Distribution of Power

Within the ILWU and the ILA

PHILIP ROSS*

IN THE LAST 8 YEARS, a growing concern of shipping companies with dock labor costs has led to vigorous employer efforts to lower costs by making changes in union work rules. The diverse sources of these rules reflect the state of bargaining in the different ports of the United States, and the rules themselves illuminate alternative methods of handling waterfront employment relationships. In some ports, restrictive work practices were incorporated into collective bargaining contracts and revealed a high degree of union power. In other ports, work rules were often an extracontractual device used to protect longshoremen from onerous and inequitable treatment. Frequently, they were directed against their unions.

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These observations seem to fit the data and square with the perceptions of participants in the longshore industries on both sides of the continent. In the course of a study concerning one particular kind of change—the containerization of cargo-the author talked to many of the persons whose influence on labor relations in the ports has been profound. In this comparison of the labor-management relations on the east and gulf coasts with those on the west coast can be seen some differences which suggest the general direction of longshore collective bargaining nationally.

On the surface, the ILWU and the ILA are pursuing dissimilar roads in their approach to bargaining. The 1960 "Modernization and Mechanization" contract between the ILWU and the Pacific Maritime Association, which was renewed

in 1966, has been widely heralded as marking a new era in waterfront industrial relations. It is claimed that by this agreement employers have eliminated all past restrictive work rules and have achieved full freedom from union opposition to innovate and modernize their operations. In contrast, the ILA has engaged in two major strikes in 1962 and 1964 in which the main issues are represented to be the union's insistence upon retaining job-augmenting and redundant work rules.

The public statements of waterfront employers endorse this view. West coast employers appear pleased with the state of their collective bargaining while their east coast counterparts have continually pled for compulsory arbitration as the only solution to their problems.

The evidence indicates that the distinction made between the two unions is overdrawn. Despite some minor disturbances involving the problem of contract enforcement and the major unsettled question of periodic contract strikes, East and gulf coast employers do not appear to be worse off than companies doing business on the west coast. In fact, the evidence that they are better off in many ways, including costs, is very persuasive.

The major differences in the bargaining experience of the ILA and the ILWU lies in the former's contract strikes. It must be emphasized that the M & M Agreement was not responsible for the west coast's strike-free record since it long antedated the 1960 contract. The ILA's proneness to strikes is basically caused by a defective bargaining relationship with deep historic roots. Symptomatic of the underlying weakness is the fact

*Professor of Industrial Relations, State University of New York at Buffalo.

1 The full report of that study, which was suggested by the Ford foundation, was submitted in May 1967 to the Secretary of Transportation.

that such critical issues as seniority and the method of royalty payments for containerized cargo were determined by arbitration and not through negotiations.

Local Dominance

The economic structure of the Atlantic and gulf coast longshore industry generates a wide range of issues which set off local against local and member against member. The many ports which make up the industry are largely independent product markets, and gains in one port are often made at the expense of another. A large port, such as New York, can best be understood as comprising separate smaller ports, each with independent leadership, occasionally pursuing different goals. The atomization of the industry creates unusual power in the hands of local officers. Evidence of this allocation lies in the prevalence of local discretion in work practices. Each port on the Atlantic and gulf coasts has different practices in fundamental areas, such as hiring methods, gang size, and work practices generally. Moreover, differences within the port of New York are perpetuated by the incorporation in current contracts of clauses which continue past variations. Although there are many practical reasons for such variationdifferences in equipment, ships, terminals, and cargos-the most important influence is the policy of the particular local union.

Since a major function of an international union is to adjust conflicts among locals, the relatively weak centralized authority vested in the ILA causes considerable disabilities in bargaining because of inability to reconcile competing local interests. Bold and imaginative leadership is made extremely difficult in a political context where consent must be obtained from a group of individual local leaders who are each guided by parochial considerations. The international leadership does possess some independent power which has been used to persuade, placate, or coerce the local power centers. The rarity of these occasions underscores the constraints upon the international union leaders, who know that the loyalty of longshoremen is primarily directed to their local leaders.

3 The ILA seems never to have sanctioned a strike from 1916 to 1945. Other ports have sustained intermittent unauthorized stoppages and slowdowns. Major wildcats took place in New York after rejection of contracts negotiated by the leadership in 1945, 1947, and 1951.

