austed remnant of the mora at length reached that they no longer ventured to repeat their ma

a rising ground, about two miles from Lechaum, and two furlongs from the sea, and boats were sent out which afforded some of them means of escape ;* and a few more were rescued by their cavalry, which came up about the same time.

rauding excursions by land, but crossed over the gulf, and landed near Corinth, when they saw opportunity of giving annoyance. Even in later times the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora-two hundred and fifty men-continued to be mentioned as the great military action of his life, and was not thought unworthy to be named in the same page with Marathon and Platea.

It is not improbable that this victory of Iphierates was attended with another result, which Xenophon has not thought fit to notice. It seems not only to have prevented the Theban envoys from discharging their commission, but to have put a stop to a negotiation which was proceeding at the same time between Athens and Sparta, after it had reached a very advanced stage. From an extant oration of Andocides, which certainly belongs to this year,† we learn that the orator had been sent on an em

After all, the whole loss of the Lacedæmonians amounted to no more than 250 men.† Yet it produced a degree of consternation and dejection on the one side, and of exultation on the other, which is significant in the same proportion that the disaster appears to us slight, and the exploit inconsiderable. Nothing more clearly shows the weakness of Sparta and the power of her name than the importance attributed both by herself and by her enemies to this petty affair. As soon as Agesilaus heard the news, he set off, without a moment's delay, accompanied by his principal officers, towards the scene of action, ordering the troops to follow after snatching a hasty meal. But before he reach-bassy to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a ed Lechæum, he was met by some horsemen, who informed him that the slain had already been taken up, and he therefore returned to the Heræum, and the next day proceeded with the sale of the booty and the captives. The Bootian envoys were now called in to discharge their commission; but they, too, had heard of the enemy's recent calamity, and thought it made such an alteration in the posture of affairs, that they forbore even to mention the business on which they had been sent, and merely requested leave to visit their troops who were quartered at Corinth. Agesilaus saw through their motives, and promised that he would take them along with him, and give them means of judging what their friends had gained by their victory. Accordingly, he marched the next day towards Corinth, and having most searchingly ravaged the surrounding country, without encountering an enemy, sent the envoys by sea to Creusis. Yet even this proof of their superiority could not allay the grief of the army, where, says Xenophon, the only cheerful faces were those of the relatives of the slain who had fallen in the late action at their post. Agesilaus, having accomplished the object of his expedition, now set out homeward. He took with him the remnant of the defeated mora, leaving another in its room at Lechæum. But his march through Peloponnesus was like that of the Roman army on its return from the Caudine Forks. He would only enter the towns, where he was forced to rest, as late as he could in the evening, and left them again at break of day. At Mantinea, though it was dark when he reached it, he would not stop at all, that his men might not have to endure the insulting joy of their ill-affected allies. On the other hand, Iphicrates was imboldened by his success to aim at fresh advantages; and he recovered Sidus, Crommyon, and Enoe, where Agesilaus had left a garrison. His achievement struck such terror into the Corinthian exiles at Sicyon,

Schneider's supposition, that the men in the boats, who

are expressly said to have come from Lechæum, were nevertheless the heavy infantry of Callias, needs no refutation, and can only excite astonishment. He ought not here to have complained of Xenophon's negligence and obscurity, well founded as the censure is in a more general application.

As the mora consisted in general of about 600 men, it would seem that the disaster was magnified in the first report brought of it to Agesilaus

peace, but that, though the terms proposed by the Spartans satisfied him and his colleagues, they chose to lay them before the Athenian assembly, and returned to Athens, accompanied by Spartan plenipotentiaries, to whom forty days were allowed for the negotiation. They were met by ministers from Corinth and Argos, who came to urge their ally to continue the war. The conditions proposed were such as, before Conon's victory, would have been deemed highly advantageous to the Athenians. They were not only released from all restrictions as to the fortifications of their city and their marine, but were permitted to resume possession of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. According to the orator's statement, there were persons at Athens who thought these proposals so inviting, that they complained of the delay which had been created by the timidity of their envoys. On the other hand, he intimates that there were others who looked for much more; who hoped to recover the Thracian Chersonesus, the colonies, and even the estates and the debts, which might be claimed by Athenian citizens in foreign lands; demands which, as Andocides observes, not only their enemies, but their allies, would certainly have resisted. But the success of Iphicrates, and the impression which it was reported to have left on the Spartans, may have caused these expectations to seem less extravagant, and have contributed at least to the breaking off of the negotiation. One trace of a sudden and violent reaction seems to be, that Andocides was banished on account of the share he had taken in it.‡

