of landing in that part, which was near the center of New-York Island. Whilft the rebels were in this ftate of expectation and uncertainty, the first divifion of the army, under the command of Sept. 15th. General Clinton, with Earl Cornwallis, Major General Vaughan, Brigadier General Leflie, and the Heian Colonel Donop, embarked at the head of Newtown bay, which runs pretty deep into Long-Ifland, and where they were out of all view of the enemy. Being covered by five fhips of war upon their entrance into the river, they proceeded to Kepp's bay, about three miles north of New York, where being lefs expected than in fome other places, the preparation for defence was not fo great. The works, however, were not inconfiderable, nor deftitute of troops, but the fire from the fhips was fo inceffant, and fo well conducted, that they were foon abandoned, and the army landed without oppofition. The enemy immediately abandoned the city of New-York, with their other posts on that part of the island, and retired towards the north end, where their principal ftrength lay. They were obliged to leave their artillery, which was confiderable, and their military ftores (of which, except powder, there was plenty) behind. They fuftained fome lofs in flain, and a greater in prisoners, as well in the retreat, as in the fubfequent fkirmishes which took place during the day. The fore remembrance of their late lofs was ftrongly visible in every part of their conduct, and their own ac counts acknowledged, that feveral of the regiments behaved ill. A brigade of the British army having taken poffeffion of NewYork, the rest encamped not far from the center of the island, with the right at Horen's Hook, on the Eaft river, and the left at the North river, near Bloomingdale; thus occupying the extent of the island from thore to fhore, which, though about 16 miles in length, is not much above one in breadth. The enemy were very strong in the north of the ifland, where they had great works erected: particularly at Kingfbridge, by which their communication with the continent of New-York was kept open, where their works were fo confiderable on both fides of the paffage, that in their prefent ftate of force they feemed to defy all attempts on either. Their nearest encampment was on the heights of Harlem, at the diftance of about a mile and a half. M'Gowan's pafs, and the trong grounds called Morris's heights, lay between them and Kingsbridge, and were defenfible against a very fuperior force. In this fituation of both armies, frequent kirmishes of course happened, and it was found by degrees that their late apprehenfions began to wear away. General Howe had not been many days in poffeffion of NewYork, when fome incendiaries, who probably had stayed behind and concealed themselves for that purpofe, being determined, if poffible, to prevent its being of any benefit to the conqueror, prepared combustibles with great art and ingenuity, and taking the advantage of dry weather and a brisk wind, fet fire to the city zoth. about about midnight, in feveral places at the fame time. Thus, near a third of that beautiful city was reduced to ashes, and nothing lefs than the courage and activity of the troops, as well as of the failors who were dispatched from the fleet, could have preferved any part of the remainder. Many of the wretches who were, as it is faid, concerned in this atrocious business, being detected, experienced a fummary juftice, and were precipitated by the fury of the foldiers into thofe flames which they had themfelves kin dled. The general perceiving that no attempt could be made on the enemy upon the fide of New-York, which would not be attended with great danger, without affording any equal profpect of fuccefs, determined at length upon a plan of operation, which would either oblige them to quit their prefent ftrong fituation, or render their perfeverance in holding it extremely dangerous. For this purpofe, oa. 12. the greater part of the army being embarked in flat boats and other fmall craft proper for the fervice, paffed fuccessfully through the dangerous navigation of Hell Gate, which forms a communication between the Eaft river and the found, and landed on Frog's Neck, near the town of Weft Chefter, which lies on that part of the continent belonging to New-York, upon the fide of Connecticut. Earl Percy, with two brigades of British troops, and one of Heffian, continued in the lines near Harlem to cover New-York. Though this movement was highly judicious in the prefent exact fate of things, it feems as if it would have been extremely dangerous if General Washington had commanded a veteran army on whose performance he could rely, and that the corps under Lord Percy would' in that cafe have been in great danger. It is, however, to be obferved, that the powerful fleet which furrounded that narrow ifland, would have afforded fhelter and protection in almost any fituation to which they could have been reduced. This fleet was of infinite fervice in all the operations of the campaign. In this the inferiority of the provincials was most felt, being totally deftitute of any force of that nature. The army was detained for fome days