sponsibility, while the whole of this important legislation is dependent upon the caprice and party intrigue of a chaotic body like Congress. What would happen under the system of executive responsibility advocated in the last two chapters? The original proposition, instead of being buried in the silence of a committee room till the end of the session, would be taken up at the beginning and discussed, first, on the general principle of government interference, second, as to the fitness of the commission as an instrument, and, third, as to the details of the bill and the powers given; and all this in the presence and with the participation of a high official, representing the public interest and the administration of the government. If the bill was either accepted or rejected against the advice of the government, the latter need not resign any more than now, standing or falling at the elections upon its general bearing and conduct in the eyes of the people, precisely as it does at present. If the Act was passed, while in carrying it out there might be just as many agents as there are now, there would be always one man, say the Secretary of the Interior, held to account in Congress for its working, and who would have nothing else to do but to stand sponsor for this as for all branches of his department. If a commission of inquiry was appointed to ascertain what the effect really was, there would always be somebody to place the result before Congress and to explain, subject to individual criticism, to that body and to the country whether the Act ought to be continued, amended, or repealed. That is the way to carry on a free government.

The analysis of this commission has been made for comparison with the strongly organized federal administrative system, to show how the action of this system is frustrated by the want of contact and coöperation between the legislative and executive powers; and how Congress, partly of

set purpose and in part instinctively and unconsciously, has established this new and startling encroachment on the executive branch. It is instructive also on account of the general and formal protest against the operation of this new machinery.

The government of the District of Columbia may be quoted as another instance of a federal commission. That, however, is less an encroachment upon the federal administration than the establishment of a wholly new and separate government, in the nature of a territorial, which seems to be regarded as satisfactory, as much so, perhaps, as any in the country. It should be observed, however, that there is no evidence that as good results might not be obtained through a single official, directly responsible to the President and through him to Congress, with the advantages we have held to accrue from such responsibility; and, in the second place, as there is no local legislature and no local election, and only such legislative attention as Congress can find time to give, that the government of the District is a purely impersonal and practically irresponsible despotism. The population, apart from that portion of winter residents which is attracted by social opportunities and those for the display of wealth, is almost entirely official. There is no commercial or manufacturing class, and nothing to develop individuality or a critical public opinion. It is in a fair way to become as bureaucratic a centre as Paris itself, and the more orderly and apparently well-governed it is, the more dangerous it becomes as an example to the rest of the country.

No such protest as above indicated has been made in Massachusetts against the work of commissions, because a wholly disjointed and nerveless executive system furnishes no standard of comparison; and the people have come to believe that commissions furnish not merely the best but the only way in which such work can be done. It will

excite surprise and even contempt to say that there is no part of the executive work of the thirty-four commissions which could not be as well or better done by single officials radiating from one head, the governor, chosen by the whole people of the State. In fact, under all the commissions there are such officials for all the executive work. What the commissions really do is to exercise legislative and judicial functions in addition. The legislature not merely gives away executive power, which does not belong to it, but throws off the responsibility of its own, so that it may have more time for party politics and obviate its own inability to adopt any settled and definite policy. Supposing an executive framework like the federal to be provided, then the work of all the commissions, instead of being, as now, separate and often at cross-purposes, would be combined into one harmonious whole, each part adapting itself to the requirements of the others. Every branch in turn would undergo examination by the legislature, and the official responsible for it would be required not merely to furnish all desired information, but to submit plans for work, defend the character of it and the agents employed, and to justify the expenditure incurred.

The importance of the system is particularly apparent in relation to the finances. As has been said, none of the States are in very bad financial condition, but this is owing to the relatively small share of the State government in local expenditure, and the immense resources which it has to draw upon. But the local burdens entailed by the loose and reckless State finance are very serious and the lavish grants to commissions not only threaten to increase these, but to affect the State treasury itself.1 In the plan

I have been looking at the state auditor's report, which came out about the beginning of the war and consequently has received even less attention than usual. It is so big a book and so clumsily edited that it requires several weeks' study to make out how the account really

proposed the state treasurer would be, next to the governor, the most important official. All the plans of all the departments would pass through his hands. As all proposals for revenue must, with the approval of the governor, come from him, so all proposals for expenditure must secure his concurrence after full discussion in the cabinet under control of the governor, and a balanced scheme of finance, comprehending the whole subject, would be annually submitted for the consideration of the legislature, and behind that of the body of the people of the State. Of course that would require a different kind of men from those who now fill the State offices, but the men are to be had. There is certainly no department of State

stands as to public debt and yearly expenses; but there can be no doubt that we are paying from one to two millions a year more than we need, and that our debt, which ought to be decreasing, is fast piling up. Then the report deals in lump sums, blindly stated, and payments to persons without specifying what it is for sometimes without specifying the persons at all which is contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of our law. For instance, that great machine annexed to the State Board of Health's costly apparatus, designated here as "purity of inland waters," paid out last year more than $20,000 in salaries, of which over a fourth part ($5615) is entered simply as "other assistants, clerks," etc. Evidently Pindar's remark that "water is the best thing" has been laid to heart by the office-seekers at the State House, for double salaries seem to be paid in that aquatic department of outlay. For example, under the broad coffer dam of the "metropolitan water-loan fund," which only dealt last year with the trifling sum of $10,422,000 (interest on this loan for two years past being $508,000), one engineer, F. P. Stearns, received as salary $8583; H. H. Sprague drew $5000, Dr. Walcott (who holds two or three other pluralities) $1500, W. R. Evans the same; in purifying our waters, X. H. Goodenough draws $3600, which is less by $341 than Walter N. Davenport got from the $10,000,000 fund, and so on.

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Why should the auditor report in a lump, for the heavenly twins, under "indigent and neglected children," "board and travel of children $59,569, clothing and supplies $20,039," a total of $79,608 - without the least specification for this large sum? Why should he pay to those "indigent and neglected children" (so far as appears) Nathan Coe, H. L. Gardner, and sixteen others, the sum of $11,000 (more or less) without telling us what it was all for? But there is no end to such conundrums, if you once begin; the fact is, the report is blind. - Boston correspond. ence, Springfield Republican, May 14, 1898.

administration comparable in complexity and difficulty to that of great railroads like the Pennsylvania and the New York Central, especially when under the burden of interference by the State and federal authorities. Yet all that work is done by a general manager or a president as the case may be. How corresponding qualities are to be ob tained in public affairs will be noticed presently.

There seems to be no reason why the governor as well as his cabinet should not have seats in the two houses of the legislature, according to the United States Senate report. He is not, like the President, the holder of an office, if we regard merely ceremonial dignity, equal to emperors and popes. He is merely the executive agent of the people of the State, and may well share the responsibility of his staff. It might be left optional with him to attend or not, and his standing with the people would depend upon what use he made of this privilege. Not only plans and estimates of all work must be submitted in advance, but progress reported and criticisms made. All methods, say in education, prisons, charities, taxation, etc., would be subject to constant scrutiny and debate, and committees of inquiry, with no power of interference, could always throw light upon them. Of course, there could be no question of resignation in case of an adverse vote. If the executive could not obtain desired appropriations, or found its policy in any respect condemned, it would acquiesce with a more or less vigorous protest and await the result of the annual election. Then for the first time the political powers would be separated. The officials would be limited to executive work and be publicly responsible for it. The legislature would make the laws and appropriations, and none the less so that this would be done or refused upon the proposal of the executive and not upon that of individ ual members, although votes might be passed calling upon the executive to propose particular measures or to show