Piræus. When they fifth month after their arrival, a strong squa- were within about half a mile of the harbour, dron was sent out from Athens to carry them they rested till daybreak, and then sailed in. home. The excursions of the Eginetan pri- Xenophon thinks it necessary to vindicate Tevateers, who were supported by Gorgopas, leutias from the charge of rashness for having were now renewed, and the Athenians order- undertaken such an adventure with so small a ed Eunomus, with thirteen galleys, to repress force. But the event itself seems sufficient to them. In the mean while the Spartan govern- exculpate him. He had no object but plunder ment had resumed its project of attaining its in view, and might safely calculate on overobject by means of negotiation, and once more powering all the resistance that could be opposent out Antalcidas, as the person whose influ-sed to such an unexpected attack. He gave ence with Tiribazus would open the readiest orders to strike none but the ships of war which access to the Persian court, as admiral in the might be lying in the harbour, to capture as room of Hierax. Antalcidas was escorted to many merchant vessels as could be convenientEphesus by Gorgopas and his squadron, and only taken in tow, and to carry away as many his arrival sent Gorgopas with ten galleys back to Ægina. The remainder of the fleet, which Joined him at Ephesus, he placed under the command of his lieutenant, Nicolochus, while he himself proceeded on more important business to the court of Artaxerxes. Gorgopas on his return fell in with the Athenian squadron under Eunomus, and was chased by him into the port of Ægina, where he arriEunomus sailed ved a little before sunset. away soon after dark, with a light in the stern of his galley, to keep his squadron together. Gorgopas, whose men in the mean while had landed and refreshed themselves, now embarked again, and pushed across the gulf in the enemy's wake, guided by his light, with every precaution for suppressing or weakening the usual sounds of galleys in motion. At Cape Zoster, as the Athenians were landing, the silence of the night was broken by the sound of the trumpet, and after a short engagement by moonlight, Gorgopas captured four of their galleys; the rest made their escape into Piræus. But not long after, Chabrias, having been sent with a squadron of ten galleys and 800 targeteers to the aid of Evagoras, landed by night on Ægina, and posted his targeteers in an ambush. The next day, according to a preconcerted plan, a body of heavy-armed infantry, which had come over with him under the command of Deimanetus, advanced into the interior of the island. Gorgopas marched to meet them with all the forces he could muster, and passing by the ambuscade, was routed and fell in the action, with some other Spartans and between three and VOL. I.-4 D prisoners as could be taken from the rest. Not The Athenians, however, still retained the ascendency in the Hellespont, where Nicolochus, who, after the departure of Antalcidas, had sailed northward with five-and-twenty galleys, was blockaded at Abydus by an Athenian squadron of two-and-thirty, which was stationed on the opposite coast of the Chersonesus, under the command of Diotimus and Iphicrates. But the aspect of affairs was completely changed by the arrival of Antalcidas, who returned in 387 with Tiribazus from the Persian court, where he had been treated wth marks of dis nians. If any state refuse to accept this peace, I will make war against it with those who coasent to these terms, by land and by sea, with ships and with money. The treaty founded on these conditions was ratified by all the parties almost without oppos tion. A little delay arose from the Thebans, who were reluctant to part with the sovereignty they had hitherto exercised over many of the Bac tian towns, and wished, for the sake of at last retaining their pretensions, to ratify in the name of all the other Baotians. But Agesilaus, who was charged to receive the oath of their min isters, refused to accept it in this form, and tinguished favour by Artaxerxes, and had fully succeeded in the main object of his mission, having prevailed on the king to aid Sparta in carrying on the war until the Athenians and their allies should accept a peace to be dictated in the king's name on terms previously arranged between him and the Spartan ambassador. Being informed of the situation of Nicolochus, he proceeded by land to Abydus, and took the command of the blockaded squadron, with which he sailed out in the night, after having deceived the enemy by a report that he had received an invitation from Chalcedon, and was going to make himself master of it. He was pursued by the Athenians towards the north, but stop-required them strictly to conform to the Perped at Percope until they had passed, and then