of "commissions,” which have increased so rapidly in number and expense since about the year 1880. From an expenditure for the duties covered by these commissions of less than four thousand dollars in 1880, we have seen a growth from year to year, until the cost of these commissions alone amounted last year to nearly a million and a quarter of dollars. Some of these commissions are unnecessary and should be abolished. Some of them should be consolidated with or made bureaus of correlative departments of the State government, and by such consolidation a very material reduction in the expense of their operation could be secured. . . . I think the sentiment of the people is more decided now than ever before that some radical change should be made on the lines above suggested. It is our duty to pay attention to this demand.

Observe that this is a mere piece of advice addressed to a legislature, of which the interest, as well as the practice, is identified with the procedure objected to.

On the 12th of November, 1884, Hon. John T. Hoffman, ex-governor of the State and ex-mayor of the city of New York, delivered an address before the Constitution Club, in which he said:

It is wrong to confound, as some do, concentration of power in proper offices with centralization. To bestow on the governor of this State the power necessary to enforce the laws of the State, and on the mayor of this city all necessary executive power in the administration of the affairs of the city; that is concentration of power in the proper hands, power adequate to the duties and responsibilities imposed. Without this concentration there is no real responsibility; without it we cannot justly hold the chief executive accountable for his due administration of the government; we fail to enjoy what the Englishspeaking race prides itself upon,-responsible government. But to assign to the governor any of the duties which properly belong to the mayor of a city, to the central government of the State any of the power of control over their home affairs which should pertain to localities, that is centralization. When the legislature by a mandatory act (as it is constantly doing) imposes taxes for purely local purposes upon this or any other city, or any other locality of the State, it violates the first principle of free government, that a community shall not be taxed without its own consent. . . . The fact that municipalities all over the country have, within the past few years, run largely into debt affords no argument against leaving this subject to local governments. Every debt has been authorized by the superior govern

ment, - the State. The worst solution of this question is to leave it in the power of the legislature to force indebtedness on you from time to time as is now done.

The framers of the constitution of 1846, under which with a few changes we still carry on what we call a State government, were eager for decentralization of power. They effected nothing of consequence in this direction; they did not secure the rights of cities, counties, towns, or villages in matters of local concern, nor abridge the powers of the State government over local interests.

The chief thing they did was to break apart and disconnect the machinery whereby the State government is carried on. They provided for a governor whose duty is said to be to execute the laws, and to administer the affairs of the State; and then gave to the people, not to the governor, the power to select all the subordinate officers on whom he must rely in their several departments for performing the actual details of administration. They made the mistake of supposing that this was decentralization. They have made other people believe it was, also.

This system did not take away any of the powers of the central or State government. It retained in the central government at Albany the administrative power, but lodged it in and divided it among some half-dozen independent heads of departments, each absolute in his own sphere. It created, in fact, half a dozen governors instead of one, each of them charged with executing a portion of the laws, free from control by the others, or by the nominal head of the State. The comptroller is governor, so far as the finances are concerned. The attorney-general is governor as to the law business of the State. The three state-prison inspectors together made up another governor for the prisons. The administration of the canals was intrusted to a board made up of several independently elected heads of departments, the governor of the State being carefully left out. The so-called "governor," who was in old times often spoken of as "the person administering the government of the State," was charged by the words of the constitution "to take care that the laws are faithfully executed," and at the same time was deprived of all power to select the agents through whom they are to be executed. He was ordered to govern the State, while the power to govern was taken away from him.

It is absurd to expect good government in this State or in this city, until you conform with the experience of ages and establish a single and united executive power.

