followed by the Army with 25,862. The Marine Corps has enlisted 3,185 in this program and the Coast Guard, 1,886.

One of the most fruitful sources of volunteer participants in Reserve training has been the incentive program under which prior service personnel can qualify for transfer to the Standby Reserve by 1 year of participation in the Ready Reserve; 31,838 reservists have entered this program-31,450 in the Army Reserve and 388 in the Marine Corps Reserve.

During the same period covered by the Reserve figures on this chart, between August 1955 and the end of 1956, the Army National Guard enlisted 133,362 men below age 1812 years; 6,983 Army National Guard men went to 6-month training in that time.

The Air National Guard enlisted 13,026 young men below age 1812 years; 247 Air Guard men entered 6-month training of that service. Let me point out here a matter of major interest to the entire subject of Reserve Forces readiness.

From these sources we have experienced gains to the Reserve Forces in excess of 300,000. Forty percent of this total, however, consists of persons without either prior service or the obligation to take basic training. This high percentage is accounted for by the fact that of 133,362 non-prior-service enlistments into the Army National Guard, at least 126,000 are under no requirement to undergo basic training.

QUALITY RESERVE

That, in brief, gentlemen, is the story of the progress made thus far in strengthening the reserve components under the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. We have recorded positive gains, to be sure, but we are not as far along the road toward our objective as we would like to be or as we ought to be.

The basic objective we are striving to achieve was established by the Congress in its definition of the mission of the reserve components. Let me recall to you that in enacting the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Congress declared

that the reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States are maintained for the purpose of providing trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require ***

More recently, a corollary objective was established by the President when he signed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. At that time, August 9, 1955, the President said:

I am instructing the Secretary of Defense to take immediate and effective action to utilize the means that the bill provides to augment and strengthen the Reserve Forces throughout the country.

Two important features of the National Reserve Plan recommended to the Congress by the President in January 1955, you will remember, were not incorporated in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. The bill did not contain the requested authority to induct into the Reserve if necessary, nor did it contain the authority to effect the involuntary transfer to the National Guard of obligated reservists.

We

We have not asked for further legislation in these two areas. do not feel that we would be justified in asking for authority to draft

into the Reserve until the exploitation of other personnel sources has failed to achieve the desired strengths.

We have not requested legislation to permit the involuntary transfer of obligated individuals to the National Guard because of the fate that befell H. R. 5297 as a result of that provision.

Our efforts have been, and are being, directed toward developing, within the structure of existing law, Reserve forces capable of fulfilling their mission. The following are some of the steps that have been taken in that direction:

In February 1956 the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board delivered to the Secretary of Defense a report by the Board of actions needed to strengthen the Reserve forces. This report took note of the high percentage of untrained men in some of the Reserve components; and urged that administrative action be taken to correct deficiencies in the Reserve programs.

In furtherance of the recommendations of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Secretary of Defense called upon the military departments in March 1956 for a reevaluation of their Reserve forces programs. One of the objectives set forth by the Secretary of Defense in this instruction was the achievement of individual readiness as a matter of high priority.

To the Departments of the Army and Air Force the following guideline was given:

Our Federal recognition standards for the National Guard should be relastic and aimed at achieving the desired readiness, and similar impartial standards should also be followed with respect to your Federal Reserve forces.

During the period in which the reevaluated Reserve forces program submitted by the services were under study, two important interim actions were taken to improve the level of individual training in the Reserve forces. The first of these related to the Army National Guard. In August the Army requested authorization for an increased fiscal year 1957 strength goal for the Army National Guard. In connection with this request, the Army noted that

enlistment of large numbers of non-prior-service men into the National Guard without requiring them to undergo an initial period of 6 months' training is a material obstacle to attainment of the desired training readiness.

The Army proposed, therefore, that recruitment into the National Guard for the increase in strength would be limited to individuals. having had prior active service or to those without prior service who volunteered for the Army's 6-months' training program. This Army proposal was approved.

