time, might enable them to overcome their for- | chus as to the designs of Alcibiades; and there eign enemies. Some of them crossed over to can be no doubt that he would have preferred the continent, and had an interview with Alcib- any form of democracy to the kind of oligarchy iades, which confirmed their hopes and quick- which his new friends wished to establish. ened their resolution. Let democracy be abol- But he seems to have had two motives for proished at Atnens, and he engaged to put them fessing himself hostile to the existing constituupon good terms, first with Tissaphernes, and tion. He might expect that the first attempt then with the king, who would be more inclined made to subvert it would involve the ruin of to trust them under a different government. Androcles and other demagogues, his personal On their return to Samos, they mustered their enemies, who, as long as they retained their friends and concerted their measures, which influence, would stand in the way of his recall; embraced not only Athens, but, the subject and he might think that the condition which he states, in which they proposed to bring about a attached to his offers, while it rendered them similar revolution; and they now ventured pub- the more plausible, might serve as a colour for licly to announce the offers of Alcibiades, with evasion and delay. Perhaps, as the final result, the condition annexed to them. The great body he anticipated a contest between two factions, of the citizens in the fleet, startled by the sac- in which he might be umpire, and might carry rifice required from them, but attracted by the away the stake. advantages of the Persian alliance, which would But the oligarchical party at Samos, making supply the deficiencies of their own exhausted their wishes the measure of probability, slighted treasury, remained in a state of suspense, which the warnings of Phrynichus, adhered to their was interpreted by the authors of the project first resolution, and sent a deputation to Athens as acquiescence. Having made this first and headed by Pisander, one of the persons who most critical step, they again held a private had been most active in keeping up the public meeting of their adherents, and took the propo-alarm in the affair of the Hermes busts, to nesals of Alcibiades into more mature considera-gotiate for the recall of Alcibiades, the abolition tion. No objection was offered by any one pres- of democratical institutions, and alliance with ent, except by Phrynichus the general, an un- Persia. Phrynichus now began to think his principled but sharpsighted adventurer, who de- own position dangerous; he foresaw that, if clared that he placed no confidence either in the Alcibiades should be restored, he should be ex intentions of Alcibiades, or in his ability to ful-posed to his fiercest resentment, as the man fil his promises, and that their whole scheme who alone had endeavoured to thwart his views; appeared to him big with dangers which they he therefore determined to strike the first blow. had not sufficiently weighed. He could not be- He sent a letter to Astyochus, informing him lieve that Alcibiades was at heart more friendly of the injury that Alcibiades was doing to the to oligarchy than to democracy, or that he de- Peloponnesian cause, and of the attempts he sired any other revolution than one which would was making to gain Tissaphernes for Athens, enable his partisans to bring him back in tri- adding an excuse or explanation of his own umph; and they must be on their guard that treachery. But Astyochus had neither the he did not involve them in a civil war. On the means nor the will to serve the wishes of other hand, it seemed incredible that the king Phrynichus. Alcibiades, after the warning he could ever be persuaded to expose himself to had received, no longer put himself in the power the enmity of the Peloponnesians, who were of the Spartans, and Astyochus, as clearly apnow formidable at sea, and masters of several pears from the sequel, had sold himself to Tisimportant cities in his dominions, for the sake saphernes. He repaired to Magnesia, where of the Athenians, whom he could not trust. the satrap was residing, and communicated the Their plan of establishing oligarchical govern- contents of the letter to him and Alcibiades. ment in the subject states would, he was con- Alcibiades immediately wrote to the principal vinced, be attended with consequences which officers at Samos, complaining of the treason they did not expect. Instead of inducing the of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should revolted towns to submit to their authority, it be put to death. On this occasion, Phrynichus would encourage the others to rebel. What blinded, perhaps, by his fears, seems to have their subjects wanted was not a change in their been deserted by his wonted sagacity, unless constitution, but independence; and if they were we should suppose his conduct the result of a forced to continue under Athenian sovereignty, very bold as well as subtle artifice. He again they would prefer the rule of the Athenian peo- wrote to Astyochus, intimating no suspicion of ple to that of an oligarchy, which they knew by his breach of secrecy, but only complaining of experience to be far more oppressive. It was his want of caution, and offered to betray the by the very persons who would take the lead Athenian armament into his hands, with the in an oligarchical government that they were town of Samos, which, like most of the others plundered and trampled on, and it was to the in Ionia, was unfortified, minutely describing people alone that they looked for protection, all the particulars of the plan. Astyochus bewhen their property or their persons were trayed this letter also to Alcibiades, who sent a threatened with violence. If the supreme pow-fresh charge against Phrynichus to Samos. er should fall into the hands of their oppressors, they would have no refuge left.