The Wildcat Syndrome

The pattern of work stoppages in the ILA jurisdiction reflects both the union's internal politics and a defective bargaining structure. The failure of the parties to develop effective working relationships is the fundamental cause of labor instability. This is not to say that the record is all bad. Most wildcats have been eliminated, and many of the ports have worked out efficient grievance and arbitration machinery. Moreover, in recent years the ILA contracts have brought great gains to the membership. On the employer side, greater unity of purpose and action now exist than ever before.

A poor bargaining relationship is indicated, nevertheless, by the remaining incidence of wildcat strikes, by the fact that every contract negotiation since World War II has led to a strike, and by past inadequacy in handling critical problems. Arbitration, not bargaining, after all, resolved the issues of containerization on the Atlantic coast and seniority in the port of New York. It is difficult to think of any other industry which would permit outside disposition of fundamental issues. which have endured through three consecutive contract negotiations.

Evidence of more persuasive influence of internal union affairs upon the bargaining process can be found in the rigid adherence to union work rules in most ports, even where the application of these rules is clearly inappropriate. This inflexibility is due mainly to membership mistrust of any action which can be construed as a surrender of acquired rights. The local union leadership is reluctant to dissipate its strength among its followers, while the international union is unable to exercise any authority except in situations involving an overt breach of contract. Even in such cases, the international's intervention may be politically dangerous, when it confronts powerful local leaders.

The Employer Contribution

The differences between the ILA and the ILWU are also exemplified by contrasting employer behavior. There is some justification for the view that the ILA, during the long presidency of Joseph Ryan, was a company-dominated union. Bargaining apathy and a willingness to act in the interest

of employers to enforce work discipline did more than create an unhealthy collaboration of international union and employer groups. It also set up the conditions under which employee rights were best attained and preserved by strong local union leaders. Experience demonstrated to the rank and file that their protection lay in the inflexible enforcement of rules which were understood, whose consequences were certain, and whose benefits were visible. Concessions could easily be obtained only by new operations at new piers, or by new employers, and then only when employee vested interests were not threatened. The employers themselves were a congeries of competing firms, whose own bargaining organization was a fragile thing.

The ILWU, on the other hand, was confronted from its formation with bitter and pervasive employer hostility, part of which was a reaction to the union's militance. Apart from a war-induced truce, the bargaining relations on the west coast were as antagonistic as in any industry in the United States and reached the point in 1934 and 1938 of all-out employer attempts to break the union. Under these circumstances, the international union took and was delegated authority by local leaders to combat the common enemy.

On both coasts, the past continues to influence present events. The reformation of the ILA required that the international officers offer strong support for improved employee benefits, so as to compete with the local leaders. As a consequence, forces of moderation within the ILA are without a secure political base, and union concessions at the bargaining table are secured with difficulty. In contrast, the ILWU has experienced a long period of internal stability.

The reorganization of bargaining on the west coast in 1948 proceeded on the tacit assumption that only a strong international union could assure mutually beneficial accommodations. Accordingly, the Pacific Maritime Association followed a deliberate policy of strengthening the international in every way possible. This effort required an effective grievance and arbitration system, which appears to have operated to insure that issues critical to the authority of the international union were favorably handled.3

Other factors also helped to consolidate the ILWU international's power. One is the prohibi

tion in some local constitutions against the re-election of officers beyond a 2-year term, a restriction which is not applicable to the international union. This provision eliminates the natural electoral base for local challenges to international authority.

Another consideration is that the ILWU is far smaller than the ILA: One Brooklyn local has almost as many members as there are longshoremen on the west coast. Moreover, since the international's headquarters are located in San Francisco, where the largest local is housed, control of the union is made easier.

Care must be taken not to exaggerate the authority of the ILWU's international officers. Local autonomy in many matters is still determinative, and local elections throughout the west coast are freely conducted. Local candidates pursue policies which contradict strongly held international positions. For example, the ILWU has always maintained vigorous international opposition to discrimination against Negroes. It has made heavy contributions to civil rights causes. However, some locals continue to discriminate against Negroes. The closeness of the ratification vote of the last agreement also indicates the degree of autonomy held by many locals.