It has been repeatedly urged in this work that the most effective instrument for moving masses of men is person

ality. The multitude do not understand measures and take but little interest in them. They do understand and are capable of enthusiasm for men. It is a matter of the commonest observation, whether in the case of artists, poets, actors, clergymen, or statesmen, that it is the individual which fires enthusiasm and draws the crowd. All our public arrangements, on the other hand, are such as to suppress the individual. Trust no one man to do anything. Always have a committee or a commission or a legislature; the effect of which is to discard entirely the immense force of personality. But the attempt defeats itself as surely as that of enclosing steam at a high pressure. The thirst for personality demands and will have satisfaction at any cost. This is the secret of the word 'boss' in politics. And no State affords a stronger illustration of this than New York. The names of Fernando Wood, William M. Tweed, Richard Croker, David B. Hill, and Thomas C. Platt are perhaps more widely known than those of any upright statesmen or public benefactors in the same generation.

Mr. Platt's career is one of the phenomena of the years 1896 and 1897. A business man and the head of an express company, he has held no prominent office in State affairs. Yet it seems to be admitted on all hands that, being a Republican in politics, he has almost absolute control of the legislature of New York. One of his methods is said to be to select young men in the Assembly districts, to pay the expense of their nomination and election, to give them a seat and a salary in the legislature, and to require from them in return absolute obedience. However that may be, there appears to be no doubt that he can procure or defeat legislation at his pleasure and that the doing so is mainly a question of price. When an election for governor was to take place in the autumn of 1896 it was admitted that the members of the Convention were

the nominees of Mr. Platt, that his candidate was nominated without a murmur and duly elected. Mr. Platt himself desired to be elected to the United States Senate. Against him was put forward as a candidate Hon. Joseph H. Choate, a lawyer of the highest personal and professional standing in New York. He had but a few scattered votes as against the master of the legislature.1

The Republicans, however, are not always in power. A few years ago the Democrats were in the majority and the position of Mr. Platt was then occupied by Hon. David B. Hill, though with somewhat less of tact and skill. But these two great leaders were far too wise to quarrel. A division of the spoil was much more statesmanlike; so that it came to be said that when the Republicans were in office Mr. Platt divided power with Mr. Hill and when the Democrats had a majority Mr. Hill divided power with Mr. Platt.

The presence of these two men in the United States Senate is a striking commentary upon the structure of that body. It may be described as the distilled essence of State legislatures. If these legislatures are made up and managed in the way which has been described, and if the conditions are the same throughout the Union, the character of the United States Senate can easily be predicted. In several States there is already a parallel to New York. For thirty years Hon. Simon Cameron held the great Republican state of Pennsylvania, as the phrase is, in his pocket, and his mantle has now fallen upon the shoulders of the Hon. Matthew P. Quay. The names of others will suggest themselves to show how the lesson is spreading, and keen self-interest and grasping ambition in all the States will not be slow to copy the models.

The consciousness of these things has raised a demand 1 See Appendix A.

for a change in the Constitution of the United States by which the Senate should be elected by popular vote. As this must be accepted by the Senate itself as well as threefourths of the State legislatures, it may safely be pronounced to be impossible; 1 while the other alternative of a constitutional convention, which would place at risk every principle upon which the Constitution is based, is not to be contemplated without a shudder. It is not at all certain, moreover, that such a change would be desirable and we had much better learn to work the Constitution as it is. The true way to improve the Senate is to improve the State legislatures; which furnishes another instance of the disproportion between the importance of the State governments and the attention which they receive.

It cannot be said that the finances of the State governments, as a whole, are in very bad condition. Many of them are practically out of debt, and in none can it be said that the demands are very heavy in proportion to the resources of the people. It is in the towns and cities, in which, in spite of the encroachments of the legislature, the bulk of the work of government is still carried on, that the great and increasing extravagance threatens to get beyond control. At the same time the growing tendency to centralization is increasing the scope of State finance, and its conditions are such as may well cause apprehension; especially as the legislatures are more and more imposing expenditure upon localities to be met from their own debt and resources.

Of system there may be said to be none at all. It has been stated that any member of either house may propose a law upon any conceivable subject, and finance is

1 In May, 1898, the House of Representatives passed, by a vote of 184 to 11, an amendment to the Constitution to this effect, but the Senate paid no attention whatever to it.