The second interim action dealt with the question of recruitment of non-prior-service personnel directly into the Reserve, as distinguished from the National Guard.

The fiscal year 1958 manpower programs contained a restriction that enlistments into the Reserve, as distinguished from the National Guard, would be accomplished only under the special enlistment programs provided in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955; that is, either the 6-year enlistment with definite assurance of 2 years of active duty or the 8-year enlistment involving 6 months of active duty for training. Study of the detailed reserve programs submitted by the services in response to the March reevaluation instruction, revealed that complete solutions had not been worked out relative to the problem of

continuing to enlist personnel into the Reserve forces, including the National Guard, under programs which permitted extended participation in paid drill of large numbers of individuals without active basic training.

Periodic reports of the status of the Reserve components, while showing quantitative gains, failed to show satisfactory qualitative gains. In the most recent such reports submitted, none of the services show a completely satisfactory condition of their Reserve components with respect to current mobilization readiness.

In consideration of these circumstances, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on November 26, 1956, which contained instructions for the correction of the deficiencies to which I have referred. I should like, with permission of the chairman, to place that memorandum in the record, reading at this point only the portion pertinent to my discussion.

Mr. BROOKS. No objections.

Secretary JACKSON. Thank you, sir.

It appears that, in the past, we may have concentrated so heavily on developing numerical strength in the Ready Reserve that the requirements for qualitative readiness may have been insufficiently stressed.

It is no longer satisfactory to evaluate Reserve components in terms of armory facilities, unit strength, drill attendance, and status of equipment. To these must be added trained readiness to respond to the instant needs of warfare today as it may be initiated by our potential enemies.

The preponderance of untrained men in some of our Reserve components dilutes their combat effectivness. Therefore, the improvement in quality of our Reserve forces, particularly as regards increasing the percentage of basically trained individuals among those receiving drill pay, is essential.

As the basis for providing pay, equipment, and facilities, I desire that measures be taken without delay to improve the mobilization effectiveness of the Ready Reserve, particularly with respect to those individuals currently in drill pay status and future accessions to this status in line with the following:

(a) Restrict to the minimum the period during which individuals entering directly into the Ready Reserve may receive drill pay prior to entry on active duty or active duty for training.

(b) Utilize existing programs and develop additional programs as necessary under existing statutes to accomplish the following:

(1) Beginning as soon as feasible but not later than April 1, 1957, require all new accessions to the Reserve components not basically trained to enter on active duty or active duty for training shortly after enlisting. This basic training to be of sufficient duration to qualify individuals concerned as basically trained for duties assigned.

You will be interested to know that the Reserve Forces Policy Board, at its December meeting, made a recommendation which supports the position of the Secretary of Defense. The Board voted to recommend that

criteria for Federal recognition and/or allocation of funds for further personnel expansion of units of the Ready Reserve which are required to be trained and mobilized as units, be established on a basis which will require that non-priorservice personnel entering such units will be given an initial period of active duty for basic training.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board accompanied this recommendation with a renewed suggestion for the two items of legislation which I discussed earlier-authority to induct into the Reserve and authority to effect involuntary transfers to the National Guard. As explained, we do not believe that we would be justified in submitting such legislation until all other available methods have been tried and proved unsuccessful.

The Army's was the first service plan approved in principle by the Secretary of Defense. Army representatives are here this morning to present the details and justification of their program. I would like, however, to comment briefly on two of its features which held special implications for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

First, the program providing 6 months of training for individuals who enlist over 1812 years of age was urged upon the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve, of the Office of Secretary of Defense by the head of the Army Division of the National Guard Bureau long before it was proposed by the Department of the Army.

