conducted by Lt. Colonel Sterling, with the 42d regiment, who paffed the East River lower down, between the 2d and 4th attacks, The laft attack was made by Lord Percy, with the corps which he command. ed on the fouth of the island. All the attacks were fupported with a numerous, powerful, and well ferved artillery.

The Heffians under Gen. Knyphaufen had a thick wood to pass, where the enemy were very advantageously posted, and a warm engagement was continued for a confiderable time, in which the former were much expofed, and be haved with great firmnefs and bra. very. In the mean time the light infantry landed, and were expofed both before and after to a very brifk and continual fire from the enemy, who were themselves covered by the rocks and trees among which they were pofted. The former, however, with their usual alertnefs and activity, extricated themselves by clambering up a very steep and rough mountain, when they foon difperfed the enemy, and made way for the landing of the reft of the troops without oppofition. During thefe tranfactions, Lord Percy having carried an advanced work on his fide, Col. Sterling was ordered to attempt a landing, and two battalions of the zd brigade to fupport him. This fervice was effected by the Colonel with great bravery. He advanced his boats through a very heavy fire, which they bore with the greatest firmnefs and perfeverance, and forcing his way up a fteep height, gained the fummit, and took 170 prifoners, notwithstanding a bold and good defence made by the

enemy.

In the mean time Colonel Ralle, who led the right column of General Knyphaufen's attack, having forced the enemy, after a confiderable oppofition, from their strong posts in his line, pushed forward to their works, and lodged his column within an hundred yards of the fort; and being foon after joined by the General with the left column, who had at length overcome the impediments which he met with in the wood, the garrifon furrendered prifoners of war. The lofs on either fide was not in any degree proportioned to the warmth, length, and variety of the action. The quantity of gunpowder found in the Fort was utterly inadequate to the purpofe of almoft the fhorteft defence. How fo large a body was left with fo poor a provifion, is extremely unaccountable. the narrative of all these transac tions is hitherto very imperfect.

But

Upon this acquifition, a ftrong body of forces under the command of Lord Cornwallis was paffed over the North River, in order to take Fort Lee, and make a further impreffion in the Jerseys. The gar rifon of 2000 men, had a narrow efcape, by abandoning the 18th. Fort juft before his lordfhip's arrival, leaving their artik lery, ftores, tents, and every thing behind. Our troops afterwards overrun the greater part of both the Jerfeys without oppofition, the enemy flying every where be fore them; and at length extended their winter cantonments from New Brunswick to the Delaware, If they had had any means of paffing that river upon their first arrival in its neighbourhood, there feems lit. tle doubt, confidering the confter nation and difmay which then pre

availed among the enemy, that they might eafily have become mafters of the city of Philadelphia; but the former, very prudently, either deftroyed the boats, or removed them out of the way.

During thefe fucceffes in the Jerfeys, Gen. Clinton, with two brigades of British, and two of Heffian troops, with a fquadron of fhips of war under the command of Sir Peter Parker, were fent to make an attempt upon Rhode liland. In this enterprize they fucceeded beyond expectation. The Dec. 8th. rebels having abandon

ed the ifland at their approach, they took poffeffion of it without the lofs of a man; at the fame time that they blocked up Hopkins's fquadron, which was in the harbour of Providence, on the adjoining Continent, The fqua

dron and troops continued here during the winter, where they had better quarters than any other of the king's forces. Hitherto the royal army had fucceeded in every object fince their landing at Staten Ifland. The Provincial army, befides the lofs by fword, by captivity, and by desertion, began to dwindle to very fmall numbers, from the nature of their military engagement. They were only enlifted for a year; and the colonists, who were but little used to any reftraint, very ill brooked, even fo long an abfence from their families. At the expiration of the term, but few were prevailed upon to continue in fervice. Every thing feemed to promise a decifive event in favour of the royal arms, and a fubmiffion of fome of the principal colonies was hourly expected.