But, before his despatch arrived there, Phrynichus-who had either discovered or foreseen These reflections do, indeed, give us a still the behaviour of Astyochus-announced that higher opinion of the sagacity and judgment of the enemy, as he had been informed on good Phrynichus than the circumspection which he authority, was preparing to take advantage of displayed, on a former occasion, in his military the weakness of the town and of the absence character. Thucydides adds the sanction of of a part of the fleet, and to surprise their enhis own authority to the conjecture of Phryni-campment; and that no time should be lost in

fortifying Samos and taking other precautions; | object for which these changes are to be made."

Urged by the apparent necessity of the case, and soothed by the hope of resuming its con cessions, the people yielded, and passed a decree, by which Pisander and ten other commissioners were invested with full powers to nego tiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Pisander, at the same time, wishing to get rid of Phrynichus, imputed the fall of Iasus to his treachery. He and Scironides, one of his col leagues, were recalled, and Leon and Diomedon were sent to supply their place.

and he immediately gave his orders as general to the same effect. After this, the letter of Alcibiades, which confirmed his information as to the enemy's designs, was not only harmless, but seemed to prove that both the charges were malicious fabrications. Alcibiades now laboured still more earnestly to convince Tissaphernes of the policy of siding with Athens; and the conference at Cnidus, which showed that he had judged rightly of the temper and views of Sparta, added fresh weight to his arguments. The satrap's inclination now tended this way; Pisander neither had fully disclosed the naand he was only restrained from yielding to it ture of the political changes which he had in by his fear of the Peloponnesians, whose naval view, nor did he mean to rely on the consent of superiority made it dangerous to provoke them.* the people for bringing them about; he had In the mean while Pisander and his colleagues more convenient instruments at his command. executed their commission at Athens with great In most of the Greek states the ambition of insuccess. In the popular assembly he exhibited dividuals, or the conflict of parties, had given the prospect which was now opened of over-rise to a number of private associations, for coming the Peloponnesians with the aid of Per-purposes either wholly or mainly political, some sia, and stated the terms on which this benefit was to be purchased; that the decree against Alcibiades must first be repealed, and that some changes must be made in the Constitution. Pisander had to encounter a vehement opposition both from the ardent friends of democracy and from the personal enemies of Alcibiades. He probably had some in the great priestly families, the Eumolpids and Ceryces, which filled the most important offices in the Eleusinian mysteries. They endeavoured to alarm the superstition of the people, while others appealed to its pride, and exclaimed against the indignity of making a way for the return of Alcibiades on the ruin of the laws. But the main point had been already gained, when the public spirit was brought down to a state in which it could tolerate such a proposal, though cautiously worded, so as to leave it doubtful what parts of its institutions the people would be required to sacrifice. Pisander felt the strong ground on which he stood, and was not moved either by the indignant protestations of the demagogues, or by the solemn adjurations of the priests, but calmly called on his opponents to answer a plain question. He successively interrogated each of them, whether he saw any hope of safety for the commonwealth, now that the Peloponnesians had raised a navy at least as powerful as their own, which was maintained by Persian gold, and were masters of more cities than remained attached to the Athenian confederacy, unless the king could be brought over to their side. None ventured to reply in the affirmative, and Pisander triumphantly concluded, "The only way of gaining this ally is to temper our Constitution, and to fill the chief offices of the state in such a manner that he may be able to trust us; this is not a time to discuss forms of government, but to provide for the public safety. If the innovations that may be expedient for the present should not satisfy us, they may be hereafter revised. Alcibiades must be restored; for he is the only man who can accomplish the

