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he may not have sacrificed the public service | to Andros. On his way to Andros, Phanosto his pleasures, it seems clear that he indulged thenes made a capture which enabled the Athewithout restraint in those which the wealthy nians to exhibit a generous feeling, of which, and voluptuous cities of the Asiatic coast placed unhappily, few instances occur in Greek histowithin his reach.* It was also discovered that ry. Dorieus, with two Thracian galleys, fell in he had built a stronghold in the neighbourhood his way, and was taken and sent to Athens of Pactye, in the Thracian Chersonesus;† and He had been outlawed, with his whole family, this provision for a refuge in distress was be- both in Rhodes and at Athens, as a sworn foe lieved to indicate consciousness of guilt, or of a to the Athenian interests; and the activity with treasonable design. The affair at Notium con- which he had since served on the side of the firmed suspicions which had been before float- Peloponnesians had rendered him an object of ing in the public mind, and excited its resent- extraordinary resentment to the Athenians. ment to the utmost. Alcibiades was removed Yet the people were softened by the presence from his command; and Thrasybulus-though of their inveterate enemy when he was brought it does not appear that he had been guilty of as a captive before the assembly; they rescindany offence but that of receiving his colleague's ed his sentence, and restored him to liberty unfortunate visit-was involved in the same without a ransom.* His majestic aspect, and disgrace. His attachment to Alcibiades was the many victories which he had won in the naperhaps the motive which really swayed the tional games,† pleaded no doubt powerfully for authors of these measures; though they must him, and detract something from the merit of have devised a different pretext to cover their the clemency which he experienced. Yet they attack. He, however, continued to serve in the did not, it seems, prove sufficient, though coupfleet; but Alcibiades, who found that even there led with the recollection of many important his conduct was generally condemned, sailed services, to screen him from the resentment of away to his fortified domain in the Chersone- the Spartans, who are said to have put him to death some years afterward on a slight suspi cion. We do not know how far he may have contributed to an event which took place in the course of this year, and which is the most mem orable in the history of his native island, and not without moment in the affairs of Greece. The three chief towns of the island, Ialysus, Lindus, and Camirus, were politically incorpo rated in a new capital, which took the name of Rhodes, and contributed each a share to its population. The unfailing tendency of such changes to promote democratical ascendency must, we should think, have rendered Sparta averse to this union, though in the present state of her affairs she did not venture to oppose it. And if Dorieus, notwithstanding his aristocratical prejudices, was induced by patriotic motives to forward it, his conduct, on this occasion, may have secretly provoked that displeasure, which afterward vented itself under the colour of a groundless charge.||

sus.

Conon was permitted to remain in office. He was wealthy, and his family seems to have belonged to the higher class; he had probably taken no part in the late political convulsions, and might therefore be courted as a useful ally by every party. He had hitherto met with few opportunities of displaying his talents, though it may perhaps be collected from a narrative of Diodorus, which, however, is certainly much exaggerated, and perhaps full of fictitious incidents—that he had preserved Corcyra when it was again threatened by its domestic factions, and had secured the Athenian interest without a renewal of the old scenes of bloodshed. He had, however, probably been rising in reputation, and was now looked upon as the man who was most capable of filling the place of Alcibiades. Nine new colleagues were associated | with him; and the list of their names possesses an unusual interest on account of its connexion with some of the most important events of the ensuing history. They were Diomedon, Leon,◊ Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes. Conon was at this time at Andros, prosecuting the siege, with a squadron of twenty galleys. He FROM THE BATTLE OF NOTIUM TO THE END OF THE received orders to proceed with his squadron to Samos, and to take the command of the fleet; and Phanosthenes was sent with four galleys

*

Compare Plut., Alc., 36; Athenæus, xii., p. 535. Ta avtou Tεixn. Xenophon, Hell., i., 5, 17. They were near the coast of the Hellespont. Xenophon, Hell., ii., 1, 25. Hepi Bicávony. Plut., Alc., 36. Se Pactyen

contulit (Diodorus, xiii., 74) ibique tria castella communivit, Rornos, Bisanthen, Neontichos. Nepos, Alc., 7.

