In the first two of these periods the elections were under a new charter for the city, and the interest felt in the greatly extended powers of the mayor secured the victory, notwithstanding the disintegrating effect of the plurality system, of two men of very high character, Messrs. Grace and Hewitt. After this the influence of the national

parties sets in, which, though they have nothing to do with the government of the city, are under existing conditions the only consolidating element. In 1888 the dissatisfaction with the Republican party, which was to bear such fruit two years later, enabled the famous Tammany association to secure the mayoralty for its agent, Mr. Grant, though he had twenty thousand votes less than a majority. In 1890 the national Democratic tide, which was alluded to in Chapter XXI., was in full operation and Tammany again elected its candidate; the falling off in the total vote of more than fifty thousand, or twenty per cent., showing how much less interest was felt in the city than in the national election, notwithstanding its much greater importance to the citizens. In 1892, when Mr. Cleveland was elected and the Democrats were on the top of the wave, the Tammany candidate was swept in by a majority of nearly seventy thousand, or twenty per cent. But in 1894 the revulsion of feeling throughout the country reversed the situation, and the Republican candidate for mayor of New York was borne forward by it with a majority of forty-six thousand, or seventeen per cent. November, 1897, occurred the first election separating the voting in New York City from the State and national. The figures are given here merely to show the working of the plurality system. The significance of the election. itself is treated of elsewhere.1

In

If there is one common tendency apparent throughout all the States, it is that towards removing the government as far as possible from the people. The reasons for this on the part of politicians are very obvious. Their aim is to control the power of making nominations, to let the people go through the form of election and then to cover up and conceal the working of the machinery. But there is much more than this. The educated and well-to-do

1 See Chap. XXV.

classes, distrustful of the people and attributing all the defects of government and all the arts of politicians to them, are by a large majority strongly inclined in the same direction. This feeling shows itself, among other ways, in establishing less frequent elections and after these less frequent sessions of the legislature.1 The terms of office for the governor have been extended in 20 States to four years, with 1 at five years, and in 22 States to two years, while in 2 States only is the term still retained at one year. The terms of senators are now fixed in 29 States at four years, in 13 States at two years, with 1 at three years, and in 2 States at one year. The terms of representatives are in 2 States four years, in 40 states two years, and in 3 States one year. In 40 States this tendency is extended to biennial sessions of the legislature, as against 5 in which it meets annually.

In discussing this subject we have to recur to the main question which has already been propounded, What is the moving force upon which our form of government relies ?2 If the answer is taken to be the will of the people, then the arrangements must be such as to call forth the will of the people, and to keep them in a mental condition for the exercise of that will. It is to be remembered that in this country, whatever may be the case elsewhere, we have no class of men of wealth, education and leisure, who take pride and exercise ambition in devoting themselves to public affairs with the sole view of securing the best results for government and the public welfare. This

1 The Americans seem to reason thus: "Since a legislature is very far gone from righteousness, and of its own nature inclined to do evil, the less chance it has of doing evil, the better. If it meets, it will pass bad laws. Let us therefore prevent it from meeting." They are no doubt right as practical men. They are consistent as sons of the Puritans in their application of the doctrine of original sin. But this is a rather pitiful result for self-governing democracy to have arrived at. - BRYCE, "American Commonwealth," Vol. I., Part II., Chap. XLV.

2 See Chap. III.

work has endeavored to show that our arrangements are such as to expel that kind of man from public life; to conceal from the people the quality and character of the men whom they have elected; to render the voters apathetic and indifferent to the extent of leaving public affairs to take care of themselves and to drift into less desirable hands. Certainly the way to remedy these things is not to diminish the intervention of the people; to decrease still further their interest in the elections through the greater infrequency of their recurrence. No doubt the multiplication of elections, national, State, and city, does make demands upon the time and attention of the voters, but, in the first place, these may be greatly simplified by reducing the number of offices to be filled. To elect a single executive head and a single legislative member is not such a great strain upon a population; and if there can be added the stimulus of clearly emphasized personality, the elections instead of a burden will become an agreeable excitement. Moreover, if we are to have free government at all, the price must be paid. The postulate upon which this work is based is, that this whole country-city, State, and nation-is suffering from a preponderance of legislative power and depression of the executive, and that the conflict of the future must be for a readjustment of these powers. Of course no help can be expected from the legislatures, and if the question is not to be referred in accordance with historical precedent to the brutal tribunal of the sword, the appeal remains only to the will of the people, and that this weapon may be effectual it must be kept in good working order and practice. As has already been said, the elections are our autumn manœuvres. As the French and German armies meet every year to be kept in training for war, so our people need their annual drill for the victories of peace. Possibly, if at some future time the different branches

should be brought into such harmonious adjustment that government goes on quietly and visibly to the general satisfaction of all, some relaxation of discipline may be allowed. But never in our history has there been a more pressing need for the application of the hackneyed saying that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

In the year 1896 there occurred in Massachusetts a striking illustration of this point. For twenty years past there was a persistent agitation with the legislature in behalf of biennial instead of annual elections, but it always met with defeat in one or the other of the houses. At length, however, chiefly by the action of Boards of Trade and with strong pressure through the lobby, an amendment to the constitution was forced through two legislatures in 1895 and 1896, providing for biennial elections both of the executive and the legislature. The principal argument in favor of the change was the saving of the trouble, annoyance, and expense of too frequent elections, and this was backed by the example of more than forty other States, who, it was said, had adopted the policy and showed no wish to go back from it. So far the case was at least based upon facts, but the advocates proceeded to assume that it would remedy the evils of too much legislation, of too long sessions, and furnish more experience and a better class of public men, for which no evidence whatever was offered.

It was replied that the expense was too trifling for consideration-as indeed this item was not insisted upon

and that the trouble was no more than a free people ought to be willing to take. As for the experience of other States, it was urged that though the people might be glad to be relieved from trouble the effect of the change, so far as it has been developed, has been distinctly unfavorable to the character of the government and the people of those States; that it has weakened the interest