returned to Abydus, where he expected to be joined by a squadron of twenty galleys which was on its way from Sicily and Italy; but before it arrived he received intelligence of the approach of eight Athenian galleys, which Thrasybulus (of Colyttus) was bringing from Thrace to the Hellespont. Having put to sea with twelve of his fastest vessels, he lay in wait in a retired situation until the enemy had sailed by; he then issued from his lurking-place, overtook, and captured the whole squadron. Soon afterward he was re-enforced, not only by the Syracusan and Italian galleys, but by others from lonia, and from the satrapy of Pharnabazus, who had gone up to court to marry the king's daughter Apama, and had left his government under the charge of Ariobarzanes, who was connected with Antalcidas by an ancient bond of hospitality. These additions raised his fleet to eighty sail, and gave him the complete command of the sea, so that he was enabled to divert the commerce of the Euxine from Athens into the ports of the allies of Sparta. The Athenians now saw themselves not only exposed to constant annoyance from Ægina, but in danger of falling again under the power of the enemy, and losing all the benefit of Conon's victory. They were, therefore, heartily desirous of an honourable peace. But the Spartans, who had to maintain a garrison at Orchomenus, and another at Lechæum, and were kept in continual anxiety by their allies, to protect the weak, and to guard themselves against the disaffected, were no less tired of the war. The Argives, also, seeing that their subterfuges would in future be of no avail, but that they must reckon on bearing their share of the evils of war, no longer wished to protract it. Most of the other states were probably still more anxious for the termination of a contest from which they could expect no advantage. When, therefore, Tiribazus, in his master's name, summoned a congress of deputies to listen to the proposals which he was commissioned to announce, all the belligerants readily sent their ministers to attend it. In the presence of this assembly Tiribazus, having shown the royal seal, read his master's decree, which ran in the following imperial style: King Artaxerxes thinks it right that the Greek cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomena and Cyprus, should belong to himself; but that all the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus; and that these should, as of old, belong to the Athe sian ordinance, and expressly to acknowledge the independence of all other states; and whea the envoys alleged that they were not authorized to comply with this demand, he bade then return home for fresh instructions, and inform their fellow-citizens that, if they resisted, they would be excluded from the benefit of the treaty. But, instead of waiting for their answer, he prevailed on the ephors to let him immediately enforce compliance with the sword; and proceeding to Tegea, began to make active preparations for the invasion of Baotia The effect of these hostile demonstrations, perhaps, disappointed his secret wishes; for be fore his forces were collected, the Theban envoys returned, and reported the submission of Thebes. One impediment to the general peace still remained; the governments of Corinth and Argos did not consider themselves bound by the treaty to altar the relations which had hitherto subsisted between them; and it was only when Agesilaus threatened them with war that they consented, the one to dismiss, and the other to withdraw the Argive garrison from Corinth. Its departure was attended by an immediate reaction in the state of the Corinthian parties. The authors of the massacre, knowing themselves to be generally odious to their fellowcitizens, thought themselves no longer safe at home, and left the city. Most of them found refuge at Athens, where they met with a much more honourable reception than they deserved. The exiles of the opposite faction were recalled; and their return dissolved the union with Argos, and restored the influence of Sparta and the oligarchical institutions. This treaty, which was long celebrated under the name of the peace of Antalcidas, was undoubtedly a masterpiece of policy; nor does it appear to deserve the censure which it incurred from the Attic orators and from Plutarch, and which has been repeated by some modern writers as a breach of political morality. Sparta, in her transactions with Persia during the Peloponnesian war, had more than once acknowledged the title of the Persian king to the dominion of the Asiatic Greeks; she had never pledged herself to maintain their independence; and even if she had done so, the revival of the maritime power of Athens, and its union with that of Persia, would have afforded a fair plea for receding from an engagement which she was no longer able to fulfil The clause in favour of Athens was, perhaps, only designed to excite jealousy and discord between Athens and the hated Baotians. It has been attributed to a deeper policy; it has Deen considered as a device by which Sparta | interpreter of the treaty; she expounded it by reserved a pretext for eluding the conditions the rule, not of reason, but of might, with the of the treaty, which she rigorously enforced in sword in hand, and the power of Persia at her the case of other states.