Unless we suppose him to have done this, the whole

account of the sedition in Diodorus, xiii., 48, must be re

jected as a mere fiction. But the observation of Thucydides, iv., 48, proves that the description of Diodorus is at least greatly overcharged.

Xenophon, H., i., 5, 16, names Leon, an officer already known to us, as one of the ten; but in the description of the battle of Arginuse he omits his name, and mentions Lysias instead. Schneider would therefore substitute the name of Lysias for that of Leon in the list, i., 5, 16, and would omit the name of Leon in the next passage where it occurs, H., ., 6, 16. It is, however, just possible that Leon was originally elected, and that he fell into the hands of Callicratidas in one of the galleys which Conon sent out from Mitylene, and that Lysias was appointed to fill his place.

CHAPTER XXX.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

WHEN Conon came to Samos, he found the fleet under his command superior in numbers to the enemy; but despondency was prevailing among the men, partly, perhaps, a consequence of the recent defeat; it was, however, probably still more owing to the want of full and regular pay, and to the contrast which they saw in this respect between their own prospects and those of the Peloponnesians, who were provided with an ample and unfailing supply from the inex haustible riches of the Persian treasury. The

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Athenian crews appear to have been thinned, support, when his year of office expired (406), as Lysander predicted, by frequent desertions, and Callicratidas was sent to succeed him. The and Conon deemed it expedient to reduce the new admiral was a genuine Spartan of the best numbers of his armament from above a hundred stamp, and directly opposite to Lysander in the to seventy galleys, that each might have its prop-leading points of his character; zealous for the er complement. His next care was to provide public service without selfish ends, keenly alive for its immediate exigencies; and he was com- both to his country's honour and his own, impelled, as Alcibiades had been, to employ it in patient of dissimulation and of servility. Lyexpeditions which had no other object than the sander exerted his utmost efforts to thwart, displunder to be collected in the descents which credit, and dishearten his successor. He sent he made on the enemy's coasts. The autumn all that was left of the Persian subsidy back to and winter passed without any more important Cyrus; and he probably instructed his partisans operations, for Lysander did not stir from Ephe- in the allied cities to withhold all that they could sus. He probably did not feel himself strong of the supplies and succours required for the enough to seek an engagement, but his atten- service. They no doubt sincerely regretted his tion was also deeply engaged by affairs of a dif- departure, and, perhaps, spontaneously vented ferent nature. His ambition was not such as their dissatisfaction in murmurs at the conduct commonly animated a Spartan general: the de- of the Spartan government, which so imprusire of glory earned in his country's service. dently changed its admirals, and often sent out His views were directed, in the first place, to men who had none of the qualifications needed his own aggrandizement; and he wished to make for the office; no naval experience, no knowl. it as much as possible independent of her great- edge of mankind, no acquaintance with the peoness. He was willing, indeed, to be useful, but ple among whom they came to command." He it was in order that he might become necessa- himself, when he resigned the fleet to Callicratry to her. On his arrival in Asia he found the idas at Ephesus, bade him remember that it Greek cities divided by the usual factions. The was victorious, and in possession of the sea. partisans of oligarchy, who had been kept down But Callicratidas, in answer to this boast, deunder the dominion of Athens, were beginning sired him to conduct it to Miletus, and to prove again to lift up their heads; but they still gen- his assertion by keeping Samos, where the Atheerally needed support from without. Here, nian fleet was lying, on his left hand. Lysantherefore, Lysander perceived an opportunity der, however, declined this test, on pretence of raising a host of adherents and satellites, that he did not choose to interfere with anoth bound to himself by the firmest ties of interest, er's province. After his departure Callicratiand ready to forward any design for which he das drew re-enforcements amounting to fifty might employ them. For the interest of Spar- galleys from Chios, Rhodes, and other quarters, 12 would have been sufficient to establish oli- and having thus collected 140 sail, prepared to garchical government in the room of democra- seek the enemy. The want of money, however, cy; but for Lysander's purpose something more interrupted his operations, and when he set about was required. While he stayed at Ephesus-procuring supplies, he discovered the machinawhere his naval preparations were perhaps rather the pretext than the motive for his protracted sojourn he sent for some of the leading men from the principal Greek cities, the boldest and most aspiring spirits he could find, and held out to them the prospect of attaining to that absolute power which they coveted over their fellow-citizens. As long as the contest with Athens remained undecided, this end could not be fully accomplished. The downfall of Athens, therefore, was a necessary condition for the fulfilment of their wishes; but it was not the only one. They would still need the aid of a patron who could engage the authority of Sparta in their behalf, and they could only hope permanently to triumph over their enemies and rivals if Lysander continued in a station which enabled him to befriend them. Having thus prepared them for future opportunities of action, he advised them in the mean while to collect their strength in clubs for mutual defence, and gradually to extend their influence by all the means which were already at their disposal; and he gave them an immediate earnest of his own good-will, by raising them to the highest offices which were subject to his nomination or control, and by abetting them in every aggression on the rights of others which his favour could enable them to commit with impunity.

