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crowd. In a popular government the first thing is to get at the wish of the people and precisely of the class which, having no direct interest, is least disposed to take an active share in politics. It is of no use to scold at them because they will not take the trouble to decide between two or more sets of men whom they have never seen and of whom they know nothing; as to which of them they will constitute the uncontrolled managers of public affairs, of which they know if possible even less than of the men. The people must be drawn and not driven. If the masses are expected to take an interest in politics, politics must first be made picturesque.

Suppose the public business to be taken out of the secrecy of the committee rooms and brought into the open arena of debate, with leaders on both sides and an order of procedure which would give scope for individual ability. There would be a small, perhaps a very small, number of voters who would follow both the details and the principles involved, dividing, according to their constitutional dispositions, into conservatives and progressives. Yet even these would have a feeling of sympathy or repulsion towards the men with whom the views were identified. Next would come a somewhat larger class, with whom the business occupied a rather less and the men a rather larger share of attention; and so on till finally the largest class was reached, for whom the measures would have very little of interest and the men a very great deal. Yet between both extremes the men would form a common bond of sympathy. Instead of indignation on the part of the first class that the others would not share their views, and frantic and more and more hopeless efforts to arouse them to action, the former would resort to the more available method, satisfied if they could forward desired measures by an agreement as to men; while all would feel increased confidence and courage, by finding that they could work

together and obtain mutual support, instead of as now drifting wider and wider apart.

Every time that a man of high character and ability achieved success, and every time that a weak and dishonest man was dismissed to obscurity, the moral tone and character of the whole people would be distinctly raised. The force of education would be brought to bear upon politics, while politics would in turn develop education. Government would not only rise to the level of the people, but would itself steadily raise that level. We should then reach those calm and profound depths of public opinion which remain unstirred by the noise of faction or the squabbles of party manipulations. The force, mightier than steam or electricity, could at last be looked to to produce adequate results through appropriate machinery.

We have endeavored to show that the difficulties of government in the Union and the several States are the same in principle, -the preponderance of the legislature and the depression of the executive; and that the remedy must be sought in the same direction. The obstacle to its application in the federal government is found in the vast area included, the variety of population and interests represented, and the task of propagandism on such a scale. In the States it arises from the indifference with which their governments are regarded and the apparent ignorance that any principles are involved. In the federal government the executive, for the reason already stated, is a positive and visible power. In the States it is so far reduced by the system of separate election, that there seems to be no consciousness of its existence for any purpose except being elected.

Nevertheless it seems as if in the States, if at all, the change must be brought about; that the compactness of the territory, which yet contains so many important problems, and the nearness to the people would make them the

easiest of attack. Of course, there is a great difference among the States. The more crowded Eastern States, with their commercial and manufacturing life, present different conditions from the agricultural and more sparsely settled South or the sanguine and elastic West. It is in the latter that material innovations most readily take their rise, but it seems as if for reforms of government history and tradition point to New England and especially to Massachusetts.

The drawback is that the evils of the existing system are perhaps less felt there than in any other State, owing first, no doubt, to the character of the men in public life, but behind that to the qualities of the people who place them there. Conservatism is, moreover, as strongly rooted there as in any other State. Massachusetts is second to none, however, in the intelligence of her people and their readiness to respond to moral influences. First in political as well as physical resistance to Great Britain in the War of Independence, it was in Massachusetts also that the antislavery movement took its rise, and from her soil went forth the first regiment in the Civil War. Hardly less characteristic was the popular response to the appeal in 1896, when, by a large majority and almost alone among the States, she rejected what would have been almost giving up her separate existence, the biennial amendment to the Constitution, proposing the suppression of all State elections separate from the national.

Assuming the contention of this work to be well grounded and the consequences to flow from the principles therein laid down, could there be a nobler addition to the laurels that already grace her history than to enter on a field of experiment, which if it leads to nothing could do no harm, and if it succeeded would furnish a model for imitation by the other States and the federal government? We may quote the saying of the Englishman Bagehot

that "if the New England States as a separate nation had cabinet government, they would be as renowned in the world for political sagacity as they now are for diffused happiness."

The idea is not a new one even in Massachusetts. In an address to the legislature on the 6th of January, 1881,one month before the United States Senate report was presented, - Hon. John D. Long, then governor of the State, said:

Speaking of these officials [the elective heads of departments], I recommend that you give them seats in the legislature, with the right to speak upon questions affecting their department, but of course without the right to vote. This could not but aid legislation.

And again on January 5, 1882:

I still am convinced of the advantage and economy of an executive council, composed of the elective heads of departments, rather than as now constituted, and of giving them seats in the legislature with no vote, but with the right to speak upon questions affecting their departments.

Moreover, in the General Statutes of 1849 there is a clause to the following effect:

The attorney-general shall, when required by either branch of the legislature, attend during their sessions and give his aid and advice in the arrangement and preparation of legislative documents and business; and shall give his opinion upon questions of law submitted to him by either branch thereof or by the governor and council.1

No result has followed from this, first, because no elective department official would be at all anxious to avail himself of it, and again, because he could attend only at the request of the legislature, and the legislature, even in those primitive days, was certain not to request anything of the kind.

It is evident that to give this measure any effect the department officials must first be made appointive by the 1 Chap. 186, § 6.

VOL. II- -2 G

governor, that is, selected by him for this special work, in harmony with him and with each other, and able to look to him for support in case of a disagreement with the houses. For the rest, the State legislature, as well as the national Congress, firmly believes that the government is, and should be, vested in itself alone, and that the executive is merely an instrument for carrying out its orders. It will never take the initiative in, nor will it ever give any support, until compelled to do so, to any scheme for a division of power or for enabling the executive to enforce responsibility to the people upon itself. Nor does it wish any more to enforce responsibility on the part of the executive to the people, very much preferring responsibility to itself alone, which is more easily obtained by private negotiation and party pressure.

The change must come, if it ever does come, through some candidate for the governorship carrying his demand directly to the people, explaining his case to them and asking for their support. Nor are the first notes wanting of this direct issue between the governor and the legislature. In January, 1891, Hon. William E. Russell entered upon three years of the governorship. We quote from his annual messages in extenso the following passages for their important bearing upon the subject.

From his address to the legislature, January 8, 1891:

I commend to your consideration the State system of administrative and executive work. With much truth Massachusetts has been described as a commission-governed State. Its great departments of education, health, charities, prisons, reform schools, almshouses and workhouses, agriculture, railroads, insurance, fisheries, harbors and lands, savings banks and others, are governed by independent boards, practically beyond the control of the people. Beside these there are commissions on gas, pharmacy, dentistry, civil service, arbitration, cattle, wrecks, pilots, State aid, and others, for special and temporary purposes. Almost without exception the members of these boards are appointed by the governor, but only with the advice and consent of nine other men. Their tenure of office is usually for a term of

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