For not only would this lie beyond the scope of a section, which, from its necessary limits, must deal rather with principles than with details, but it would also run counter to the position which I took up in the chapter on History, viz., that the Past must not be allowed to dictate to the Present, but must be kept strictly in subordination to it; and that all historical results, except the most broad and general, are to be regarded rather as appendage and illustration of principles drawn from a just insight into To-day, than as furnishing the main basis and support of these principles. My aim, therefore, shall be to give such a skeleton and outline of the progress of civilization as will exhibit clearly the great laws on which it depends, with just sufficient illustration to show the relations and connexions of the great factors by which it is produced. CHAPTER II. AT THE CONTROLLING FACTOR. T the outset of this chapter, it is necessary to remark that no Theory of Civilization can have any coherence or vital unity until the central and controlling factor is determined, that is to say, the factor to which we must address ourselves if we are to advance or retard it. On this very point, however, there is the widest difference of opinion, not only among those systematic thinkers who have grasped the subject in its entirety, but also among the great masses of men, who, although they may not consciously have formulated their opinions on the subject, nevertheless show by their actions and sympathies the direction of their thoughts. But these opinions, divergent though they be, will all fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, there are those who think that civilization is to be best advanced by primarily addressing the hearts and imagination of men, by appeals to their consciences, and exhortations to duty and self-sacrifice-or, in a word, by the preaching of morality; on the other hand are those who believe that it is to be best advanced by ameliorating the material and social conditions of men, in the belief that, out of the improved conditions, the higher morality will arise of itself. Speaking broadly, we may say that the Church represents the view that civilization is to be best advanced by the preaching of duty and morality: the State, the view that it is to be best advanced by improvement in men's material and social conditions. Now, as it is to the last of these views that I give my own firm adhesion, I have selected as representatives of the former view, not, as might perhaps be expected, theologians, whose opinions from the nature of the case might be discredited from the very outset, but the two most powerful and profound of its philosophical exponents-Comte and Carlyle. Not that either of these distinguished thinkers altogether ignores those material and social conditions to which I attach so much importance, but, rather, that they believe the preaching of duty and morality to be the primary and efficient factor in Progress, while regarding ameliorations in the material and social conditions as of but secondary and subordinate importance. But, how comconsiders these That Comte does not altogether ignore the influence exerted on Progress by the mode of distribution of material, political, and social power, is shown in the fact that, in his scheme of polity, he advocates the Republican form of government as superior both to the Monarchical and Imperial forms; he proclaims the necessity of equal education, of personal freedom, of freedom of opinion, and the like. paratively subordinate in importance he distributions of material and social power is seen in the way in which he ignores those political checks and balances," which, to statesmen and political thinkers generally, are of supreme and paramount importance. Manhood-suffrage, for example, as a defence against the abuse of power by one class over another; the ballot-box, as a defence against the abuse of power by one individual over another; the election of representatives by the people themselves, rather than by any one clique or section of the people; the more equitable distribution of wealth, and the like; he believes to be quite unnecessary. His reason is this:-he regards Humanity in general, and each State in particular, not as a mere aggregate of individuals, each of whom is to follow his own interests and what he calls his rights; but as an organic whole, in which classes and individuals have their own special duties and -functions to perform. From this it of course follows that all positions of trust and authority, all property, capital, and even labour itself, instead of being individual possessions, individual rights to be disposed of according to individual His interest or caprice, are to be regarded rather as public trusts, 'to be used for the public benefit. If this be the case, why then, should we be so anxious to have a vote to defend our rights, when the question is not what are our rights, but what is our duty? Why should we have a ballot-box to secure us from intimidation, when the object of all is not to suppress our opinion, but to get the free expression of it? Why should working-men and those who do not understand affairs, wish to have a voice in the management of these affairs, when those who do understand them are working, not against the working-man, but for him? But even supposingwhich indeed he thinks to be improbable after so convincing an argument that these different classes of men will not do their duty; that men of authority will not hold their position and talents, capitalists their property and wealth, and workingmen their labour, for the public good, but for their own interests rather; what then is to be done? By reverting to the object he has in view, we shall anticipate his answer. object, as we have seen, is to unite men and draw them together; not to make them independent of each other. Hence, instead of arming each individual or class with sufficient power-material, political, or social-to defend its own interests, as against the world, he would exhort all classes alike to do their duty in the name of that Humanity whom they serve, trusting to the pressure of an enlightened Public Opinion to bring the recalcitrants to submission. In this course he is strengthened by his doctrine, that Progress in the Past has been due to the exhortations to duty, morality, and self-sacrifice which religions have enjoined; and therefore that it is likely to be the same in the future. Fetishism, for example, he asserts to have given rise to the moral union between children born of the same parents, known as the Family; Polytheism, to that wider moral union between members of different families, constituting the City or State; and Catholic Monotheism, to that still wider union among the different States of Europe, known as Christendom. And just as Progress in the Past consisted in the widening of this moral union from the Family to the State, and from the State to Christendom; so Progress in the Future will consist in extending this union, so as to embrace all nations, tribes, and conditions of men. And, further, as in the past these results have been attained by the preaching of duty and morality, in the name of the gods of the different religions; so, in the future, like results will be attained by preaching morality and duty in the name of Humanity. Let us now turn to Carlyle. Like Comte, he does not altogether deny the influence of material and social conditions on Progress; like him, too, he regards them as but of secondary importance; indeed, in his later days, this feeling grew so strong with him that he could not speak of them but with contempt. He admits, it is true, that adjustments of material and political power between the various classes of a nation are sometimes useful, and even necessary; but, believing with (Comte, that the State is an organic whole, in which each man should be bound to his neighbour by duty and affection, and not an aggregate of commercial Ishmaelites each with his hand against his neighbour, he trusts more to direct appeals to the hearts and consciences of men (with the occasional and judicious use of the rod in obdurate cases) than to any indirect benefit likely to arise out of ameliorations in their conditions of life. In support of this, he tells us that all the great Worldmovements that have announced new eras and epochs have been due, in point of fact, not to any mechanical re-arrangements of political, material, or social forces, however cunning and skilful, but to the dynamical agency of direct appeals to the great primary elements of man's nature, his love, wonder, enthusiasm, religion. Was not Christianity, he asks, due to moral suasion and the direct preaching of the word? Were the Crusades not due to the rapt preaching of one man; the French Revolution to the enthusiasm for Liberty, |