Minute as these occurrences are, they are, perhaps, both in themselves and for the impression they produced, the most momentous that took place in Greece before the end of the war. We should have been glad, indeed, to know a little more of the causes which withdrew Iphicrates from this scene of action shortly after his victory; for they would perhaps have thrown But Xenophon only informs us that he was dissome light on the internal state of Corinth. missed by the Argives, after he had put to death

Nepos, Iph., 2. Moram Lacedæmoniorum interæpit: quod maxime tota celebratum est Græcia. † See Mr. Clinton, F. H., ii., p. 99. # Pseudo-Plut. Vit. X. Orat. Andocides.

some Corinthians of their party from what motive and on what pretext, we do not learn; nor does it appear whether this transaction had any influence on the relations between Athens and Argos.

which, Xenophon observes, no army, great o small, could have passed without the consent of the Etolians. They permitted his passage, because they hoped to be aided by his influence in recovering Naupactus. At Rhium he cross ed the straits, and returned home

losing a harvest, on which the subsistence of the people, who were but little conversant with arts or commerce, mainly depended, sent envoys to Sparta to treat for peace, and submitted to the terms which Agesilaus had dictated.

The same year his young colleague Agesipolis, who had now reached his majority, was intrusted with the command of an expedition against Argos. He had reason to expect that the Argives would avail themselves of the presidency which they claimed, in the name of Corinth, over the Isthmian games, to stop his march under a religious pretext, which, though he might disregard it himself, might exert some influence on the superstition of a Lacedæmonian army. He therefore thought it proper first to consult the ministers of the Olympic god, whether he might invade Argolis without impiety, even if the Argive should claim the protection of the holy season, which it belonged to the

In the year following, no military operations seem to have taken place in Peloponnesus ex- The event proved the policy of the modera cept the petty combats or alternate inroads be- tion which he had shown against the wish of tween Sicyon and Corinth, which Xenophon his allies. The next spring, as he was prehimself does not think worth more than a gen-paring for a second invasion of Acarnania, the eral notice. But the arms of Agesilaus were Acarnanians, alarmed by the prospect of again turned against Acarnania, where he displayed his usual ability, and established the Spartan supremacy almost without bloodshed. The Etolian town of Calydon seems to have found itself in need of protection against the hostility of the Acarnanians, and thus to have been induced to attach itself to the Achæan body, which, with its usual liberality, admitted it to the enjoyment of equal rights, and sent a body of troops to garrison the town. But after this event the Acarnanians continued their aggressions, and being supported by Athenian and Boeotian auxiliaries, pressed the town so closely that the Achæans were at length compelled to demand aid from Sparta. Agesilaus marched to overawe or chastise the Acarnanians. Before he crossed their frontier, he sent a messenger to the national congress at Stratus, threatening to lay waste the whole country unless they immediately renounced their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and joined the Spartan confederacy. When they refused to sub-presidents of the games publicly to announce. mit, he began to put his threat into execution, The god was made to answer that piety did not and ravaged the district which he first entered require him to admit a fraudulent plea, such as with such unsparing diligence, as to advance that of the Argives would be, if they should alno more than about a mile and a half in the day. ter the time of the festival to suit their own inThe extreme slowness of his progress, which terest, even should their title to the presidency was attributed to the resolution which he had be acknowledged.* Agesipolis then put the expressed, encouraged the Acarnanians, who same question to the Delphic oracle, under a at first had removed their flocks and herds to form which sounds to us ludicrous, whether the mountains for safety, to bring them down Apollo was of the same mind as his father, and again into the plains, and to continue their ru- he received an equally encouraging reply. He ral labours. But Agesilaus, after having lin- then proceeded to Phlius, which he had apgered for a fortnight near the border, to lull pointed as the place of rendezvous, and led his them into complete security, made a forced army towards Argolis. The Argives, as had march of twenty miles, which in the course of been their practice on former occasions, sent one day brought him to a plain on the margin two heralds to meet him at the border, and anof a lake, where almost all the cattle were col-nounce the commencement of the sacred truce, lected for pasture, and thus made himself master of a great part of the wealth of Acarnania. He was afterward attacked by the Acarnanian targeteers as he issued from the plain, in a narrow pass, between the mountains and the edge of the lake, but dislodged them from the heights by a vigorous charge, and killed about 300. During the rest of the summer he ranged over the country, and at the request of the Achæans, attacked some of the towns, but without success. When he was preparing to withdraw, the Achæans expressed a wish that he should stay to the end of the seed-time, and destroy the hopes of the next harvest. But he observ-to the presidency of the Isthmian games, to avail themselves ed that this would be to deprive himself of the only hold he had on the fears of the Acarnanians, by which in another year he might bring them to sue for peace. An Athenian squadron was lying at Eniadæ, to intercept him, if, as was expected, he should attempt to cross the gulf from any part of the coast immediately below Calydon. To avoid it, he marched to Rhium through the heart of Ætolia, by roads along