attached to a single leader, others united by the common interests of the members. These clubs were of long standing at Athens. Cimon had formed one, which rallied round him as its centre, attracted not more, perhaps, by his for tune and abilities than by his principles, shared the reproach which he incurred by his partiality for Sparta, and proved its devotedness to his person at the battle of Tanagra. It seems to have been by means of a similar union that Thucydides, the rival of Pericles, endeavoured to collect and guide the strength of the aristo cratical party. It was so, perhaps, that Nicias and Alcibiades had been enabled to defeat the attempt of Hyperbolus. It was on his com mand over such associations that Alcibiades relied for the accomplishment of his ambitious designs. But there appear to have been many political clubs at Athens which did not acknowl edge any chief, but merely aimed at certain objects in which all the members were equally concerned. The defective administration of justice exposed unprotected individuals to vexation and wrong, but enabled a number who combined their fortunes and credit the more easily to shield each other, or to strike a com mon enemy. Another end for which such coalitions were formed, was to control the elec tions for offices of trust and power, either with a view to self-defence, or to the extension of their influence. In every case both the object and the means, if not positively illegal, were such as the law did not recognise; the mutual attachment of the associates was stronger than the ties by which they were bound to the state, and even than those of blood; and the law of honour which generally prevailed among them required that they should shrink from no sacrifice and from no crime which the common in terest might demand. These associations, therefore, were hotbeds of seditious and revolu tionary projects, and Pisander found it easy to engage them on his side; and before he left Athens, he had organized an extensive conspir acy among them for the immediate subversion of the democratical government.

This appears to be the meaning of Thucydides, viii., 52, and not to be improperly or harshly expressed according to Leon and Diomedon arrived off the coast of the reading Toonvat. According to the reading or Asia before him to take the command of the fleet, vat, which Krueger prefers, the views attributed to Tissaphernes, whether it was the confidence of Alcibiades or and soon after sailed to Rhodes to inspect the that of the Athenians that he is supposed to desire to gain, enemy's condition. They found the Peloponwould, even if in themselves probable, be much more obnesian fleet still laid up, but made a landing on

scurely intimated.

the island, and gained a victory over the troops | interview. He saw that the policy he had which marched against them, and then station- adopted required that he should open his coffers ed themselves at Chalce to watch the move- to them; that without a supply of money they ments of the enemy, and to seize all occasions could not maintain their fleet, or would be comof annoying him. While they were here Peda-pelled to hazard a battle on disadvantageous ritus sent to Rhodes to announce that the Athe- terms with the Athenians; in either case the nians had completed their works, and that Chios balance which he wished to preserve would be could only be saved by the immediate succour lost. There was, however, besides, a danger to of the whole Peloponnesian armament; but be-apprehend, which still more nearly concerned fore it could move to his relief, collecting all him. Urged by their need, and irritated by his his land forces, he made a sudden attack on the conduct, they might easily be tempted to seize enemy's naval camp, and succeeded in storm- by force what he withheld from them, and ing it, and in taking some of their galleys which at once to satisfy their wants and their venwere hauled up there; but the Athenians soon geance by plundering and ravaging his province. brought up their main body, and an action en-Yet, after the conference at Cnidus, they could sued, in which he was defeated and slain. The siege now became closer than before, both by sea and land, and the Chians began to suffer greatly from hunger.

Pisander and his colleagues were not disheartened by the issue of their negotiation with Tissaphernes, and, on their return to Samos, they both strengthened the resolutions of the oligarchical faction in the fleet, and found means to form a new oligarchical party among the Samians, who had so lately overpowered and persecuted their old nobility. Their Athenian partisans, though sensible of their weakness and danger, came to the determination of renouncing all dependance on Alcibiades, who, they began to see, could never become a cordial adherent to such a cause as theirs, and prepared to meet the emergency by extraordinary efforts and sacrifices, to which they encouraged one another by the reflection that they should no longer be labouring for any end but their