at Frog's Neck, waiting for the arrival of the provifions and ftores, and of a reinforcement which was drawn from Staten Ifland. They then proceeded through Pelham's Manor to New Rochelle, which lies on the coaft of the Sound, as that channel is called, which feparates the continent from Long Island. At this place they were joined by the greater part of a regiment of light horfe from Ireland, one of the tranfports having been taken in the paffage. They were alfo joined by the fecond divifion of Heffians under General Knyphaufen, with a regiment of Waldeckers, both of which had arrived at New-York fince the departure of the army from thence. The first object of this expedi tion was to cut off the communications between Washington and the eaftern colonies; and then, if this meafure did not bring him to an engagement, to enclofe him on all fides in his faftneffes on the north end of York Island. The King's troops troops were now masters of the lower road to Connecticut and Bofton; but to gain the upper, it was neceffary to advance to the high grounds called the White Plains; a rough, ftony, and mountainous tract; which, however, is only part of the afcent, to a country ftill higher, rougher, and more difficult. Upon the departure of the army to the higher country, it was deemed neceflary to leave the fecond divifion of Heffians, with the Waldeck regiment, at New Rochelle, as well to preferve the communications, as to fecure the fupplies of provifions and neceffaries that were to arrive at that port. Indeed the army was now fo pow. erful, that it was enabled to fupport every service. camps, which occupied every height and ftrong ground from Va lentine's Hill, not far from Kingf bridge, on the right, to the White Plains, and the upper road to Connecticut, on the left. In this pofition they faced the whole line of march of the King's troops at a moderate distance, the deep river Brunx com vering their front, and the North river at fome distance in their rear, whilft the open ground to the laft afforded a fecure paffage for their ftores and baggage to the upper country. A garrifon was left for the protection of Fort Washington, the lines of Harlem and Kingfbridge. In this fituation of the enemy, General Howe thought it necef fary to proceed with great circumfpection. The progrefs was flow, the march of the army close, the encampments compact, and well guarded with artillery, and the moft foldier-like caution ufed in every respect. This did not reftrain the enemy from fending parties over the Brunx to impede their march, which occafioned several fkirmishes, in which the royal army were generally fuccefsful. Upon the approach of the army to the White Plains, the enemy quitted their detached camps along the Brunx, and joining their left, took a ftrong ground of encampment before the British on the former. General Washington was not inattentive to the danger of his fituation. He faw, that if he continued where he was, he would at length be compelled to commit the whole fortune of the war, and the fafety of all the colonies to the hazard of a general engagement; a decifion, of which he had every cause to apprehend the event, and in which a defeat would be final, as there could fcarcely be a poffibility of retreat. His army likewife, which had been difheartened by their late misfortunes, was then much reduced by fickness, which the feverity of the fervices, indif. ferent quarters, infufficient cloath. Every thing being prepa- 28th. ing, the want of falt and other ne red for bringing the enemy ceffaries, joined to a flovenlipels to action, the army marched early generally prevalent in America, in the morning in two columns had rendered general, and very fa- towards the White Plains, the left tal in his camp. being commanded by General Heifter. Before noon, all the enemy's advanced parties being drove back to their works by the light infantry and Heffian Chaffours, the [*] A grand movement was accordingly made, by which the army was formed into a line of small, detached, and entrenched VOL. XIX. army army formed, with the right upon the road from Mamoroneck, at about a mile's distance from their centre, and the left to the Brunx, at about the fame diftance from the right flank of their entrenchments. A body of the enemy poffeffed an advantageous ground, that was feparated from their right flank by the Brunx, and which also, by its windings, coyered that corps in font from the left of our army. As this poft would have been of great confequence in attacking that flank of the entrenchments, Brigadier General Leslie, with the fecond brigade of British troops, the Heffian grenadiers under Colonel Donop, and a battalion of that corps, were ordered to dislodge the enemy. Previous to their attack, Colonel Ralle, who commanded a brigade of Heffians on the left, had paffed the Brunx, and gained a poft, which enabled him to annoy the enemy's flank, while they were engaged with the other forces in front. Though the paffage of the river was difficult, it was performed with the greatest fpirit, and the 28th and 35th regiments, being the firft that paffed, formed with the greatest steadiness, under the enemy's fire on the