to prevent air transport aircraft from using large airports near the area. However, there exist many smaller airports or suitable landing areas that may be operationally satisfactory for use by light aircraft, thus permitting the airlift of essential supplies and personnel (medical, food, etc.) into the stricken area until larger airports can be restored to operational use. The availability of aircraft repair and maintenance facilities after an attack occurs is a primary factor in determining what air operations can be conducted and sustained effectively, whether under civil or military control. This requires the FAA to develop a wartime capability for determining reliably: (1) the number and type of aircraft available; (2) their load-carrying (passenger and cargo) capacity, operating limitation and landing area requirements; (3) the available landing areas and their operational limitations; and (4) the location and type of available repair services for aircraft. To insure the maximum possible availability of civil aviation resources after an attack on the United States requires that appropriate preattack measures be taken to reduce the vulnerability of civil aviation facilities and to minimize the effects of damage to such facilities arising from nuclear attack. This involves the development of plans, procedures, and standards covering: (1) protective actions to be taken by the management of civil aviation facilities prior to a national emergency, (2) the survival actions to be taken during and immediately following an attack, and (3) recovery actions to be taken during the postattack restoration and rehabilitation period. Information on the actions required may be disseminated to approximately 3,300 airports, 250 air carrier operating and maintenance headquarters, 580 repair stations, 2,200 air agencies and air-taxi operations bases, and 1,200 non-Federal civil aviation communications stations and dispatching centers. Program objectives The estimate of $125,000 requested for the civil aviation defense functions will provide for carrying out during fiscal year 1960 assigned responsibilities of the following nature: 1. Providing technical guidance to the aviation industry for the protection of essential civil aviation operating facilities against the hazards of nuclear attack and for reducing the vulnerability of essential civil aviation facilities against attack. 2. Providing technical guidance to States, counties, municipalities, and others engaged in the operation of public airports suitable for use in the event of national emergency on measures to reduce vulnerability to damage and developing plans for the direction of Federal activities with respect to the emergency clearance and restoration of essential civil airports and landing facilities in damaged area. 3. Developing plans, procedures, and technical standards to insure the maximum utilization of repair stations and other civil aviation facilities required for the support of essential aircraft movements. 4. Maintaining liaison with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization at the national and regional level to insure coordinated dissemination of nonmilitary defense information to the owners and managers of the civil aviation facilities. 5. Developing plans, procedures, and technical standards for the application of Defense Mobilization Order I-19 and the national shelter policy to the Nation's civil airport facilities. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES "For expenses necessary for the design, construction and equipment of a protected regional facility for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, $2,700,000 to remain available until expended. "(50 U.S.C. App. 2251-2297). Supplemental estimate 1960, $2,700,000.” After Operational Alert 1958, it was the unanimous recommendation of the Seminar Group on Operational Readiness that the capability of the Federal Government to operate at the regional level under emergency conditions must be strengthened. The direct effect of attack, as well as fallout, could divide the Nation into an unpredictable number of "islands of survival." Planning and analysis to date make it clear that decentralized Federal guidance and control will be necessary under attack emergency. Well-protected regional operational sites will provide the basis for this decentralized Federal guidance, control, and leadership. Summary of requirements. Surveys conducted thus far indicate that the best locations for the protected centers are probably in the general areas of the present eight regional offices of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. However, the specific location of these centers will be determined by such factors as the vulnerability of the area, availability of communications, transportation, other support facilities, and the location of other Federal agencies. Each regional control center will serve as a subordinate or alternate command headquarters. Any one of them might be required to operate independently, or even to direct the total Federal recovery effort. Therefore, the existence of eight protected control centers will add flexibility to national leadership by making a protected point of operation accessible and available to the President, Cabinet officers, the Director of OCDM, appropriate representatives from the departments and other agencies no matter where within the United States they might be. The provision of eight protected centers means that key Government officials, while in this country, will never be more than about 750 miles from such a center. The shortening of probable warning time makes the ready accessibilityof a protected control center of highest importance. The proposed centers for the regional civil defense and defense mobilization activities of government are for use in day-to-day operations as well as in an emergency. They will be the basis for OCDM every day regional operations. Regional directors of OCDM or their successors in an attack emergency will coordinate and, in appropriate circumstances, direct the civil defense and defense mobilization activities of the Federal agency field establishment within their regions. The centers will also house designated numbers of other agency personnel, including executive reservists, and limited numbers of personnel who before an emergency would perform liaison with their own regional headquarters and assist the OCDM regional directors in the coordination of the overall regional program. In an emergency, if other agencies are unable to operate at their regular or alternate sites-and contact with national headquarters has been disrupted-agency liaison representatives at the OCDM regional control centers will assist the OCDM regional directors in making necessary decisions and will be prepared to take actions, as may be indicated and are feasible, with respect to their own agencies' functions. Planning for these facilities has been related to the requirement for 500 personnel under emergency conditions. This figure was developed from the field experience of OCDM regional directors in day-to-day operations and in exercises, particularly Operation Alert. In addition, the number of other agency personnel as listed on page 5 have been furnished by each agency on the basis of numbers required to carry out their functions at the regional centers. Each regional center will be designed to provide adequate protection from radiation and have 30 pounds per square inch of blast protection with an effective filter system. The filter system will protect not only against the radiological hazard but also biological and chemical hazards. Communications will be installed with the necessary backup system connecting the site with the classified location (OCDM), with operational headquarters (OCDM), with States within the regions, and with regional Federal agency facilities-normal and emergency. Design criteria have been prepared for protective features, operational and equipment requirements, and the functional layout. These basic criteria are reflected in exhibits included in this request. (See pp. 7, 8, 9, and 10.) Detailed requirement This supplemental request finances the construction of the first protected regional control center. It is proposed that this center be located near Denton, Tex., the city which houses the regional office for OCDM region 5. Engineers of the General Services Administration and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization have developed a preliminary cost estimate of $2,700,000 for this facility. These funds will provide the structure, including the facilities and equipment for heating, lighting, air conditioning, and an elevator. Also included are auxiliary power and water supplies. The structure will be about 140 feet by 160 feet. It will have two small structures above ground and two levels underground. It will provide 30 pounds per square inch blast protection and will incorporate a filter system against radioactive particles and biological and chemical agents. The upper level includes the operations room, communications center, decontamination chamber and office space for use in an emergency or in day-to-day operations. The lower level contains the emergency sleeping areas, much of the mechanical equipment and additional office space. Design criteria for this facility will provide capacity space for 300 other agency personnel and 200 OCDM personnel. The staffing pattern for this regional control center is given below. |