He had thus placed himself at the head of a number of powerful, enterprising, and unscrupulous factions, which depended entirely on his VOL. 1.-0 00

tions of Lysander's adherents, and the murmurs by which they called his capacity in question. He was anxious, in the first place, to secure the active co-operation of his own countrymen who were serving under him, and for this purpose he assembled them at Ephesus in a council of war, in which, with dignified plainness, he noticed the complaints which had gone abroad. "He could have been content to have stayed at home, and had no ambition to dispute the precedence of naval skill with Lysander, or any one else who pretended to it; but he had been sent out to command the fleet, and it only remained for him to do his best. But finding him self thwarted as he was, he desired their advice, whether he should stay or return home, to ro port the state of affairs to the Spartan government."

To such an appeal only one answer could decently be given; all present exhorted him to persevere in the discharge of his duties. But the only expedient which seemed to present itself for the immediate supply of his necessities was to apply to Cyrus; and Callicratidas reluctantly repaired to Sardis. It is not clear whether Cyrus had been prepared by Lysande to mortify Callicratidas, or merely observed the common forms of the Persian court, without be ing conscious that he was wounding the Spartan's pride. Callicratidas, it seems, expected an immediate audience, and was ordered to wai till the day after the morrow; and then-either purposely, or because he desired to be admitte

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at an inconvenient hour-he was still repeated- | strong re-enforcement by which the ener