Second, the only feature of the Army plan which has generated sharp controversy between the National Guard and the Department of Defense is with reference to the six-months requirement. I point out to you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that the National Guard, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Army, and I believe as has been indicated by the Chairman this morning, the members of this committee are all in complete accord that it is highly desirable that the Army National Guard, indeed all of our Reserve components, have as soon as practicable the minimum degree of active duty for training required to fulfill their missions. The issue is simply this, should it be 11 weeks as advocated by the National Guard or 6 months as advocated by the Department of the Army and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

In their opposition to the length of the period, namely, 6 months, the National Guard has contended that there is opposition from teachers and parents presumably because of the effect on the enlistee with respect to his attendance at school. The Department of Defense is cognizant of this problem, and instructions have been issued to insure that application of the principles laid down to achieve quality Reserve Forces will not operate to either interrupt high school careers or deny high school students the opportunity to participate.

Carrying out the clear mandate of Congress with respect to inductions and with respect to the 6-months program of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Secretary Wilson issued interpretive instructions on January 31 in this regard. These state in part:

(b) Individuals between the ages of 17 and 181⁄2 pursuing a course in high school may be enlisted in Reserve programs up to 1 year prior to expected date of entry on active duty or active-duty-for-training *** Participation of these individuals in paid drill during the 1-year period will be as determined by the departmental Secretary concerned.

(c) The 1-year limitation imposed * ** above may be waived in the case of qualified individuals between the ages of 17 and 182, pursuing a course in high school, who later would be precluded, by reason of attained age, from enlisting in an authorized Reserve program.

So now the controversy is further narrowed to the sole issue of whether or not 11 weeks or 6 months is a military necessity for the Reserve components of the Army to meet their mission. The 6-months training requirement was approved by the Secretary of Defense on the strong recommendation of the Secretary of the Army, supported completely by his Chief of Staff and in turn by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a military judgment. And these officials of the Department of the Army are here to give you the basis of this judgment.

Essentially interrelated with the military requirement is the consideration of the individual himself. We are it seems to us duty bound to see to it that he has the maximum chance for survival under conditions of modern warfare if he is required to meet in combat the seasoned fighters of any armed force which might attack our Nation. This concept is reflected in the report of this committee on the 1951 amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act when it stated that it was intended in this act to prevent-

any person inducted into the Armed Forces from being sent into a combat area located on land for the first 6 months following his induction **

And, finally, we believe, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that the parents of these young men share the same concern and should be assured that their sons have such training and such chance for survival. Thank you.

Mr. BROOKS. That is a very fine statement, Mr. Jackson.

Secretary JACKSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. It is very clear and concise. I think the committee can get the basic points of difference.

Now I would like to ask you this. It appears to me from reading the charts that our great problem in obtaining sufficient manpower has not been whipped completely but certainly rendered much less of a problem than when we started. Actually your charts show that we have had too many men in the Ready Reserve category; that is correct, isn't it?

Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. And, therefore, your work recently has been that of culling out, so to speak, the individuals who by being eliminated from service will thereby, in effect, raise the standard of the Reserve compopents; is that a correct statement?

Secretary JACKSON. That is right, yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Now we have to get our Ready Reserve down to 2.9 million, and I think your statement shows that because of the ready reservists who are on active duty, the number would have to be reduced lower than that, to 2.5 million.

Secretary JACKSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. So that our objective now is to maintain a Reserve of 2.5 million plus the additional reservists on active duty and to raise their standard of training and efficiency as reservists; isn't that correct?

Secretary JACKSON. Correct, yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Now in doing that, you come forward, through the Secretary of Defense, with a proposal that no reservist shall be accepted in the Reserve program unless he has 6 months active duty, field training, or at least he anticipates taking that almost at once after he enters the Reserve establishment.

Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir. Unless he has an obligation to take it shortly after entry, except the high school boys as I have indicated, that is correct.

Mr. BROOKS. With your high school boys, you will adapt that program so that they will suffer the minimum amount of interruption in the school program.

Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir, just as the Congress has enacted with regard to the induction and the 6-month program in the Reserve Act.