during which they pretended to the same ex

nature of the pretence set up by the Argives, because we *We have adopted this conjecture of Dodwell's as to the do not know of any that does not raise still greater difficulties. Yet, if Xenophon's history did not abound in ble that he should have related the scruples of Agesipolis seeming inconsistencies, we might have thought it incrediwithout throwing out some hint to reconcile them with the conduct of Agesilaus, who, at the preceding Isthmian festival, had treated the Argives as intruders. One would have thought that after this the Argives could not have dreamed of stopping a Spartan army by such an expedient. Anoth er difficulty is raised by Xenophon's remark, that this had been their usual practice (warep siwcoav). What opportunity had they ever had before, since the beginning of their union with Corinth, on which they founded their title

of it in this manner? Dodwell presumes, without any auartifice. But this is the more improbable, as his invasion thority, that they had tried to stop Agesilaus by the same did not take place in an Isthmian year. Possibly, however, the Argives may have abused their presidency of the Neexpose the extravagant absurdity of the supposition, that mean festival for such purposes. We need say nothing to the subject on which Agesipolis consulted the two oracles was a mere ordinary proposal of truce, and that Xenophon could have used such a phrase as brоpéρev Tods μnvas to express such a meaning, even if the words ὁπότε καθήκοι ὁ Xpovos had not occurred in the same sentence

secured the fidelity of Abydus by an appeal to its fears and hopes from the Spartan powerwhich, he argued, was not shaken by the event of the sea-fight-and induced the people of Sestus to give shelter to several of the ejected harmosts, and to other friends of the Spartan inter the Chersonesus, and to defy the attacks of the Persian armament. Pharnabazus, when he ar rived at the Hellespont, endeavoured to detach these two cities from the Spartan alliance by threats, but in vain; nor could he make any impression on Abydus, though he ravaged its territory, while Conon blockaded it by sea. But, in the course of the winter, Conon drew contributions from the other cities on the Hellespont for the armament with which Pharnabazus designed to retaliate upon Sparta for the injuries he had suffered.

emption from hostile inroads as the Eleans enjoyed for the celebration of the Olympic festival. But Agesipolis answered that the gods had decided against their plea, and continued his march, spreading terror as he advanced, towards the capital. It happened that on the same day the shock of an earthquake was feltest, whom he collected there from other parts of in the Spartan camp. The king and his principal attendants, who were at supper, immediately raised a pæan to Posidon, the earth-shaking god; and their example was followed by the Lacedæmonian troops. But a murmur arose among the allies, that the earthquake was a warning to retreat, as Agis had done from Elis, on a similar occasion. Agesipolis, however, with great prezence of mind, interpreted the omen as an encouragement, because it had occurred after he had crossed the border. Yet, after he had ravaged the country even beyond the extreme points which Agesilaus-whom he affected to outdo-had reached in his invasion, ted a great fleet, and raised a strong body of and had driven the enemy within their walls, he suffered himself to be deterred by the aspect of the victims from fortifying a post on the border, which might have been as annoying to Argos as Decelea had been to Athens. As it was, the expedition yielded no fruit but the plunder, with which he returned to Sparta.