ly put off. Plutarch represents him as stand-numbers had been raised to the double of
ing at the prince's gate during the banquet, and, own, made an attempt to save Methymu
when he was informed by the attendants that he arrived too late, and finding that Car
Cyrus was drinking, replying that he would wait das was already master of the town, te z
till he had finished his draught. His patience chored for the night off a group of sma
was at last worn out, and he quitted Sardis with- ands, lying between the coast of Lestos
out having obtained an audience, deploring the the main, called the Hundred Islands.*
wretched condition of the Greeks, who were re- Spartan admiral, when he heard that the
duced to cringe to barbarians for money, and nian fleet was in the neighbourhood, decim
declaring that if ever he returned safe home, he that he would put a stop to Conon's de
would do his utmost to bring about a peace be with the sea,t and sailed early next morning
tween his country and Athens. He then sailed quest of him. He might, indeed, now chan
to Miletus, and thence despatched some galleys absolute mastery over the sea, for since la 2
to Sparta to procure supplies. Miletus was one parture from Miletus, or during his stat t
of the cities in which Lysander had formed a he had increased his armament to 170 gün
party, which had hitherto thrown every imped- Conon was sensible of the danger of his pos
iment it could in the way of Callicratidas. He, tion, and had already got under way to 5.
however, called a general assembly, stated his his retreat, when Callicratidas appeared, a
wants, and urged the Milesians to relieve them. immediately began a vigorous pursuit, top
One of the arguments which Xenophon attrib- vent him from reaching Samos. Mitylene we
utes to him implies that he considered the war the nearest place of refuge, and Conon s
as a struggle for the deliverance of the Asiatic himself compelled to make for it. That he
Greeks from the yoke of the barbarians, no less any intention of combating an armament wiS
than from that of the Athenians. He promised, surpassed his own by 100 galleys, is difficia
as soon as he received the supplies which he believe,‡ and Xenophon supposes him to im
expected from Sparta, to requite the Milesians used his utmost speed. But he was overtaka
for all that they advanced, and for all the servi- near the mouth of the harbour, probably
ces they rendered to him in the mean while; part of the hostile fleet, and lost thirty gake
and he conjured them to let the barbarians see before he could make his way into the ton
that, without paying court to them, Sparta and where he hauled the remaining forty on sh
her allies were able to subdue their enemies. under shelter of the walls. Callicratidas
It seems as if the partisans of Lysander, con- master of each entrance of the two harbo
scious of their own selfish aims, and knowing formed by the small island on which Old Ma
how much they depended on Spartan patronage, lene was built, and which was parted by a nar
supposed that more was meant by this language row channel, called the Euripus, from the mai-
than met the ear, and interpreted it not as an land of Lesbos. He sent for all the forces
appeal to the generosity and patriotism of their Methymna, brought a body of troops over fra
fellow-citizens, but as a threat pointed against Chios, and blockaded the town by sea and land
themselves. They were, therefore, among the A voluntary supply of money from Cyrus was
foremost to propose a grant of money out of the the first fruits of his success. Mitylene
public treasury, and even to offer private con- ill-provided for a siege, especially after its pop
tributions. With the funds thus raised, and an ulation was increased by so many additional
additional sum furnished by the Chians, aug- mouths, and Conon saw that, unless inte
mented. if we may trust Diodorus, by the plun- gence of his situation was speedily carried t
der of Teos,* Callicratidas was enabled to ex- Athens, he might be forced to surrender befor
ert the force of his superior numbers. It is any succours came to his relief. He therefore
probable that he received an invitation from a drew down two of his fastest sailing galleys
party in Methymna, which induced him to shape and manned them with the best rowers in the
his course first towards that quarter. For Dio- fleet, who went on board before daybreak, azi
dorus relates that the town was betrayed to him, during the day were screened by an awning
and this may be consistent with Xenophon's from the enemy's view, while the soldiers went
statement, that the presence of an Athenian gar-kept below; at night they went on shore aga
rison, and the predominance of Athenian influ-
ence, compelled him to take it by storm. The Νήσῳ τῶν Ἑκατὸν καλουμένων, Diodorus, xiii.,
plunder was given up to the troops; the cap-Ekaros, a title of Apollo, the god whose worship provaled
Strabo, xiii., p. 618, derives the name 'Exatóiyse fra
tives only were reserved as public property;
but Callicratidas, though urged by his allies, re-
fused to sell the Methymnæans, and declared
that, so far as rested with him, no Greek should
be made a slave. He was, perhaps, forced to
limit the application of this generous sentiment,
so as to except the Athenian prisoners, who
were sold together with the slaves found in the
place; but the Methymnæans were set at lib-2,
erty, and left in possession of their pillaged

town.

Conon, though he was probably aware of the

* xiii., 76. All that raises a doubt as to the fact is, that in the same passage Diodorus attributes the reduction of Delphinium also to Callicratidas, seemingly contradicting Xenophon, H., ì., 5, 15.

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on the adjacent coast. By a strange coincidence in a strange
oversight, both Wesseling and Schneider describe these -
ands as near Samos.

+ Xen., i., 6, 15. Κόνωνι εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶν
τα τὴν θάλατταν.

+ Diodorus, xiii., 77, 78, represents Conon as drawing
the enemy into a battle, in which, as at first he had only
the foremost of his pursuers on his hands, he was victorious,
until the rest came up and captured thirty of his galleys
which had advanced too far in pursuit. Polyænas, 1, 45,
tells half the story.