preparing to bring up the great Phoenician fleet, mitted the citizens to return to their dwellings. to which the two contending parties had long He then marched against Abydos, but could not been looking forward with anxious expectation. succeed there, either by force or persuasion, and The Peloponnesians now determined to re- therefore crossed over to Sestus, which he turn, as Tissaphernes himself wished them to made his station for the protection of the Heldo, to Miletus; but before they had left Rhodes, lespont. After his departure the Chians bethey were invited by an embassy from Eretria came decidedly superior to the enemy by sea, to lend their aid towards effecting the revolt and Astyochus ventured to sail along the coast which had been long meditated in Euboea. One with two galleys to Chios, and to bring away of the main obstacles to the execution of that the squadron with which they had been last redesign had been recently removed. The town enforced to Miletus.* The armament under of Oropus, which, so long as it remained in the his command now amounted to upward of a hands of the Athenians, afforded them the hundred sail, and he soon after appeared with means of continually annoying the island, and it before Samos to offer battle to the Athenians; especially its opposite neighbour Eretria, had but the state of affairs at Samos, which he was been betrayed to the Boeotians, notwithstand-probably acquainted with, did not permit them ing the presence of an Athenian garrison, by to accept his challenge, and he sailed back to a party of the citizens, aided by some Eretri- Miletus. ans, who were now eager to shake off the authority of Athens. But the Peloponnesian commanders considered the relief of Chios as an object of superior importance, and towards the beginning of the spring of 411 set sail from Rhodes with their whole armament. In their passage, off the Triopian foreland, they saw the Athenian fleet, which had just left its station at Chalce. There was no disposition on either side to risk an immediate attack; but this movement of the Athenians, who arrived at Samos about the same time that the enemy reached Miletus, convinced the Peloponnesians that they should not be able to relieve Chios without a battle. But while they remained in suspense, the Chians, hard pressed by the siege, made a vigorous effort for their own deliverance. A Spartan, named Leon, who accompanied Antis-own private advantage. With this purpose thenes to Miletus, had taken the command in the room of Pedaritus, and had brought a squadron of twelve galleys, which had been left to guard Miletus while the fleet lay at Rhodes. With this re-enforcement the Chians were able to man thirty-six galleys ;* the Athenians only numbered thirty-two. The besieged drew out their whole military force, and occupied a strong position, while their fleet advanced against the enemy. A warm engagement ensued, which lasted till late in the evening, and the Chians, if not victorious, were at least not worsted; and this, in an action with an Athenian fleet nearly equal in numoers, was still a triumph. This success was immediately followed by a happy change in the state of their affairs. Early in the spring Dercyllidas, a Spartan, marched from Miletus with a small body of troops towards the Hellespont, to excite the cities in the satrapy of Pharnabazus to revolt from Athens. As soon as he arrived there, Abydos opened her gates to him, and Lampsacus imitated the example two days after. On hearing of these events, Strombichides sailed from Chios with twenty-four ships, including some transports, and took Lampsacus, an unwalled city, by storm, after defeating its troops, but contented himself with the pillage, and per

drachma a day. Krueger, p. 356, supposes that this was the rate always implied when no particular sum was expressed.

*Nothing, it might have been supposed, can be clearer than the statement of Thucydides, viii., 61, that the Chians had received the re-enforcement brought to them by Leon beofore they went out to fight the Athenians, and did not go out to meet him. Perhaps some Latin translator has obscured the author's meaning.

they sent Pisander home, with five of his col leagues, to prosecute the work which he had begun there, and instructed them to establish oligarchical government in all the subject cities at which they might stop in their voyage; and the remaining five were despatched on the like mission to other quarters. Diotrephes, who had been appointed to command on the coast of Thrace, was sent from Chios with instructions of the same kind. Accordingly, on his arrival at Thasos, he abolished the democratical constitution; but the result of this change was very different from that which its authors expected, though Phrynichus had predicted it. Within two months after, when Diotrephes had left the island, the Thasians began to fortify their city, and prepared to resume their independence; and a party of refugees who, from their places of exile in Peloponnesus, had long been concerting measures with their friends at home for this end, unexpectedly found the principal obstacle to the accomplishment of their designs-the opposition of the commonaltyremoved by the Athenians themselves. And such, Thucydides observes, were the consequences of the revolution in most of the states where it was effected. Instead of reconciling them to the rule of Athens, it was viewed, not as an equivalent for independence, but as a step towards it; and the sober, wary spirit of the oli

* viii., 63, κομίζει αὐτόθεν τὰς ναῦς. Not certainly all the ships-which the Chians would not have parted withand therefore it seems that Leon's squadron must be refer red to. Yet the Chians might have added some of their own, so as to raise the number of the Peloponnesian fleet from 94 to 112. Krueger, p. 303, supposes that the galleys not accounted for may have been furnished by the Rhodians

ens.

garchical governments* rendered their success | speakers in every debate, and no proposition the more certain. was brought forward, either in the council or the assembly, which had not been previously discussed in their private meetings. Their boldness created an exaggerated persuasion of their strength. As the extent of the conspiracy could not be ascertained, none could know that any man he met, whether friend or stranger, was not privy to it; and some notorious cases, in which men who were believed most adverse to oligarchy were discovered to have taken a part in it, contributed to destroy all mutual confidence among the patriotic citizens, and to stifle every murmur of indignation, and all counsels of resistance.