In the following spring, 393, having collect

mercenaries, Pharnabazus himself again embarked with Conon, and, sailing to the coast of Laconia, entered the Messenian Gulf, where they ravaged the rich vale of the Parisus about Pheræ, and, making descents at many other points, inflicted all the damage in their power. When it seemed no longer prudent to remain In the mean while, through the ambition of on a hostile and harbourless coast, and their Sparta and the patriotic efforts of Conon, Athens provisions were growing scarce, they made for had been enabled to take some great steps to- Cythera. The inhabitants of the town of Cy. wards securing her independence, and recover-thera, whose walls were in bad condition, capiting a part, at least, of her ancient power. Af-ulated, and were allowed to withdraw to Laco ter the sea-fight of Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Co- nia. The fortifications were repaired, and Ninon had cruised about the Ægean, had expelled cophemus, an Athenian, an intimate friend of the Lacedæmonian harmosts from most of the Conon's,* was left there with a garrison as harmaritime cities, and had won the inhabitants most. They then sailed to the Isthmus, and by the assurance which the satrap was induced Pharnabazus, after exhorting the deputies of by his Athenian counsellor to hold out to them, the allied states whom he found there to carry that their citadels should not be occupied by on the war with vigour, and to abide by their foreign garrisons, and that they should be left engagements to his master, and leaving them a in the unrestrained enjoyment of domestic lib- subsidy as large as he could spare, prepared to erty. It was one of the rare happy junctures return home. But Conon now requested that in their history, when a struggle between the the fleet might be placed at his disposal, promgreater powers gave a temporary importance to ising to maintain it at the expense of the isl their preference. Pharnabazus afterward land- anders of the Ægean, without any farther deed at Ephesus, where he left the greater part mand on the Persian treasury. And he propoof the fleet, and, ordering Conon to meet him sed, in the first instance, to employ it in a work at Sestus with forty galleys, proceeded by land which, as he represented to the satrap, would to his own satrapy. But, before he and Conon be felt by Sparta as one of the deepest wounds met in the Hellespont, Dercyllidas, who, having she could suffer. It was to restore the Long been sent forward, as we have seen, by Agesi- Walls of Athens, and the fortifications of Pirælaus, happened to be at Abydus, when he re-us, and thus to undo what it had cost the Sparceived the tidings of Pisander's defeat, both

But the ground of this pretension is extremely obscure. Schneider observes that he does not know of any passage in any Greek author that made mention of an Isthmian truce. And perhaps this ought to be considered as one of the circumstances which point rather to some local or Dorian festival (of which Pausanias seems to speak, iii., 5, 8, πέμπουσι κήρυκα οἱ 'Αργείοι σπεισόμενον πρὸς ̓Αγησίπολιν | σφισι πατρώους δή τινὰς σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους) than to the Isthmian games. This would be consistent enough with Xenophon's language; but it does not appear how the Argives could have claimed the right of fixing the time for the celebration of such a common festival; and it seems certain that they

never possessed it with regard to the Carnea.

To any one not used to Xenophon's manner, it must seem surprising that, after having related, iv., 4, 19, that Agesilaus had ravaged the whole of Argolis (δηώσας πᾶσαν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν), he should now say that Agesipolis did not lead his army far into the country (hycito où Toppw els Thy xúpav), but only, having learned from his soldiers, who had served under Agesilaus in Argolis, how far he had extended his ravages, endeavoured to go beyond him.

tans the efforts of many years to accomplish. He would thus, while he conferred an inestimable obligation on the Athenians, most effectually revenge himself. Pharnabazus eagerly adopted so easy a mode of gratifying his resentment, and not only granted Conon's request, but furnished him with money for his undertaking. Conon immediately sailed to Athens, and re stored a great part of the walls with the labour of his crews, and of workmen hired with the Persian gold. The rest was completed by the Athenians themselves, with the aid of their allies, more especially the Thebans, who, a few years before, had done their utmost to level the whole city with the ground. While this work was proceeding, the Corinthians, with the sub sidy they had received, fitted out a squadron, with which their admiral, Agathinus, scoured

the Corinthian Gulf. The Spartans sent Polemarchus with some galleys to oppose him; but their commander was soon after slain, and Pollis, who took his place, was compelled, by a wound which he received in another engagement, to resign it to Herippidas. Herippidas seems to have driven the Corinthians from their station at Rhium; and Teleutias, who succeeded him, recovered the complete mastery of the gulf, and was thus enabled, as we have seen,* to co-operate with Agesilaus at Lechæum.

master's consent, he did not scruple privately to supply Antalcidas with money for the purpose of raising a navy to carry on the war with the states which were still acknowledged as allies of Persia; and, having drawn Conon to Sardis, he threw him into prison, on the pretext that he had abused his trust, and had employed the king's forces for the aggrandizement of Athens. He then repaired to court to report his proceedings and to consult the royal pleasure. It was, perhaps, rather through some court intrigue or vague suspicion, than a delib