* But it is doubtful back. And thus the peace of Antalcidas, which whether the exception expressly made con- professed to establish the independence of the cerning the three islands which Athens was al- Greek states, subjected them more than ever lowed to retain could have been needed, or, if to the will of one. It was not in this respect needful, could have availed, as a colour under only that appearances were contrary to the real which Sparta, while she stripped Thebes of her state of things. The position of Sparta, though sovereignty in Boeotia, might keep possession seemingly strong, was artificial and precarious; of Messenia and the subject districts of Laco- while the majestic attitude in which the Pernia. Sparta did not permit a question to be sian king dictated terms to Greece, disguised a raised on this point; she was constituted the profound consciousness that his throne subsisted only by sufferance, and that its best security was the disunion of the people with whom he assumed so lordly an air. By Manso, Sparta, iii., 1, p. 105. APPENDIX TO THE FIRST VOLUME. 1. ON THE NUMBER OF THE SPARTAN TRIBES. THAT before the conquest of Peloponnesus, the Dorians were divided into three tribes, which were supposed to have derived their names from Hyllus, the son of Hercules, and from Dymas and Pamphylus, sons of the Dorian king Ægimius, seems sufficiently certain (Steph. Byz., Avμav). This, of itself, without any direct testimony, raises a presumption that the same division prevailed in all the Dorian states, where the contrary cannot be distinctly proved. Besides this, there appears to be scarcely any valid ground for assigning the same number to the Spartan tribes. Pindar's allusion to the forefathers of the Dorian race (Pyth., 1, 61), seems not to deserve the stress which is laid upon it by Mueller (Dor., iii., 5, 1), whose argument does not need it. It gains little from the remark of the scholiast, who introduces Dorus among the sons of Ægimius. The main question is, whether there is any reason for preferring a different number for the Spartan tribes. Several authors, overlooking the Dorian tribes altogether, have confined their attention to passages in which the local divisions of Sparta, or its immediate neighbourhood, are described as tribes, and especially to a passage of Pausanias, where he speaks of the inhabitants of these four divisions as if they comprehended the whole body of the Spartans (iii., 16, 9, Of Λιμνᾶται Σπαρτιατῶν καὶ Κυνόσουρεῖς καὶ ἐκ Μεσόας τε καὶ Пrávns). To these four some add a fifth, the Egeids, on the authority of Herodotus (iv., 149, Alyciðaι Quλn peyan Ev Enápr). And Barthelemy (Anacharsis, note to c. 41), acutely perceiving the necessity for a local division corresponding to this fifth tribe, places the chapel, or, as he calls it, the tomb of Ægeus, mentioned by Paus., iii., 15, 8, in an imaginary hameau des Egides. Other authors, without making any such supposition, add the Heracleids as a sixth tribe. So Cragius, De Rep. Lac., 1, 6, who is followed by Manso (Sparta 1, Beylage 8). But as Barthelemy urges the number of the Ephors in confirmation of his hypothesis, so Manso insists on the ancient division of Sparta into six regions as an argument for the six tribes, but does not point out any connexion between these two divisions. He seems to have found no difficulty in associating two purely genealogical tribes, such as the Egeids and the Heracleids, if they were tribes at all, must have been, with others, attached to certain localities. So Meursius (Misc. Lac., 1,7) enriches the same list with the tribes Avuavis and Пaudulis, without troubling himself about the quarter which they inhabited. On much slighter grounds, Goettling (Excursus 1, ad Aristot., Polit.), who strangely misconceives the force of Mueller's arguments, contends for ten tribes. He does not pretend to assign their names; but he thinks that this number is proved by that of the Cretan Cosmi, which he supposes to have been likewise that of the Spartan Ephors, before the reign of Theopompus. This supposition he grounds on a passage in the Lexicon of Timæus, which speaks of ten Ephors, five superior, and five inferior ("Epopot. Tévre uelSous, Kai Révre λárrous). It is clear, however, that this passage, whatever may be its authority, will admit of a very different