the information or the reasons why the same should be withheld, and then the Senate shall vote on the resolution, unless it shall be withdrawn or postponed.

"In putting any question to the Secretaries, or the Attorney-General, or Postmaster-General, no argument or opinion is to be offered, nor any fact stated, except so far as may be necessary to explain such question; and in answering such question the Secretary, the AttorneyGeneral, or Postmaster-General shall not debate the matter to which the same refers, nor state facts or opinions other than those necessary to explain the answer."

These rules relate only to the execution of the last section of the bill to giving information-to putting and answering questions. They in no wise affect the debate permitted and invited by the first section. They have been framed after a most careful examination of the rules and modes of procedure of the British Parliament and French Assembly, and are believed to contain the best provisions of both. They are framed to accomplish the purpose of obtaining the needed information with the least interference with the other duties of the heads of departments. No question can be called up unless after three days' notice to the Secretary; and the answers are limited to the specific point of the question, in order that accuracy may be attained. These rules may be amended as experience shall show their defects.

The bill confers a privilege and imposes a duty on the heads of departments. The privilege is to give their suggestion and advice in debate, by word of mouth; the duty is to give information orally and face to face.

The report, which follows the above, sets forth some of the advantages of the measure, its consistency with the Constitution of the United States, and the almost universal prevalence of a corresponding practice in all countries which make even a pretence to representative government. Almost at the outset the report says:

The advantages of the system proposed are so obvious and manifold that the committee feels itself relieved from a detailed statement of them, and confines this report to an examination of the question of its constitutionality.

It seems somewhat strange that a measure thus unanimously endorsed by a committee of both parties, presenting

1 See Appendix D for the list of countries given in the report as following a similar practice.

advantages so obvious, and with so complete a demonstration of its accordance with the Constitution, should never since have received the slightest attention from either house of Congress or from the executive. The explanation of this circumstance is of even more importance than the actual analysis of the measure itself. In fact, the dismissal by the report, in the few words above quoted, of the whole question of its political bearing has an exceedingly suspicious look, as if the committee did not care to assume the burden of a discussion in which they saw plainly that a tide of opposition was sure to set in.

In reference to this measure there are three points to be considered:

1. The advantages offered by the proposed change. 2. The objections to it.

3. The nature of the opposition to be encountered.

The first advantage is that it would bring to bear for the first time in the discussion of legislation the public interest as a whole. We have seen how every member of both houses has a precisely equal right to propose bills upon any namable subject. As it is obviously impossible that all should be considered, all must be referred to the standing committees, made up by the Speaker in the House or elected in the Senate. These committees, like the main bodies, are made up of precisely equal members from districts. No one of them has any authority to speak for the whole country or to oppose the schemes of other districts or the private interests in them. The committee reports are, therefore, the result of a composition of forces, a compromise arrived at by trading among local and party interests for mutual support and against mutual opposition. When the report comes before the House or the Senate, it still meets only representatives from districts in the House

or from States in the Senate, two kinds of interests having thus to be settled with.

If the members of the Cabinet were present in either house they would, by virtue of their office, stand above all the members and offer a central point to which independent and single members could appeal. When the committee reports come in, objectors, instead of challenging an impersonal and intangible majority, could summon the head of a department to give his opinion as to the bearing of a measure upon the public interests. His replies and comments would go over the whole country and awaken an interest such as no debate now does, and for the very simple reason that the official represents all parts of the country and interests all.

Much more than this, the work would begin with the session. When the mass of bills and resolutions was pouring in at the beginning of the session and being referred to committees, certain members would appeal to the cabinet officer to demand immediate attention for some particular subject of pressing interest, say the currency or the tariff, instead of waiting for it to be bargained and fought over in committee during a whole session, and then reported upon when debate is impossible. A secretary who should fail to respond to such an appeal would at once lose weight with the country. If he did respond to it neither the Speaker nor the House would dare to refuse him a hearing, and the subject would be considered, as it never is now, from a national point of view.

It is not merely that the cabinet officer represents the whole country as compared with localities. He also represents the administration of the government, which cannot be said of any member or officer either of the House or the Senate or of their committees. To these latter legislation is mainly an instrument for promoting party success, in which their own is included, its effect upon the govern

1

ment being only a secondary consideration and one which must give way when it comes in conflict with the main question. However much they may individually desire to promote good government and however much the constituents of any number of them may look to them to promote it, we have seen abundant reasons why their efforts must end in failure. But the main object of the cabinet officer must be the success of administration. It is that, and that only, upon which his own success and reputation must depend. From his leading position, therefore, he can bring to bear upon all kinds of legislation a crucial test which nobody else can, — their relation to the practical working of government.

Again, the action of the cabinet officer would not be confined to the discussion of reports of committees. If, as suggested, he was called upon at the beginning of the session to discuss certain principles, it would very quickly follow that he would not limit himself to the plans either of members or of committees, but would bring forward plans of his own; and from the necessities of his position those plans must be framed, first, with an eye to the public interest as a whole, and, second, to the requirements of administration, whereas the plans of members, even if framed with that intention, would be quickly manipulated by the committees in a different direction. Hon. Hannis Taylor, while favoring the admission of the cabinet officers to Congress, maintains that that would be useless unless they were given the initiative of legislation. That is true enough, but to affix such a condition in advance would be to increase, to the point of impossibility, the difficulty of procuring their admission in the face of legislative opposition. The first thing is to get them in and then trust to a process of evolution to achieve the rest. Of

1 See Chap. XVIII.

2 North American Review for August, 1894.

course the attempt would be made to refer the secretary's plans with all others to the standing committees and then would arise a conflict to be noticed presently.

From this again would follow that the attention of Congress, instead of awaiting the decision of fifty committees upon thousands of subjects, would be concentrated, through the action of the Cabinet and at the opening of the session, upon a few great questions of public importance and in the order of their importance. In the same way, instead of receiving indifferently thousands of bills on all possible subjects and referring them to the committees, the practice would grow up of deciding by a first reading and in the light of executive guidance and criticism whether particular proposals should be taken into consideration at all, with a manifest economy of time and efficiency on the part of the houses, and with protection of great business interests from constant and harassing uncertainty and fear.

The next advantage to be gained is, that the House would have leaders, of whom there are now none and no possibility of any. The chairmen of the committees and especially of the Ways and Means are sometimes spoken of as leaders. But they are so only in a limited and temporary sense. They are, like all other members, the representatives either of a district or a State. They represent neither the country nor the administration of the government. If they are not fettered by party and personal jealousy within their committees they are certain to be so in the houses, and they possess no official authority of any kind. The Speaker of the House offers the nearest approach to a leader; but he is again only a district member and represents neither the country nor the administration. He is elected by the party majority, makes up the committees and guides the procedure in their interest. He is at once spoiled for the function of an impartial presiding officer, protecting the minority and enforcing equitable