HILST our own affairs

ticks of other ftates. The unhap.

fo

field of bufinefs and action, the reft of Europe has happily preferved its tranquillity, and affords few objects of hiftorical difcuffion. Indeed it feems as if the transactions we have defcribed, had occafioned a kind of pause in the active poli

gaged, is of fuch general importance in its progrefs, and may be fo widely extenfive in its confe quences, that every commercial ftate finds itself interefted in the one, and its fpeculation ftrongly excited by the other. [*M] 3

Political enthusiasts,

enthufiafts, like all others, overlook all obftacles to the establishment of their favourite fyftem, and all impediments in the way to that point, which they have fixed upon as the fummit of attainment. Such a fchemer as Alberoni, would now fee a profpect opened for a total change in the political fyftem, of Europe, and a new arrangement of power and commerce in both the worlds. However the race of projectors may become extinct in other fciences, they are immortal in the affairs of nations. In them Alberoni's are never wanting.

It is not then to be wondered at, that the political attention of fome of the great European ftates fhould be frongly attracted by objects, in which Great Britain and her colonies fhould only have an intereft; or that the confcioufnefs of a power, which would enable them to convert all favourable circumftances to the greatest advantage, fhould difpofe them to look forward to poflible confequences. It is as little a matter of furprize, that other ftates, whofe views are more limited, fhould endeavour to profit of the prefent conjuncture.

No alliance, no ties of political friendship founded upon mu. tual intereft and fafety, (and no other can fubfift between ftates) are capable of refifting the allurements of commerce, with its concomitants wealth and power, when thefe even approach in value, to that of the bands which cemented the union. If fuch be their influence upon the clofeft alliance, upon thofe who are bound by many common motives of connexion and friendship, what muft it be upon natural enemies; upon jealous and fufpicious rivals; upon thofe who

dread, or who have experienced our power; or even fuch as only envied our greatnefs? Without the attainment of those benefits to themfelves, the fimply withdrawing them from an envied or dreaded power, and thereby leffening its importance and the apprehenfion it excited, would be an object of the first confideration.

France and Spain have opened their ports, with the greatest apparent friendship to the Americans, and treat them in every respect as an independent people. The remonftrances of the British minifters have availed but little. They already have a taste of the sweets of that commerce which we had fo long fecluded from the rest of the world; and which would have still preferved our greatness if we had loft all other. They now begin to know by experience the extent of thofe advantages, which before were only objects of an uncertain fpeculation, and whofe real value was not well understood by ourfelves. Not content with reaping the benefits of the American commerce, by keeping barely within the pale of a verbal neutrality, they go farther; they folicit and afford the means for its continuance. The American privateers have been openly received, protected, and cherished, and the rich prizes they have taken from the British merchants, rather publicly fold in the French ports, both in Europe and the colonies. Artillery and mi litary ftores of all kinds have been likewife fent; whether really bought with their own money, or fupplied gratis, is uncertain. At this the British minitters find them felves obliged, fometimes to re monftrate, fometimes to wink. French engineers and officers have

alfo

alfo joined the Americans, in numbers not before known upon any occafion of foreign or volunteer service. It fignifies little to enquire, whether this has been practifed by permiffion, or fuffered by connivance.

Two evils attend this unhappy civil contention, which at the fame time that they diftinguish it from other wars, render it more dangerous and grievous than any. The one is, that by the advantages which it lays open, either immediately or in profpect, to other nations, it caufes an union in a certain degree, either in act or fentiment, of the commercial world against us; holding out a temptation to mankind to become our enemies. The other is, the weaknefs which it induces with respect to foreign powers. Our dominions are not only fevered at that critical juncture, when it is too evident that a ftrict union of the whole would be particularly neceffary; but a new enemy fprings up in the feparated part, which from the extraordinary vigour of exertion, proceeding from the novelty of the fituation, the danger attending it, and the bitterness of domeftic enmity, acquires an efficacy and force, far beyond what it contributed, or knew it poffeffed, when in unity, and only forming a fubordinate fhare of general defence. Thus we have been obliged to be the tame fpectators of a conduct, which in another feafon would have been deemed infufferable, and to fubmit to a degree of injury and infult which we never before experienced, or, at leaft, which was never offered with impunity.