Hell., i., 6, 15, is in his most confused style.
See Plehn, Lesbiaca, p. 14, 15. Schneider's note on
But even
without it there are great difficulties about the geography
of Xenophon's narrative.

Η Ες κοιλὴν ναῦν μεταβιβάσας. Xen., H., 1., 6, 29, ΤΗ
object plainly was concealment; but the precise nature of
the contrivance cannot be understood without a clearer so
tion than we now possess of the rapappépara here mer
tioned by Xenophon, and of the purpose for which they
were used on this occasion. Schneider's note on the texi

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This process was repeated four days to lull the | enemy's suspicions. On the fifth, at noon, while the crews of the galleys stationed to guard the mouth of the harbour were taking their meal on shore, the two Athenian galleys suddenly pushed out, and issuing from the harbour, made, the one for the south of the Ægean, the other for the Hellespont. The former was overtaken after a day's chase; the latter outstripped its pursuers, and finally reached Ath

ens.

Xenophon does not inform us how Conon's colleagues were employed while he was engaged in the operations just described. It appears that only two of them accompanied him in his flight to Mitylene. Diomedon was elsewhere with a squadron of twelve galleys-perhaps in the Hellespont-and the galley which carried the news to Athens may have apprized him of Conon's danger. He hastened-apparently with more zeal than discretion-to share it, but was intercepted by Callicratidas, and narrowly escaped, leaving ten out of his twelve galleys in the enemy's hands. But the Athenians, as usual, were roused by the new emergency - for the loss of the armament at Mit- | ylene would have been almost irreparableto extraordinary efforts. They immediately put forth the whole remaining strength of the commonwealth, and by the end of thirty days they had manned a fleet of 110 sail. Every hand that could be spared from the defence of the city was employed in this service. Many citizens of the equestrian class, who were usually exempt from such duty, embarked with the common freemen, and as their number did not still suffice, slaves were invited by the promise of freedom to join the expedition. All Conon's colleagues, except Archestratus, who died at Mitylene, and Leon, for whom Lysias appears to have been substituted, took the command in person. They first sailed to Samos, and there strengthened themselves with ten Samian galleys, and with thirty more from other quarters; and now, feeling themselves able to cope with the Peloponnesians, they prepared to seek them. Callicratidas, on his part, did not shrink from a decisive conflict; but, leaving Eteonicus with fifty galleys to maintain the blockade of Mitylene, he stationed the remainder of his fleet at Malea, the southernmost headland of Lesbos.† is less obscure than that in the Corrigenda. How Cæsar's account of Antony's stratagem throws any light on Conon's, which was so completely different both in the end and the means, we are unable to divine.

These, according to the present text of Xenophon, Hell., ., 6, 16, were Leon and Erasinides. Morus proposed to strike out both these names, and to substitute that of Archestratus, who, it appears from Lysias (ano). dup., p. 162), died at Mitylene. Schneider observes that Erasinides, who was present at the battle of Arginusaæ, cannot have been blockaded with Conon in Mitylene, unless it was he who commanded the galley which escaped to Athens. The like conjecture would, as we have already observed, explain all that is obscure about Leon; so that the text might stand without any alteration. Schneider's conjecture is confirmed by the facts mentioned by Lysias. His client's ship was reckoned the best sailer in the fleet; on this account, after the death of Archestratus, Erasinides went on

board of it. This proves that, if Archestratus accompanied Conon to Mitylene, Erasinides was already there; so that the difficulty about his presence at Arginusa would still re main. And if his galley was accounted the fastest sailer, it must have been one of the two selected by Conon.

Not the Malea mentioned by Thucydides, ii, 4 (on which see the note on p. 347), as was supposed by Schneider, whose note on this subject, in his Addenda, p. 98, throws everything into confusion.