Containerization in the West

The emphasis on cost reduction which ultimately resulted in the 1960 Modernization and Mechanization Agreement in the west coast longshore industry necessitated a shift of responsibility for contract enforcement from the stevedoring companies to the shipping companies.1 Procedures were established to invoke cost penalties upon stevedoring companies for tolerating violations and for calling portwide shutdowns to meet job action on any particular ship in the port. This new attitude assumed that employers could now act as a united body, and that the union could be relied upon to deliver the fruits of any agreement.

The reality of these assumptions, however, was far from certain. On the employers' side, the ob

3 The method of accomplishing this cannot be fully documented, but one piece of evidence is the manner of selecting arbitrators. For ports where opposition to the international was serious, the port arbitrators jointly agreed upon were union officers who resigned to take the post. More important was PMA's position in accepting coastwide bargaining, and enforcing coastwide rules among its member employers.

For an extensive description of the 1960 M & M Agreement, see "Working Rules in West Coast Longshoring," Monthly Labor Review, January 1961, pp. 1-10.

stacles to unity were embedded in the diversity of employer interests. Nor was the union a monolithic organization with a united purpose. The organization of the longshore industry into a number of separate ports, each preoccupied with its own problems, was reflected in the union structure. The considerable degree of local autonomy which then existed on the west coast meant that the international union, while influential in some areas, was not an all-powerful source of central authority. Moreover, past bargaining hostility diminished the international union's ability or willingness to discipline the local unions, even in matters where they were clearly wrong.

The reasons which impelled the employers to take the necessary steps which preceded the 1960 M and M Agreement centered on the need to cut their exceptionally high costs. Why the union agreed to sell established practices is not so obvious. The most important reason seems to have been recognition that change could not be indefinitely postponed. Moreover, given employer unity, and the rising determination to insist upon innovation, the union could forestall change only by indulging in costly strikes. Finally, there was the realization that "a candid review of the past several years showed that despite the militant position of the membership, many operating changes had been made and we had nothing to show for them; no positive benefits or gains had accrued to the men from the changes already put into effect by the management." 5

The 1960 agreement culminated several years of intensive negotiations. It gave the employers the right to introduce new machinery and to change certain restrictive work practices. Multiple handling was eliminated, the limit on sling loads could be increased, the 4-on-4-off practice was largely abolished, and the specified minimum size of the gang was lowered below the prevailing practice in most ports. The agreement specifically abrogated past contractual restrictions as well as "unwritten, but existing union unilateral restrictions and

5 Lincoln Fairley, "The ILWU-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement," in Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association Spring Meeting, Chicago, Ill., May 4-5, 1961 (Madison, Wis., The Association, 1961), p. 669.

By way of compensation, the union obtained an annual contribution of $5 million for the next 5 years or for the contracts, which would be used to establish a fund for longshoremen. The most recent renewal of the contract took effect July 1, 1966, for 5 years, and raises the annual payment to $6.9 million a year for a total of $34.5 million.

arbitration awards which interfere with the employer's rights dealing with sling loads, first place arrest, multiple handling, gang size, and manning scales."

The effect of the 1960 agreement was to actively encourage new methods of operation. Employers were given the right to introduce new techniques and man them at any level, subject to arbitration. In contrast, the union's only recourse was to the grievance machinery.

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The wage guarantee was made feasible by freezing the registration of workers in 1958 and by making registration coastwide, enabling longshoremen to move from port to port. Furthermore, the second part of the fund, which greatly raised retirement benefits and included a lump sum payment of $7,920 for normal retirement age of 65, also contained provisions of early retirement at 62 in the event of a surplus of labor.

Since its inception in 1960, the M & M Agreement has been hailed as a breakthrough in collective bargaining. Its reaffirmation in 1966 testifies to its value to both parties. But not all waterfront employers benefit from the new technology. Some companies, such as those in stevedoring, are in danger of having their past practices disrupted, with no guarantee of continued profit. Even steamship companies and terminal operators are not all favorably affected by containerization, because most of them are not equipped to handle containers and necessary adjustments will be expensive.

Employer enthusiasm for the new agreement accomplishes longstanding desire to cope with certain consequences of union power. Prior to 1960, the ILWU had established the highest dock costs in the United States. The major achievements of the 1960 agreement were the restoration of costs to an approximation of the highest cost ILA ports and the continuation of strike-free negotiations. While these are tangible gains, and, given the impediments, represent a substantial collective bargaining achievement, they do not constitute a golden age. In fact, the biggest achievement-the elimination of contract strikes-actually antedated the 1960 agreement by 12 years.

