IN

CHAPTER XXXII

THE EXECUTIVE IN THE STATE

N examining the State governments we have seen that the main difficulty running through them all is the same as with the federal government, the absorption of power by the legislature, with the common result of impotence, both in that and the executive, for any stable government. There is this difference, however, that the federal executive, the President, is the head of a powerful organization, consisting of one man in every place from his Cabinet down to the lowest departments of administration, even within the limits of the States; whereas the governor of a State is hampered by a body of officials separately elected in all the chief departments, independent of him and cutting him off completely from the whole chain of subordinate administration. Even in the military department, the control of which by its head is absolutely necessary to any kind of efficiency, the officers are elective from below. While, therefore, the President of the United States does wield a very great power, even if in subjection to the legislature, the governor of a State is really nothing but a figurehead, except for such scraps of power as the legislature may see fit to dole out to him, or as he can obtain by lobbying and intrigue.

We will take, as before, Massachusetts in the first place as an example, and our argument will be directed to establishing two points:

1. That the report of the United States Senate committee, referred to in the last chapter, should be applied to the legislature of the State, and,

2. That the governor should have the power of appointment and removal of every State executive official, with or without the approval of the Senate, but without reference to the council.

These propositions, again, will need to be considered from different points of view.

1. The effect upon administration.

2. The effect upon legislation.

3. The effect upon the character of public men.

4. The effect upon the voters and universal suffrage in the State.

5. The effect of example upon other States as well as the federal government.

Of course the putting into practice the Senate report would be worse than useless as long as the present executive organization remains in force. A state treasurer, an attorney-general, a secretary of state, all elected separately and independent at once of each other and of the governor, would simply excite laughter when exposed by question and criticism to any public responsibility. Neither of them could have any policy, because the departments depend upon each other, and no one has any control beyond his own; nor could any one, for the same reason, give any available information without criticising other departments, which would be very likely to produce recrimination. Neither could present a policy from the governor, because the governor, having no power, can have no policy, and if he had, the separately elected heads of departments are under no obligation to advocate it or carry it out. The first step, therefore, is to procure an amendment to the Constitution, permitting the governor to appoint and remove all officials. This would encounter at once the conservatism of the State, backed by the politicians who find in the elective offices material for stimulating

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and rewarding party work, corresponding to the spoils system in national affairs. It is certain that no initiative in this direction will be found in the legislature.

The inertia will be further increased by the crystallizing of precedent in the government by commissions, which has been already described. The people of the State, reduced to despair by the experience of a paralyzed executive and an impotent legislature, are so delighted to find that any public work can be well done as to feel that the blessed change is a result of the system of commissions, and are proportionately enamoured of it; though the dark side is already beginning to show itself. In fact, there is a conflict for supremacy going on between this system and that which has stood the test of history, at least for efficiency, a single executive head with individual responsibility radiating from it to the furthest extremity. On this latter principle stands before us the federal administration in its simple grandeur for a hundred years, and proving itself on the whole, and, making allowance for the interference of Congress and the suppression of public responsibility, the equal of any in the world.

On this system but two serious encroachments have thus far been made, the Indian bureau and the Interstate Commerce Commission. The former is complicated with other considerations, but the second offers instruction which will repay a brief examination, particularly as it is the first and thus far the only attempt under the general government to supersede the regular administrative organization and to establish a new basis of executive power.

The Act passed February 4, 1887, constituting the commission, is of interest as giving the structural principle of this new form of government, developed not only in the nation but in the State.1

1 Forty-ninth Congress, Second Session, General Statutes, Chap. 104, 1887.

That a commission is hereby created and established to be known as the Interstate Commerce Commission, which shall be composed of five commissioners who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The commissioners first appointed under this Act shall continue in office for the term of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the first day of January, 1887, the term of each to be designated by the President; but their successors shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the commissioner whom each shall succeed. Any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Not more than three of the commissioners shall be appointed from the same political party. Said commissioners shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. No vacancy in the commission shall impair the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the powers of the commission.

The salaries of these commissioners are $7500 each, within a fraction that of a cabinet officer. Note first the effect, if not the intention, to break down and crush the regular executive power. There is not, as in the States, a necessity for finding an available substance for an executive deadlock. The regular organization had always worked perfectly well. Foreign Affairs, the Treasury, the Army and Navy, the Revenue System, the Post-office, had, even with the inroads of the spoils system, done no discredit to the country. That Congress should accomplish such a revolution of its own motion, without effective debate and with so little sign of consciousness on the part of the country, is an indication how far our public affairs are at the mercy of chance and the lobby. Instead of a single official, responsible to the President, and through him to the country, there are five officials, with only a joint responsibility, such as it is, of whom the President can appoint the majority only after being in office for three years, and over whom he has no control unless by removal for reasons which involve disgrace. Of course the plea is that with five men a more comprehensive and impartial judgment would be arrived at. The argument has been

already submitted1 that such is by no means the effect of impersonal executive work. The result is much better reached through a single official with all necessary assistance and open to the public criticism of a legislature.

As with the whole system of commissions the object is, moreover, to get away from popular control. Even sincere and public-spirited men believe that the safest way is to select a group of persons of the best character and qualities, and to hand over the work entirely to them. They forget that a stream cannot rise higher than its source; that if the popular action comes in at any point it will reach to the extremity; the only question being, whether it shall be kept informed by constant comparison of the work and the men, or shall be manipulated by politicians at the initial stage to surrender its subsequent control.

In the next place, there are five comfortable salaries of $7500, available for political work. The fact that it was necessary to limit the members to not more than three of one party, shows how politics were expected to enter into the case from the start. Politicians would rather divide spoils than not have any.

The vastness and complexity of the interests involved -including all the affairs, financial, administrative, and economical, of some two hundred thousand miles of railroad in every possible variety of magnitude, circumstances, and relation, whether to the corporate proprietors on the one side, to the interests served on the other, or to the State authorities between be urged as reasons why may the subject cannot be intrusted to one man. But nobody expects all its branches to be intrusted to one man. should include only the executive work, which in that way only can be best done. The trouble is, that the functions of the commission are at once legislative, executive, and

1 See Chaps. XXII., XXIV.

That