In the evening of the same day the Athenians arrived at the Arginusæ, three small islands, near the Æolian coast, over against Malea. Their camp fires first announced their presence to Callicratidas, who, as soon as he had ascertained it, prepared to surprise them by a sudden attack. For this purpose he set sail at midnight; but a thunder-storm, accompanied by a heavy rain, induced him to abandon his design, and to wait for daylight before he advanced against them.

The Athenians were then ready to meet or receive him; and a battle ensued, which for the number of vessels engaged was the greatest that had yet been fought between two Greek navies. We are informed by Xenophon that Callicratidas was dissuaded by Hermon, a Megarian, the master of his galley, from venturing on an action against such greatly superior numbers as those of the enemy. The Spartan's answer became very celebrated. It was, as Xenophon reports it, "Sparta would suffer no hurt from his death; but he should be dishonoured by flight." This, however, can scarcely have been said on the occasion to which Xenophon refers it, and is only applicable to the story told by Diodorus, who relates that the Lacedæmonian soothsayer interpreted an accident which happened before the battle as a presage of the admiral's death. His reply would in this case be both rational and magnanimous. But, according to another report, he said that Sparta might repair the loss of a fleet, but he, if he fled, should not be able to retrieve his honour. In this language, indeed, there would be nothing absurd but the false pride which Cicero condemns.* But, besides that the anecdote, in this form, is not supported by sufficient authority, it seems clear that Callicratidas entered into the action with fair hopes of a victory; and he might not unreasonably believe that his inferiority in numbers was compensated by the better condition of his vessels and his crews. The Athenian commanders were conscious of their own disadvantage in this respect, and it was on this point that the dispositions made on both sides were grounded. The accounts which Xenophon and Diodorus give of the order of battle differ from each other in most particulars,† but they seem to agree as to the general design of both parties that the aim of the Peloponnesians was attack, that of the Athenians defence. But Diodorus describes the Athenian line as formed so as to take in one of the islands, which separated it into two divisions; to meet which, Callicratidas disposed his fleet in two squadrons parted from each other by a considerable interval. Xenophon represents the Athenians as advancing to a distance from the shore, but formed in a compact mass of two lines in each wing, and only a little weaker in the centre. Aristocrates commanded fifteen galleys in the extreme left; Diomedon was stationed by his side, and Pericles and Erasinides in their rear, each with an equal number. The centre was occupied by ten Samian galleys, under Hippeus, a Samian commander, and by as many under the ten Athe

* Offic., i., 24.

It is difficult to understand Schneider, when, in his note on Hell, i., 6, 31, he denies that Xenophon and Diodorus differ on any point in their description of the battle, though, according to his own statement in the same note, there is hardly a single point on which they agree.

in the most private manner, and presently to return to the camp with garlands on their heads, and shouts of joy, announcing that Callicratidas had conquered, and that the whole Athenian armament was destroyed. When it came back, he himself made a public sacrifice of thanksgiving for the victory; but he gave orders to the captains of the fleet to sail away as soon as pos

nian taxiarchs,* and they were supported in the rear by a smaller number of Athenian or allied galleys. On the right, Protomachus took the lead, with Thrasyllus by his side, and Lysias and Aristogenes behind, each having fifteen galleys under his command. The Peloponnesians Xenophon describes as drawn up in a single but unbroken line, to take advantage of their superiority in offensive manœuvres over the un-sible to Chios, and advised the merchants who practised Athenian crews. According to Diodorus, Callicratidas himself commanded in the right of his line, and Thrasondas, a Theban, in the left. Neither author, however, gives any intimation as to the effect which these arrangements produced, nor as to the causes which decided the battle, except so far as its issue may have been connected with the fate of the Spartan admiral, who was killed in a conflict with one of the enemy's galleys, according to Diodorus, after he had sunk that of Lysias-who, however, survived-and had struck and grappled with that of Pericles. After this event the Peloponnesians were completely routed, and fled, some towards Chios, some to Phocæa, leaving seventy galleys and upward destroyed or taken. Among them were nine out of the ten which composed the Lacedæmonian contingent, and were, therefore, probably under the immediate orders and eye of Callicratidas.

had been attracted to his camp to embark their property as secretly and speedily as they could, and accompany the retreating squadron. The wind favoured their flight. He himself, after setting fire to his camp, led the land force across the island to Methymna. Conon, finding the harbour clear, as soon as the gale had abated, set sail towards the Arginusæ, and met the friendly armament, which, after a short stay at Mitylene, proceeded to Chios; but being unable to effect anything there, it took up the old station at Samos. Conon and two of his colleagues, Protomachus and Aristogenes, remained with it; but the other six, Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides. returned to Athens.