Neither was neighbourhood, long alliance, the power of pro

clamations, nor the vigilance of our Ambaffador, fufficient to retrain the Dutch from fharing in thofe advantages which were now offered. In a word, all the nations who poffefs colonies in America, were eager to partake of the new and unexpected commerce which was now opened; and all, excepting the Portuguefe, who, much against their inclination, have been retrained through our influence at that court, ftill continue moft sedulously to profit of the opportu nity. This difpofition has, by degrees, appeared pretty general in other European ftates.

It must indeed be acknowledged, that this commerce, whilft confined merely to the European colonies in the New World, may be juftified upon fome very reasonable grounds. The French, Dutch, and Danish islands in the Weft-Indies, as well as our own, had at all times been fupplied by NorthAmerica with various commodities, fome of which, fuch as provifions and lumber, were even effential to their exiftence. Nor were all the Spanish colonies, notwithstanding their extent of continent, wholly free from this neceffity. It could not then be expected, that these States, from any regard to our private quarrels, or attention to our acts of parliament, should suffer their islands to be ftarved, or their ftaple commodities loft. Nor could the ruin which they faw coming upon our own West-India islands, and palliated chiefly by captures from the Americans, be the fmalleft inducement to their fubmitting to a fimilar mischief.

However, from this invasion of the American trade by foreigners one advantage is derived, if not to [*M] 4

the

the commerce and navigation, yet to the manufactures of England; that these nations not having yet got into the way of providing a proper affortment for the American market, they refort hither for Supply. This is felt in all the manufacturing towns; and the Miniftry owe much of their quiet, during the prefent contention, to that fource.

It is probable that Europe is much indebted, for the continuance of its tranquillity, to the pacific difpofition of the French monarch, which is fuppofed with difficulty to have reftrained the activity or reftleffnefs of a clofe ally and powerful neighbour, as well as the ardour of the princes of the blood, the nobility, and the nation in general, who are thought to be eagerly difpofed to a war. Indeed, from whatever caufe it proceeds, the American party is fo ftrong in France, that it feems nearly to include the whole nation, except the ruling part of the court. How ever that may be, the prefent difpofition of that court is favourable to the happiness of mankind, and, in the prefent ftate of affairs, particularly fortunate to Great-Britain.

The military preparations how ever, in France, particularly on the fea-coafts, and the naval armaments, have been fo confiderable, that no exp nation which could be given of the motives, was fufficient for a time to allay the alarm and apprehenfion which they excited. It was faid, that as the feas were covered with English fleets and American cruizers, and not only an actual war carried on, but fuch armies fent to the New World as had never before appeared there,

:

it became neceffary for France to arm in fuch a manner, as would effectually fecure her colonies, and protect her commerce: That her engagements with Spain, and the difputes between that power and Portugal, rendered it befides ne ceffary, that the fhould be in fach a ftate of preparation, as in cafe of a rupture would enable her to fulfil them and that it was very extraordinary, that thofe who, befides being themselves in the higheft poffible ftate of warlike preparation, had also sent hofts of armed foreigners into the New World, fhould make objections to their neighbours putting themselves in a proper ftate of fecurity. Whatever fatisfaction thefe answers afforded, no better could be obtained; and it is very probable, that a greater reliance was placed upon a knowledge of the temper of the French Minifters, and of the cabals which prevailed in the court, than upon any affurances they could have given. All together were not fuf. ficient to prevent alarm, or totally to remove apprehenfion.

The Count de St. Germain, who in the preceding year had been recalled by the King to the fervice of his country, and placed at the head of the war department, ventured upon a military regulation, which for a time made a great noif, and would, in a more turbulent feafon, have been exceedingly dangerous. This was the fuppreffion of the Mufquetaires, and fome other of thofe corps, which being adapted more to the parade of guarding the royal perfon, than any real military service, were fupported at a prodigious expence, without an adequate return of benefit to the fate. Notwith

ftanding