Pisander, while he executed his commission, drew some re-enforcements of armed followers from several of the cities where he established oligarchical ascendency on his voyage to AthOn his arrival he found that during his absence great progress had been made there towards the completion of the work which he had set on foot. His associates, by the language which they openly held, had prepared the public mind for various changes in the laws and constitution, some of which were clearly desirable, and none very repugnant to the feelings of moderate men. They contended that no pay ought to be allowed for any but military service; a Such was the state of affairs when Pisander reform levelled against the abuses of the courts arrived; and though he had totally failed in the of justice and the popular assembly, but which principal object of his mission, the undertaking was also strongly recommended by grounds of had advanced too far, and his associates were economy. It was intimately connected with too deeply engaged in it to be affected by this another measure, which they suggested at the disappointment. The aid of Alcibiades was only same time as the basis of the new constitution, important with a view to the foreign war; the for limiting the enjoyment of all political rights domestic revolution now stood in no need of to a body of not more than five thousand citi-him, and in some respects even gained strength zens, who were to be chosen with regard both by his estrangement from it. Neither Pisander to property and to personal qualifications. Thu- nor any of the principal conspirators were percydides justly admires the ingenuity of this pro-sonally attached to him; most of them, perhaps, posal. The number was large enough to con- were secretly jealous of him, and their rupture ciliate those who had apprehended that the oli- with him procured one very useful accession to garchy to be prescribed to them was to be form- their party. Phrynichus, as soon as he perceived on a much narrower foundation, and who ed that the establishment of oligarchy, instead did not perceive the hollowness of this seeming of furthering the restoration of Alcibiades, would liberality; and it secured the good-will of all be an effectual bar to. it, became one of their who might hope to be included in the privileged warmest abettors. Among the rest there was class, and who were not aware that its privi- probably a great diversity of views and motives. leges would be merely nominal, and that the au- Antiphon, the man whom Thucydides reprethors of the revolution would reserve the sub- sents as the soul of the plot, and whose charstance of power to themselves. But while the acter and abilities he describes with the affecleaders of the party covered their designs with tionate admiration of a friend and a scholar,* these specious professions, some of their young- was a person qualified, perhaps, for filling a staer associates were serving their cause in a dif- tion like that of Pericles, but neither capable of ferent manner, by ridding themselves of their reaching such an eminence, nor disposed to acmost obnoxious and formidable adversaries. quiesce in a lower sphere; and it seems to have Androcles was first marked out, both as a pow- been disappointed ambition that made him hoserful demagogue, interested in upholding de- tile to the democratical institutions, under which mocracy, and as a victim the most agreeable to he felt himself depressed below his proper level. his enemy, Alcibiades, on whom the hopes of Thucydides extols his eloquence, which he had the oligarchs at Athens still rested. He was cultivated with extraordinary care-undoubtedremoved by secret assassination, and some oth-ly as an instrument for acquiring reputation and er persons, who were deemed irreconcilably hostile to their plans, shared his fate. These proofs of reckless daring and determined resolution struck all classes of the citizens with terror, and prepared them passively to submit to the will of the party which wielded such instruments. No formal change, indeed, was yet made in the mechanism of the constitution; the popular assembly and the council of Five Hundred still met, as usual, for the transaction of public business; but they deliberated under fear of the oligarchical dagger, which was sure to reach every one who thwarted the wishes of the conspirators. And thus by degrees they usurped the entire management of affairs, were the only

* Σwppoœúvn, viii, 64. This quality seems to be mentioned here with reference, not to the motives for desiring the change, but to the means of effecting it; but the expression σωφροσύνην λαβοῦσαι is very singular and obscure.

+ Thuc., vin., 66, éneì éleiv ye why módi oinep Kai uclioτασαν ἔμελλον. The manner in which these words have sometimes been interpreted proves that a moderate acquaintance with the language of the Greek authors may be as useful a qualification for the historian of Greece as the art of handling an oar or of shouldering a firelock.

power-and believes that he was only prevented from displaying it in the popular assembly by the jealousy which the people conceived of his intellectual superiority, and that, finding himself thus excluded from public life, he aided those who were unable to plead their own cause in the assembly or the courts of justice with his counsels. Antiphon, indeed, is said to have been the first orator who wrote speeches for his clients,† as he was one of the first that opened a school of rhetoric. But that he was driven to this occupation by the cause which Thucydides mentions, is a view of the matter which we can hardly adopt, even on this authority. Athens had surely been too long inured to the pres

By this we do not mean that the testimony to the fact, that Thucydides was the disciple of Antiphon, is decisive, though we know of no reason for questioning its truth. But even if the manner in which Thucydides speaks of him was the sole ground of the tradition, it will be not the less true, that from some cause or other the historian does use language which naturally suggests the thought of such a relation. See the dissertation De Antiphonte, in Ruhnkens Opuscula, p. 9, 10.

† See the dissertation De Antiph., p. 18.