II.

Teach the

in war.

THIS innovation in the military system was SECT. quickly followed by another, which the custom of employing Swiss in the Italian wars was the oc- Europeans casion of introducing. The arms and discipline the superior importance of the Swiss were different from those of other of infantry European nations. During their long and violent struggles in defence of their liberties against the house of Austria, whose armies, like those of other considerable princes, consisted chiefly of heavyarmed cavalry, the Swiss found that their poverty, and the small number of gentlemen residing in their country, at that time barren and ill cultivated, put it out of their power to bring into the field any body of horse capable of facing the enemy. Necessity compelled them to place all their confidence in infantry; and in order to render it capable of withstanding the shock of cavalry, they gave the soldiers breast-plates and helmets as defensive armour; together with long spears, halberts, and heavy swords, as weapons of offence. They formed them into large battalions, ranged in deep and close array, so that they could present on every side a formidable front to the enemy*. The men at arms could make no impression on the solid strength of such a body. It repulsed the Austrians in all their attempts to conquer Swisserland. It broke the Burgundian Gendarmerie, which was scarcely inferior to that of France, either in number or reputation; and when first called to act in Italy, it bore down, by its irresistible force, every enemy that attempted to oppose it. These repeated proofs of the decisive effect of infantry, ex

Machiavel's Art of War, b. ii. chap. ii. p. 451,

II.

SECT. hibited on such conspicuous occasions, restored that service to reputation, and gradually re-esta blished the opinion, which had been long exploded, of its superior importance in the operations of war. But the glory which the Swiss had acquired, having inspired them with such high ideas of their own prowess and consequence as frequently rendered them mutinous and insolent, the princes who employed them became weary of depending on the caprice of foreign mercenaries, and began to turn their attention towards the improvement of their national infantry.

National infantry esta

Germany.

THE German powers having the command of blished in men, whom nature has endowed with that steady courage and persevering strength which forms them to be soldiers, soon modelled their troops in such a manner, that they vied with the Swiss both in discipline and valour.

In France.

In Spain.

THE French monarchs, though more slowly and with greater difficulty, accustomed the impetuous spirit of their people to subordination and discipline; and were at such pains to render their national infantry respectable, that as early as the reign of Louis XII. several gentlemen of high rank had so far abandoned their ancient ideas, as to condescend to enter into that service *.

THE Spaniards, whose situation made it difficult to employ any other than their national troops in the Southern parts of Italy, which was the chief

* Brantome, tom. x. p. 18. Mem. de Fleuranges, 143.

II.

scene of their operations in that country, not only SECT. adopted the Swiss discipline, but improved upon it, by mingling a proper number of soldiers, armed with heavy muskets, in their battalions; and thus formed that famous body of infantry, which, during a century and a half, was the admiration and terror of all Europe. The Italian states gradually diminished the number of their cavalry, and, in imitation of their more powerful neighbours, brought the strength of their armies to consist in foot soldiers. From this period the nations of Europe have carried on war with forces more adapted to every species of service, more capable of acting in every country, and better fitted both for making conquests, and for preserving them;

impositions as are
While the feudal

The Italian sion an in

wars occa

crease of the public

Europe,

As their efforts in Italy led the people of Europe to these improvements in the arts of war, they gave them likewise the first idea of the expence with which it is accompanied when exten- revenues in sive or of long continuance, and accustomed every nation to the burden of such necessary for supporting it. policy subsisted in full vigour, while armies were composed of military vassals called forth to attack some neighbouring power, and to perform, in a short campaign, the services which they owed to their sovereign, the expence of war was extremely moderate. A small subsidy enabled a prince to begin and to finish his greatest military operations. But when Italy became the theatre on which the powers of Europe contended for superiority, the preparations requisite for such a dis

SECT.

II.

tant expedition, the pay of armies kept constant-
ly on foot, their subsistence in a foreign country,
the sieges to be undertaken, and the towns to be
defended, swelled the charges of war immensely,
and, by creating demands unknown in less active
times, multiplied taxes in every kingdom. The
progress of ambition, however was so rapid, and
princes extended their operations so fast, that it
was impossible at first to establish funds propor-
tional to the increase of expence which these oc-
casioned. When Charles VIII. invaded Naples,
the sums requisite for carrying on that enterprise
so far exceeded those which France had been ac-
customed to contribute for the support of govern-
ment, that before he reached the frontiers of Italy,
his treasury was exhausted, and the domestic re-
sources of which his extensive prerogative gave
him the command, were at an end. As he durst
not venture to lay any new imposition on his
people, oppressed already with the weight of un-
usual burdens; the only expedient that remained
was, to borrow of the Genoese as much money as
might enable him to continue his march.
he could not obtain a sufficient sum, without con-
senting to pay annually the exorbitant interest of
forty-two livres for every hundred that he recei-
ved *. We may observe the same disproportion
between the efforts and revenues of other princes,
his contemporaries. From this period, taxes went
on increasing; and during the reign of Charles
V. such sums were levied in every state, as would
have appeared enormous at the close of the fif

*Mem de Comines, lib. vii. c. 5. p. 440.

But

teenth century, and gradually prepared the way for the still more exorbitant exactions of modern times.

SECT.
II.

of Cambray

THE last transaction, previous to the reign of The league Charles V. that merits attention on account of its another influence upon the state of Europe, is the league occurrence, important of Cambray. To humble the republic of Venice, and to divide its territories, was the object of all the powers who united in this confederacy. The civil constitution of Venice, established on a firm basis, had suffered no considerable alteration for several centuries; during which, the senate conducted its affairs by maxims of policy no less prudent than vigorous, and adhered to these with an uniform consistent spirit, which gave that commonwealth great advantage over other states, whose views and measures changed as often as the form of their government, or the persons who administered it. By these unintermitted exertions of wisdom and valour, the Venetians enlarged the dominions of their commonwealth, until it became the most considerable power in Italy; while their extensive commerce, the useful and curious manufactures which they carried on, together with the large share which they had acquired of the lucrative commerce with the East, rendered Venice the most opulent state in Europe,

tives of it

THE power of the Venetians was the object of The ma terror to their Italian neighbours. Their wealth was viewed with envy by the greatest monarchs, who could not vie with many of their private