oppofite fide; they then afcended a fteep hill, in defiance of all oppofition, and rush ing on the enemy, foon routed, and drove them from their works. No lefs alacrity was fhewn by the other troops in fupporting thefe two regiments. The gaining of this important poft took up a confiderable time, which was prolonged by the enemy's ftill fupporting a broken and fcattered engagement, in defence of the adjoining walls and hedges. In the evening, the Heffian grenadiers were ordered forward upon the heights within cannot fhot of the entrenchments, the 2d brigade of British formed in their rear, and the two Heffian brigades, on the left of the fecond. The right and centre of the army did not remove from the ground upon which they had formed. In that pofition the whole army lay upon their arms during the night, with a full intention, and in the higheft expectation, of attacking the enemy's camp next morning. It was perceived in the morning that the enemy had drawn back their encampment in the night, and had greatly ftrengthened their lines by additional works. Upon this account the attack was defer. red, and it was thought necessary to wait for the arrival of the 4th brigade, and of two battalions of the 6th, which had been left with Lord Percy at New-York. Upon the arrival of these troops, the neceflary difpofitions were made in the evening, for attacking the enemy early on the laft of October; but an extreme wet night and morning prevented this defign from being carried into execution. In the mean time, General Washington had not the fmallest intention of venturing an engagement, whilt there was a poffibility of its being avoided. He knew that delay was in fome fort victory to him. That fmall actions, which could not in the leaft affect the public fafety, would more effectually train his men to fervice, and inure them to danger, than a general action, which might in one day decide their own, and the fate of America. It must be acknowledged, that in the courfe of this campaign, and more particularly in this part of it, he fully performed the part of no mean commander. The American accounts fay, that upon our covering four or five batteries with a powerful artillery, preparatory to an attack, together with the General's knowledge that by turning his camp, the British might become poffeffed of hills at his back which totally commanded it, he found it neceffary to change his 'pofition. He accordingly quit ted his camp on the night of the ift of November, and took higher ground towards the North Caftle diftrict, having first fet fire to the town or village of White Plains, as well as to all the houfes and forage near the lines. The British army on the next day took poffef fion of their entrenchment.. General Howe seeing that, the enemy could not be enticed to an engagement, and that the nature of the country did not admit of their being forced to it, determined not to lofe time in a fruitless purfuit, and to take this opportunity of driving them out of their ftrong holds in York Inland; an operation which their army could not now poffibly prevent. For this purpofe, General Knyphaufen croffed the country from New Rochelle, and having taken poffeffion of King's Bridge without oppofition, entered York-Ifland, and took his station to the north of Fort Washington, to which the ene: my had retired at his approach. Fort Washington lay on the weft fide of New York Island, not far from King's Bridge, near Jeffery's Hook, and almoft facing Fort Lee on the Jersey fide, from which it was feparated by the North River. This work, though not contemptible, was not fufficient to refift heavy artillery; and it was by no means of a fufficient extent for any other purpofe than the ftrengthen ing of lines. But the fituation was extremely ftrong, and the approach' es dificult. 16th. The army having Nov. 13th. returned flowly by the North River, encamped on the heights of Fordham, at a mode rate diftance from King's-Bridge, with that river on its right, and the Brunx on the left. Every thing being prepared for attacking the Fort, and the commander, Cola nel Magaw, refufing a fummons to furrender, and declaring he would defend it to the last extremity, a general affault was determined upon, as faving the time that would be loft in regular approaches. The garrifon confifted of near 3000 men, and the strong grounds round the Fort were covered with lines and works. Four attacks were made at the fame time. The firft, on the north fide, was conducted by General Knyphaufen, at the head of two columns of Heffians and Waldeckers. The fecond, on the caft, was led on by Brigadier General Matthews at the head of the 1ft and 2d battalions of light infantry, and two battalions of guards, fupported by Lord Cornwallis with the 1ft and 2d battalions of grenadiers, and the 33d regiment. Thefe forces croffed the East River in flat boats, and as the enemy's works there extended the breadth of the island, redoubts and batteries were erected on the oppofite fhore, as well to cover the landing of the troops, as to annoy thofe works which were near the water. The third attack, which was principally intended as a feint to diftract the enemy, was [M] 2 con |