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not excluded. All sorts of schemes for expenditure are brought forward and referred to the committees, and their success depends upon the skill and energy of the lobby. And to make the case complete, expenditure and revenue are treated separately. What would be thought of a man who at the beginning of the year should call his wife and children together and ask them how much they wanted to spend in the next twelve months; and who, when they had handed in their estimates, should simply add them up and say to himself, My business must produce so much.' The bankruptcy court could easily be predicted as the not far distant result. Of course, every man not merely of prudence but of common sense makes a more or less careful estimate of what his income will be and then tells his family how much he can afford to allow them. Yet it is precisely the first method upon which all our public finance is conducted, from Congress through all the States and the cities, the effect being concealed by the fact that the resources of the people have not yet been severely strained.

No doubt the Secretary of the Treasury and the auditors of the States and cities do make a statement of the receipts and expenses of the year past and even an estimate for that to come; but the several legislative bodies are in nowise bound by them. Questions of revenue and expenditure, which may be raised by any body, are referred to different committees. The subjects of taxation are for the most part permanent, while the rates upon them are raised or lowered according to the requirements of expenditure, though new sources, whether or not in accordance with the principles of modern science, are constantly suggested by the free lances who have a hand in everything. On the same principle the lobby needs only to concern itself with expenditure, having no interest in or responsibility for the revenue side of

the account. It is the consciousness on the part of the people of this uncertainty which hangs like a cloud over this as over every other department of the government.1 One provision of the constitution of Massachusetts may be quoted to show the effect of careless legislation. Up to the year 1855 the governor and lieutenant-governor were voted for by the people at a meeting specially called for the purpose, the persons receiving a majority of the votes cast being elected. If no persons received such majority, the house of representatives was to select two out of not more than four persons receiving the highest number of votes, from which two the senate was to select one as governor; and the same process was to be repeated for the lieutenant-governor. The senators were elected annually by the people at meetings called for the purpose. If no candidates had a majority of votes cast, then the members of the house of representatives and the senators duly elected were to meet together and fill up vacancies from the candidates having the highest number of votes equal to twice the number of vacancies to be filled. to the representatives, they were also elected at popular meetings, and, though the constitution is silent upon the subject, a majority of the votes cast was presumably required, and the voting had to be renewed until it was obtained. All this procedure had obvious and grave inconveniences. The simple mode of overcoming them was to provide for a second election between the two candidates having the highest number of votes, when a majority must have resulted unless a tie had to be settled by a third election or by lot.2 Instead of this, the follow

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1 Compare on this point what is said in Chapter VI. of the relation of the English chancellor of the exchequer to the national finance.

2 An election has just occurred in West Priegnitz, a typically Conservative seat in the typically Conservative province of Brandenburg, and the ballot revealed a majority for the Conservative, Herr von Saldern, of 1895 votes over the Radical, Herr Max Schultz, the Social Democrat on his

ing amendment to the constitution was passed by the legislatures of 1854 and 1855, and ratified by the people on May 23, 1855.

ARTICLE XIV. In all elections of civil officers by the people of this commonwealth, whose election is provided for by the constitution, the person having the highest number of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected.

It may be doubted whether any single law ever did more to undermine and degrade the government of the State. As already observed (Chapter XXI.), it is the fundamental principle of democracy that the majority shall rule. But apart from the question of ruling, there is an important consideration in the effect upon the character and action of the voters. If the largest of any number of fractions is to control the government, then the object of every intriguer, of every ambitious schemer, of every demagogue, of every social theorist, will be not merely to start a fraction of his own, but to multiply and diminish all other fractions that the relative proportion of his own may be magnified. And the more the people are split up into groups, the more do they not only become confused and discouraged, but also become absorbed in their own idiosyncrasies, to the neglect of the general public interest. Instead of using two large parties to part carrying off 2015 votes, and the Anti-Semite, who may be described usually as a foe to capital but not to society, only 1909. As, however, Herr von Saldern had less than half the total number of votes recorded, a second ballot was held on Sunday last, when the whole body of Socialists went to the polls, drawing with them some Anti-Semites, and the Radical was seated by 7481 votes against the 5999 of his Conservative opponent, receiving, moreover, a majority of 639 over the half of the unusual number (13,485) recorded at the poll.

On the honesty and intelligence of the average man we must ultimately rely for our security. But the modern problem is how to provide amid our vast aggregations of people for the necessary control of public men by their masters, the public; how to carry on business, so to speak, in the open with criticism alike free and well informed, and with adequate supervision. Spectator, London, November 13, 1897.

check and control and if need be to replace each other, and stimulating them by competition to raise the common level, the voter who, as is not unlikely, becomes disgusted with both will turn away, and leaving them to their unclean struggle will hug his conscience by devoting himself to some side issue, as prohibition of the sale of liquor, woman suffrage, particular systems of taxation, religious faith, and so on, watching his fraction and hoping it may grow to outnumber any other; in which effort he will be strenuously encouraged by the cunning politician, who, though he cannot command a majority of the voters, may hope by the tie of self-interest to wield the force of the largest group. Still another and large fraction of voters will be led by the multiplying of groups to abstain from voting at all.

It is for this reason that the national party names of Republican and Democrat have kept such a firm hold even upon State and city affairs, though they have absolutely no meaning in relation to them. The political sense of our people has made them cling to this line of division, so that the plurality principle has not yet effected all the harm of which it is capable.

Election by plurality tends further to destroy the element of personality which is so important in moving multitudes. If the two great parties are personified in individuals it is easy to awaken enthusiasm as between them, but if the voters can be led off in pursuit of separate and pet ideas, the individual has much more difficulty in calling them back, particularly under political methods which of themselves make it a prime object to suppress personality on all sides.

If the voters in a mass are ever to be taught to have confidence in each other, to rise to enthusiasm, to act together, and to put forth their strength on behalf of good government, election by majority must be insisted upon.

VOL. II-E

It may be said that we have too many elections now, and that second elections would be intolerable. But first, if only a single executive head was voted for the elective function would be considerably reduced; secondly, if we are to have free government we must submit to the trouble of elections; and thirdly, second elections would seldom be necessary, as, if the people once understood that they must elect by majority, they would learn to close their ranks at the start. It may be asked, "How are reforms to be brought about in State affairs if the only agency is a majority to be extorted from the solidly intrenched national parties?" They must be advocated and urged forward by fractional votes - even though those votes are displaced by second elections-till the demand is strong enough to command a majority either within or outside of those parties. For this personality is the only effective, as it is an entirely adequate, instrument. Reforms obtained through the establishment of a plurality system are pretty certain to cost more than they are worth, since that system may be readily made use of to introduce changes which are far from being reforms.

This election by a plurality of votes has now become widely established throughout the Union. Perhaps as good an illustration as any at once of the effect of plurality election and of the supremacy of the national parties may be taken from the city of New York. In the year 1884 the votes for mayor were, for

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