The continuation of labor peace in west coast longshoring cannot be considered assured. The personal relationships between the leadership of the employer group and the ILWU were extremely important in developing the climate in which a

strike-free accommodation could be made. Successors will be subject to new pressures from their respective organizations.

The ILA's Early Experience

For a variety of reasons, east coast employers were not initially interested in introducing containerized cargo, and union resistance to the innovation also developed slowly. When a maverick company, Sea-Land Services, Inc., introduced roll-on, roll-off containers in 1955, the union accepted the operation."

A showdown did not come until November 1958 when the union refused to handle shipper-loaded containers, taking the position that the 1956 contract permitted them to refuse container work from any company not engaged in container operations prior to the contract's effective date.

Following an arbitration award requiring the ILA to handle the containers, and arduous negotiations marked by a strike, language was embodied in the new contract which permitted the employers to use containers.8

Pursuant to the contract, a board of arbitration held that containers that were loaded or unloaded away from the pier by non-ILA labor should pay royalty. The conditions of payment are: "1. On conventional ships, 35 cents a gross ton of the weight of the cargo in the container. 2. On partially automated ships (conventional ships converted for handling vans and containers) where not more than two hatches have been converted for the handling of containers, the royalty is 70 cents a gross ton. 3. On partially automated ships (conventional ships converted for handling vans and containers) where not more than 40 percent of the ship's bale cube has been fitted for containers, the royalty is 70 cents a gross ton. 4. On ships where more than two hatches have been converted or fitted for the handling of containers, the royalty is $1 a gross ton." The union's statement of policy, which provided the basis for its insistence upon the assessment for containers, was given in the following terms: "It is the union's view that the time has come for management in American industry in general, and in the shipping industry in particular, to begin to view the unfavorable employment effects of changes in technology as an added cost to the employer who puts such changes into effect.

There is no reason why business investment in new techniques and new equipment cannot be introduced in such a way as to eliminate these costs to the employer's present employees . . . investment in new techniques can and should be broadened out to include any human cause that may be involved.""

Although at the time of this agreement the number of containers actually moving in the Port of New York was extremely small, the union did not harbor any illusions about its future growth. The union's convention which preceded negotiations was told "I am convinced it has got to come, and when it does come, its effects on us can be tremendous. It is not too farfetched to estimate that we stand to lose, in the full force of the container use, 8,000 to 9,000 jobs in the New York area alone, and a proportionate number in all other ports. This amounts to 30 percent of the membership. At stake, also, is the merit of a strong union. We are a union of dockworkers. We have the ocean at our backs. Any shrinkage in jobs cost means a permanent reduction in union size." 10

Although the arbitration award establishing the container royalty system was made in 1960, its terms have been continued unchanged in subsequent agreements made in 1961 and in 1964. The funds are administered by a board of trustees composed of an equal number of representatives from the union and the Association. The annual income going to the container fund is extremely small. In the first 2 years it averaged around $202,000, an average income per employee per year of $6.79, or 11⁄2 cent income per hour worked in the port. No decision has been reached on the use of these funds.

See the ILA testimony on this innovation in Labor Management Problems of American Merchant Marines: Hearings Before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (U.S. House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, H.R. 5734), p. 879.

8"(a) Any employer shall have the right to use any and all type of containers without restriction or stripping by the union; (b) the parties shall negotiate for 2 weeks after the ratification of this agreement, and if no agreement is reached, shall submit to arbitration described in paragraph 13 below, the question of what should be paid on containers which are loaded or unloaded away from the pier by non-ILA labor, such submission to be within 30 days thereafter; and (c) any work performed in connection with the loading and discharging of containers from nonmembers of the NYSA which is performed in the Port of Greater New York whether on piers or terminals controlled by them, or whether through direct contracting out, shall be performed by ILA labor." (Memorandum of Settlement, p. 2.) It should be noted that, on its face, clause (c) violates Section 8(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Report of General Organizer Thomas W. Gleason, before the 39th Convention of the ILA, July 13, 1959, p. 13. 10 Ibid., pp. 14–15.