But this partial success did not diminish the alarm with which the Spartan government view-erate purpose of adopting a line of policy oppoed the operations of Conon, who was proceed- site to that of Tiribazus, that Artaxerxes deing to restore the Athenian dominion on the tained him at court, and sent Struthas down to coasts and in the islands of the Egean. It fill his place. Struthas had, perhaps, witnessed perceived that it was necessary to change its the Asiatic campaigns of Agesilaus, and could policy with regard to the court of Persia, and not all at once get rid of the impression that for the present, at least, to drop the design of the Spartans were his master's most formidaconquest in Asia, and to confine itself to the ble enemies. He therefore immediately made object of counteracting the efforts of the Atheni- known his intention of siding with the Atheans, and establishing its own supremacy among nians and their allies. The Spartan governthe European Greeks; and it did not despair of ment, perhaps too hastily, concluding that their making the Persian court subservient to these prospect of amicable dealings with Persia was ends. For this purpose, Antalcidas, a dexterous now quite closed, determined to renew hostilipolitician of Lysander's school, was sent to Ti- ties in Asia, and sent Thimbron-apparently ribazus, who was now occupying the place of the same officer whom we have already seen Tithraustes in Western Asia, to negotiate a commanding there, and who had been fined, on peace. His mission awakened the apprehen- his return to Sparta, for his misconduct-to insions of the hostile confederacy, and envoys vade the king's territory. Thimbron, if it is the were sent from Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, and same person, had not learned wisdom from exArgos, to defeat his attempts, and to support perience. He was addicted to the pleasures of the interests of the allies at the satrap's court. the table, careless, and improvident in the disAntalcidas, however, made proposals highly charge of his duties. In the inroads which he agreeable to Tiribazus, and accompanied them made from Ephesus and from the lower vale of with arguments which convinced the satrap the Mæander, into the satrapy of Struthas, while that his master's interest perfectly coincided he suffered his troops to range over the country with that of Sparta. He renounced all claim on for plunder, he paid little attention to their the part of his government to the Greek cities safety, and, when they were attacked, would in Asia, and was willing that they should re- succour them in as negligent and disorderly a main subject to the king's authority. For the manner as if he thought his presence alone was islands and the other towns he asked nothing sufficient to scare the enemy away. Struthas but independence. Thus, he observed, no mo- took advantage of his failings, and, one day that tive for war between Greece and Persia would he had gone out at the head of a small party to be left. The king could gain nothing by it, and attack some of the Persian cavalry who had would have no reason to fear either Athens or been purposely thrown in his way, suddenly apSparta so long as the other Greek states re-peared with a superior force, slew him and a mained independent. Tiribazus was perfectly satisfied, but had not authority to close with these overtures, at least against the will of the states which were at present in alliance with his master; and they refused to accede to a treaty on these terms. We should have wished to know what objections they alleged; but Xenophon has only mentioned the grounds on which they were averse to it. The Athenians feared that, by assenting to the principle which was proposed as the basis of the treaty, they should forfeit their claim, not only to maritime dominion, but even to the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus, which they were accustomed to consider as parts of their own territory. The Thebans dreaded the loss of their sovereignty in Boeotia; the Argives, that they should be compelled to abandon their hold upon Corinth. They probably grounded their opposition on very different arguments; and, though they did not convince Tiribazus, they succeeded in putting an end to the public negotiation.

But, though the satrap did not venture openly to enter into alliance with Sparta without his * Above, p. 571.

flute-player named Thersander, the favourite companion of his convivial hours, and defeated the rest of his army, as it came up after him, with great slaughter.

Diphridas was sent from Sparta to collect the scattered remains of his army, and to raise fresh troops, to defend the allied cities, and carry on the war with Struthas; and, as he was much superior to Thimbron in energy and self-command, he soon repaired the consequences of his predecessor's misconduct, and, among other advantages, captured Tigranes, the sonin-law of Struthas, with his wife, as they were on their way to Sardis. Their ransom afforded an ample supply for the payment of his troops. He was brought over by a squadron of eight galleys, which the Spartan government sent, under the command of Ecdicus, at the request of their Rhodian partisans, to wrest Rhodes from the sway of the democratical party and the Athenians. But Ecdicus, on his arrival at Cnidus, found that the democratical Rhodians were superior to their adversaries both by sea and land, and that their naval force doubled his own, so that he was forced to remain inactive

at Cnius. When his situation became known | remark that he died with the reputation of a at Sparta, Teleutias was ordered to sail to Asia with the twelve galleys which he had with him m the Corithian Gulf, to supersede Ecdicus, and to prosecute the war, in Rhodes or elsewhere, as he found opportunity. His first adventure, after he had taken the command at Cnidus, illustrates the complicated relations and the unsettled state of Greek politics at this period. Teleutias, whose force had been raised, by some additions which it received at Samos, to seven-and-twenty galleys, on his way from Cni-pected from him, the government readily s dus to Rhodes fell in with a squadron of ten, sent by the Athenians to aid Evagoras, who had revolted from the King of Persia, their ally, and the enemy of Sparta, whose admiral nevertheless destroyed or captured the whole.