explanation, and can only prove that there were two sets of officers, differing in dignity, both bearing the title of Ephors. Nothing can be more arbitrary than to suppose that the number of the Ephors was reduced from ten to five by Theopompus. It would be a much more probable conjecture that the number was increased in his time from five to ten, as might have happened, if the original functions of the Ephors, or a part of them, were then transferred to other magistrates called by the same name. But a statement so insulated as this of Timæus affords no foundation for any hypothesis. Still less can Aristotle's remark, that the Spartans were said to have amounted at one time (ROTE, which Goettling translates ab initio) to ten thousand, warrant any inference as to the original number of the tribes. On the whole, as there is no difficulty in supposing that both the Heracleids and the Egeids were included in the three tribes, and as this number is perfectly consistent with a different one for the local division of the capital, it seems preferable to every other that has been proposed. All the information which the ancients have left us, exclusive of scattered facts and allusions on the Spartan institutions, lies within a very narrow compass. A few chapters of Herodotus (1. 65, vi., 51–60), the little treatise as cribed to Xenophon, De Republica Lacedæmoniorum, the Of the foreign authors who have treated it, we do not pretend to give a list: the most valuable may be presumed to be known to most readers who take an interest in these researches; but as those who are most familiar with them will be least inclined to despise even the smallest additional help, we will take this opportunity of mentioning a few works which have not acquired so much celebrity. The old compilations of Cragius and Meursius are perhaps chiefly interesting, as they show the immense progress which philology has since made, and the same remark may apply, though not with equal force, to the works of Barthelemy (Anacharsis, c. 41-51) and Pastoret (Histoire de la Legis lation, vol. v.), who is less critical, as well as less amusing than Barthelemy, though certainly much more instructive than Pauw (Recherches sur les Grecs), and free from his ridiculous presumption. Mueller's great work (History of the Dorians) will long be the best book on the subject. But Manso's Sparta may still be read with profit, though his prolixity and frequent want of critical tact presents a contrast to Mueller's condensed exuberance and never-failing, though not altogether infallible sagacity. Schlosser (Universal Historische Uebersicht, vol. i.) is on this, as on all subjects, instructive; but has, perhaps, been a little biased on some points by his prejudice against Mueller. Next to Mueller, the works of Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthumskunde) and C. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthuemer) are the most important. Those of Tittmann (Darstellung der Griechischen Staatsverfassungen), Heeren (Ideen), and Plass (Geschichte Griechenlands, vol. ii.), may be consulted with more or less advantage. And on account of the intimate connexion between the Cretan and Spartan institutions, Hoeck's elaborate work on Crete (Kreta) deserves particular notice here. A third class might be formed of works and essays which require to be used with great caution, as they frequently combine very ingenious and original views with extremely rash and ill-founded conjectures and assertions. Among the authors of this class we feel obliged to number Huellmann, though many of his writings (particularly his Anfänge der Griechischen Geschichte, and Staatstrecht des Alterthums) contain a great store of interesting combinations. We have had occasion more than once to refer to Goettling's Excursus on the Politics. Some of the mistakes which he has committed there are corrected in the Additions to Mueller's Prolegomena. His views on the Spartan Constitution may be found more fully unfolded in an article in the Hermes, vol. xxv., which affords a fair specimen of his critical merits and failings. We might, perhaps, not have placed Kortuem in this list, if we had only formed a judgment of him from his work, Zur Geschichte Hellenischer Staatsverfassungen. But an essay entitled Wesen und Schicksal der Dorisch-Lakonischen Ackergesetzgebung in Schlosser's Archiv., amply deserves mention here, though less for its ingenuity than for its astonishing temerity. Finally, a remarkable example of extensive learning devoted to the service of a political fanaticism, which can only be explained from the temper of the period in which the work appeared, may be found in Stuhr's Untergang der Naturstaaten, which he published in 1812, under the assumed name of Feodor Eggo. (The part relating to Sparta will be found in p. 103-138.) |