After a victory as complete and important as the Athenian arms had ever gained, which delivered the state from a most pressing danger, when defeat would manifestly have been atThe Athenians lost five-and-twenty galleys, tended with immediate and utter ruin of all its and almost all at such a distance from the shore hopes, they might well have expected an honthat the men who survived had no chance of ourable and grateful reception. But causes had safety but in clinging to the wrecks. They seem been at work during their absence which led to to have spent very little, if any, time in pursuit a very different result, and turned their triumph of the fring enemy, and the generals, having into a calamity, fatal to themselves and disreturn to their station at the Arginusæ, held graceful to their country. The news of the vica council on the course to be next adopted. tory had, as usual, elated the people, and dispoDiomedon thought that their first care should sed them to listen to the counsellors who most be to save as many as they could of their own humoured their presumption. They, however, people and of their disabled vessels, and that showed one indication of a right feeling, which the whole fleet ought for this purpose to sail was probably the first impression produced by immediately to the scene of the action. Era- the joyful tidings. They rewarded the slaves sinides contended that it was of greater impor- who had served in the battle with immunities tance to proceed directly with the utmost speed similar to those which had been enjoyed by the to Mitylene, that they might surprise and over- Plateans, and which placed them very nearly power the enemy's squadron, which was still on a level with the citizens. The dejection blockading it. But Thrasyllus suggested that caused at Sparta by the blow which had depriboth these objects might be accomplished, if ved her of nearly half her navy was proportionthey detached a squadron sufficient to take care ed to her rival's exultation, and contributed to of the wrecks, and sailed with the rest of their raise it to an inordinate degree. The party forces to Mitylene. This advice was adopted; there which viewed the war with feelings like and it was agreed that each of the generals those expressed by Callicratidas, when he was should detach three of the galleys under his repulsed at the gate of Cyrus, took advantage command to accompany twenty-three of those of the prevailing despondency, to propose anwhich occupied the centre in the battle, in all other embassy to Athens, to renew the attempt forty-seven, to the scene of action. This squa- which had failed after the battle of Cyzicus, dron was to be conducted by some of the infe- and envoys were sent with overtures of peace. rior officers, among whom were Theramenes It seems that they offered no concession beyond and Thrasybulus, while the generals led the rest the evacuation of Decelea* and the Attic territo Mitylene. Both designs, however, were frus-tory, and required the Athenians to resign their trated. A violent storm came on, which prevent-revolted colonies. Cleophon is said again to ed Theramenes and Thrasybulus from executing have come forward as the most active opponent the orders they had received, and the generals of peaceful counsels; and we find him descrithemselves from moving that day out of the Arginusæ. In the mean while Eteonicus received intelligence of the event of the battle by means of a boat which had been kept in readiness for the purpose. To deceive Conon, he directed the men who brought the news to sail out again

Who, however, were properly military officers. But of the ναύαρχοι, who are mentioned on this occasion as three | in number, we can find no explanation.

bed, on the authority of Aristotle, as appearing in the assembly highly excited with wine, and in armour.t protesting against the terms proposed, and declaring that he would accept nothing short of the restitution of all the cities which had been separated from the Athenian empire.

* Λακεδαιμονίων βουλομένων ἐκ Δεκελεία ἀπιέναι ἐφ ̓ οἷς ἔχουσιν ἀμφότεραι. Schol. Aristoph, Ran., 1590. † Μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδεδυκώς. Ibid.

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