pride, and of their separation from the body of Christians, than of their union with Christ the head. Take heed therefore that you adorn the faith with a meekness and quietness of spirit, that you may have the comfort and consolation of knowing that you have not believed in vain.

SUMMARY OF DISCOURSE XLV.

MATTHEW, CHAP. V.-VERSE 48.

As practice is the end of all precepts and exhortations, to command or exhort to any thing impracticable must be absurd. Some have endeavored to obviate this objection to the text, by affirming that it contains only counsel or advice, and not a command or precept: the insufficiency of this reasoning is shown. The reason and equity of God can be no more justified in advising than in commanding impossibilities: others tell us that it is not equality, but quality of perfections that the text enjoins; and that we are commanded to aim at the same perfections with God, though not in the same degree. This exposition, though it avoids the difficulty complained of, is not that which arises from the circumstances of the text. From the words of our Lord, in Matth. v. 43-46. preceding the text, it is evident that it was not the quality of mercy, which even the publicans possessed in some degree, that our Lord recommended; but the extensive exercise of it, which was discernible in the works of providence. As these expositions afford no relief, it is to be considered what assistance we derive from the circumstances of the context, or the general reason in which the precept is founded for if we considér it as part of the gospel doctrine, it will be sufficient to know how far it may be extended on the authority of the gospel; or if as a general maxim and rule of religion founded on reason, and antecedent to the gospel, we must discover how far the reason of the command goes, and how it may be applied to the duties of religion and morality. First: the text examined, as it stands

limited by the circumstances of the context. It is shown that the precept is applied to the particular case of charity and mercy in other instances of duty the example of God is not proposed; and there are some to which neither the example nor the exhortation can be applied, such as the duties arising from the relations which are peculiar to man; as in the case of afflictions and persecutions, which are to be borne patiently. In the instance of mercy and forgiveness, what greater motive can we have to obedience than the example of God, who bears with so much lenity the abuses and affronts of wicked men? Supposing then that this example is confined to the exercise of love and mercy, it is shown that our Saviour's precise meaning must be, that our love should be universal, unconfined by partialities, and with respect to its objects as large as God's is: not that our love either to enemies or friends can be supposed to bear any proportion to the divine love. Though in this case of extending our love, the example and the exhortation are proper, in others it would be very injurious to the Deity to suppose that any example could be drawn from his perfections. An instance of this is given in the government of the thoughts. As therefore the exhortation to imitate the divine perfections cannot reach to all parts of our duty, it ought not to be considered a general precept. St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Ephesians, exhorts them to be followers of God as little children: but we see, from chap. iv. 33., and chap. v. 1. 2. that this exhortation stands inclosed on both sides with the precepts of love and charity, as if he intended to secure it from being applied to any thing else. That this was also our Saviour's meaning may be inferred from the sixth chapter of St. Luke, who, in the sermon on the mount, after introducing the example of God, concludes with an exhortation referring to the example, as St. Matt. does; but instead of the phrase, Be ye perfect as your Father is perfect, says only, Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful. If the two Evangelists are consistent,

the exhortation of St. Matthew can relate only to that particular perfection of mercy and forgiveness recommended by our Saviour; and is therefore of no greater extent than St. Luke's. The holy writers often require of us that we should be perfect and blameless; or, as St. Paul says, Coloss. iv. 12. stand perfect and complete in all the will of God. The will of God manifested to us is the rule of perfection which we ought to aim at; the perfections of the Deity are not to be attained by any creature. Though there is no room to exhort men to be perfect, as God is perfect, yet it is reasonable to press them to imitate their heavenly Father. The imitation of God has not for its end the attaining to the perfection of God, but to the greatest perfection of which we are capable. In this sense St. Peter exhorts us to be holy, because God is holy (1 Pet. v. 1-15.); and St. John expresses the same, chap. iii. 3. A conformity to the divine nature in the moral perfections of it is the utmost excellence and happiness of human souls; and this was taught by some few wise heathens, who found, by the light of reason and nature, wherein the true dignity and happiness of man consisted for the imitation of God has its foundation in the reason and nature of things. This is the second thing considered. That we should endeavor to be perfect, even as God is perfect, in the strict meaning of the words, is the direction neither of reason nor revelation. It is shown that the perfections which are essential to God, considered as a rational being, are those which we as rational beings ought to aspire to; and as they are in him in the utmost perfection, to say that we are to imitate the excellences of the Deity, means only that we ought to endeavor after those perfections which are natural and proper to rational minds, which belong to us as made in the likeness of God. Though the example of God be a strong motive for holiness, yet it is but a secondary argument, and supposes an antecedent obligation to the duty, the due performance of which we learn from it. We must therefore search

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for a reason why some of the perfections of God are proper examples, and others not so; that is, we must search for their primary rule of duty. It is shown that from the light of our own minds we discern the difference of moral good and evil, and the obligations consequent on that difference: the moral perfections of the Deity are made visible to us by the same light; so that the same reason which holds forth to us the rule of our duty, holds forth also the perfect example of it: it follows that to obey the dictates of reason, and to imitate the example of God, is the same thing. This appears by considering that we can only trace the perfections of the Deity from the natural notions of perfection in our own minds; so that whether we follow the dictates of reason in endeavoring after these virtues, or copy from the perfection of the Deity, we follow the same virtues, though placed in a different view. The imitation of God therefore is a principle of religion arising from and depending on the right use of reason; and this shows us on what foundation it stands in natural religion, and how we may apply this principle in particular cases. It is absurd to aim at the measure of God's perfection: we are perfect as he is perfect, when we do only what he will approve. To stand approved in the eye of an all-perfect being is the true perfection of every creature: this is the Christian excellency described by St. Paul, Coloss. iv. 12.