sures.

II.

little con

with

WHOEVER records the transactions of any of SECT. the more considerable European states during the two last centuries, must write the history of Eu- They were rope. Its various kingdoms, throughout that pe- nece other. riod, have been formed into one great system, so closely united, that each holding a determinate station, the operations of one are so felt by all, as to influence their counsels and regulate their meaBut previous to the fifteenth century, unless when vicinity of territory rendered the occasions of discord frequent and unavoidable, or when national emulation fomented or embittered the spirit of hostility, the affairs of different countries are seldom interwoven with each other. In each kingdom of Europe great events and revolutions happened, which the other powers beheld with almost the same indifference as if they had been uninterested spectators, to whom the effect of these transactions could never extend.

mation of

the affairs

DURING the violent struggles between France A confirand England, and notwithstanding the alarming this from progress which was made towards rendering one of France. prince the master of both these kingdoms, hardly one measure which can be considered as the result of a sagacious and prudent policy, was formed in order to guard against an event so fatal to Europe. The dukes of Burgundy and Bretagne, whom their situation would not permit to remain neutral, engaged, it is true, in the contest; but in taking their part they seem rather to have followed the impulse of their passions, than to have been guided by any just discernment of the danger

II.

SECT. which threatened themselves and the tranquillity of Europe. The other princes, seemingly unaffected by the alternate successes of the contending parties, left them to decide the quarrel by themselves, or interposed only by feeble and ineffectual negociations.

From those of Spain,

From those of Ger

many.

This inactivity occa

NOTWITHSTANDING the perpetual hostilities in which the various kingdoms of Spain were engaged during several centuries, and the successive occurrences which visibly tended to unite that part of the Continent into one great monarchy, the princes of Europe hardly took any step from which we may conclude that they gave a proper attention to that important event. They permitted a power to arise imperceptibly, and to acquire strength there, which soon became formidable to all its neighbours.

AMIDST the violent convulsions with which the spirit of domination in the See of Rome, and the turbulent ambition of the German nobles, agitated the empire, neither the authority of the popes, seconded by all their artifices and intrigues, nor the solicitations of the emperors, could induce any of the powerful monarchs in Europe to engage in their quarrel, or to avail themselves of many favourable opportunities of interposing with effect and advantage,

THIS amazing inactivity, during transactions so sioned interesting, is not to be imputed to any incapacithe state of ty of discerning their political consequences. The govern- power of judging with sagacity, and of acting with

entirely by

ment,

1

II.

vigour, is the portion of men of every age. The SECT. monarchs who reigned in the different kingdoms of Europe during several centuries, were not blind to their particular interest, negligent of the public safety, or strangers to the method of securing both. If they did not adopt that salutary system, which teaches modern politicians to take the alarm at the prospect of distant dangers, which prompts them to check the first encroachments of any formidable power, and which renders each state the guardian, in some degree, of the rights and independence of all its neighbours, this was owing entirely to such imperfections and disorders in the civil government of each country, as made it impossible for sovereigns to act suitably to those ideas, which the posture of affairs, and their own observation, must have suggested.

pened dur.

century,

der the

efforts of

more pow

BUT during the course of the fifteenth century, Events hap various events happened, which, by giving princes ing the 15th more entire command of the force in their repec- which rentive dominions, rendered their operations more vigorous and extensive. In consequence of this, nations the affairs of different kingdoms becoming more erful and frequently as well as more intimately connected, extensive, they were gradually accustomed to act in concert and confederacy, and were insensibly prepared for forming a system of policy, in order to establish or to preserve such a balance of power as was most consistent with the general security. It was during the reign of Charles the Fifth, that the ideas, on which this system is founded, first came to be fully understood. It was then, that the

SECT. maxims by which it has been uniformly maintainII. ed since that æra, were universally adopted. On

The first of these was

ing the

tories on the

continent.

this account, a view of the causes and events which contributed to establish a plan of policy, more salutary and extensive than any that has taken place in the conduct of human affairs, is not only a necessary introduction to the following work, but is a capital object in the history of Europe.

THE first event that occasioned any considerthe depriv- able alteration in the arrangement of affairs in English of Europe, was the annexation of the extensive territheir territories, which England possessed on the continent, to the crown of France. While the English were masters of several of the most fertile and opulent provinces in France, and a great part of its most martial inhabitants was bound to follow their standard, an English monarch considered himself rather as the rival, than as the vassal of the sovereign of whom he held. The kings of France, circumscribed and thwarted in their schemes and operations by an adversary no less jealous than formidable, durst not enter upon any enterprise of importance or of difficulty. The English were always at hand, ready to oppose them. They disputed even their right to their crown, and being able to penetrate, with ease, into the heart of the kingdom, could arm against them those very hands which ought to have been employed in their defence. Timid counsels and feeble efforts were natural to monarchs in such a situation. France, dismembered and overawed, could not attain its proper station in the system of Europe. But the

11.

death of Henry V. of England, happily for France, SECT and not unfortunately for his own country, delivered the French from the calamity of having a foreign master seated on their throne. The weakness of a long minority, the dissensions in the English court, together with the unsteady and languid conduct which these occasioned, afforded the French a favourable opportunity of recovering the territories which they had lost. The native valour of the French nobility, heightened to an enthusiastic confidence, by a supposed interposition of Heaven in their behalf; conducted in the field by skilful leaders; and directed in the cabinet by a prudent monarch; was exerted with such vigour and success, during this favourable juncture, as not only wrested from the English their new conquests, but stript them of their ancient possessions in France, and reduced them within the narrow precincts of Calais, and its petty terri tory.

of this on

the power

monarchy.

As soon as so many considerable provinces were The effect re-united to their dominions, the kings of France, increasing conscious of this acquisition of strength, began to of the form bolder schemes of interior policy, as well as French of foreign operations. They immediately became formidable to their neighbours, who began to fix their attention on their measures and motions, the importance of which they fully perceived. From this æra, France, possessed of the advantages which it derives from the situation and contiguity of its territories, as well as from the number and valour of its people, rose to new influence in Eu