twenty-two cantons to none; and the second by 347,046 votes to 145,207, and by thirteen and a half cantons to eight and a half.

It is generally agreed in Switzerland that the popular initiative, as it is now established by the federal constitution, might at any time place the country in very considerable danger. From the moment that the regular representatives of the people are placed in such a position that they have no more to say in the matter than an irresponsible committee drawing up articles in a bar parlor, it is clear that the limits of sound democracy have been passed, and that the reign of demagogy has begun. The people have no other safeguard than their own good sense.1

The whole position of the legislative bodies is in Switzerland materially lowered by the referendum, or power of appealing directly to a popular vote upon proposed measures, which, as we have already seen, is the most remarkable feature in the Swiss Republic.2

1 Numa Droz, Contemporary Review, March, 1895.

2 Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty," Vol. I., Chap. IV., p. 375.

VOL. II-R

IN

CHAPTER XXVIII

A STUDY OF DEMOCRACY

N a former chapter have been considered some treatises upon the general principle of universal suffrage by writers who regard it with unmitigated dislike and contempt. It is in the light of what has been written in the later portion of this book that we may now examine a work, which, in its discussion of the practical results of experiments in representative government thus far made, is entitled by the thoroughness of its treatment, the impartial and philosophical spirit which it manifests, and the high reputation of the writer, to very serious consideration.1

One general remark may be made as to the whole book, that it is concerned chiefly with what we have called the motive force of government and not with the machinery through which it is applied. Mr. Lecky does, indeed, examine the position of the House of Lords in the British constitution and also the preponderant power which has accrued to the House of Commons. He dwells upon the evils of unlimited power in the hands of a single chamber and the advantages of a definition of power in all the branches of government by a written constitution as it prevails in the United States. But as to the true adjustment of power, the balance of forces between executive and legislature, the importance of getting at the real mass of average public opinion, the immense force which may be derived from moral enthusiasm aroused by and excited on behalf of an executive power elected 1 W. E. H. Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty," London, 1896.

periodically by a whole people, and at the same time held in control by a jealous and vigilant legislature; of any consideration of these things there is no trace. Mr. Lecky analyzes with great force and detail the effect, actual and probable, of democracy upon government; he leaves almost untouched, what is perhaps an equally fertile field, the effect of government upon democracy.

To European writers constitutional government implies either a limited monarchy or else a republic like those of France and Switzerland. In either case all that the voters have to do is to elect the legislature and the legislature makes and controls the executive-in Great Britain the ministry, in France nominally a president but in practice again the ministry, in Switzerland the Federal Council. In Great Britain the ministry has an indirect appeal to the country through a dissolution of Parliament, and it is this which has raised it in two centuries to be the highest development of popular government in the world. In no other European constitutional government is there any such appeal to the people as a whole, and that is at least a principal reason why the others have to such an extent come to failure. There is nowhere in the world anything like our popular election of president, governor, and mayor, and Europeans do not understand at all the significance of it. Even Mr. Bryce has failed to grasp it, and Mr. Bagehot, one of the most sagacious writers upon the modern English executive power, totally misunderstands it. This is certainly not surprising, in view of the perversion of its meaning through the ambition and encroachments of the legislatures, which have everywhere, from Congress down through the States and cities, striven, with only slight differences of success, to reduce the executive from being an agent of public opinion, charged with carrying on the government for the benefit of and in accordance with the will of the whole people, to be an

instrument of faction and party intrigue for the purpose of plundering the people on behalf of private and local interests.

The real questions with regard to popular government may be reduced to two: 1. Does the great majority of the population in countries like Great Britain, France, and the United States really desire good government with order, economy, and justice to all classes, or does it aim directly or indirectly at the plunder of the rich by the poor, with all the social disorder which that involves? 2. As the tide of democracy rises do the prevailing political methods tend to secure the best results of average public opinion, or to defeat that public opinion and throw government into the hands of comparatively small classes to be used for their own private interests, regardless of the public welfare and wishes?

Upon his first page Mr. Lecky refers to the principles of English parliamentary government in the eighteenth century which found their best expression and defence in the writings of Burke.

It was then almost universally held that the right of voting was not a natural right but a right conferred by legislation on grounds of expediency, or, in other words, for the benefit of the state.1

It is precisely upon this principle that the whole argument of the present work is based. With abstract questions of natural right and justice we have nothing to do. If universal suffrage is best adapted to promote not merely the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but the highest average of happiness for the whole people, then its existence is justified; otherwise not. But in making this concession we demand one in return. Mr. Lecky assumes, throughout in implication and sometimes in the letter, that intelligence, education, and property have a 1 Lecky, op. cit.

natural right to govern. It is worthy of note also that he couples the word 'loyalty' with these qualities, as if it necessarily and exclusively accompanied them. The limitation is the same as with universal suffrage. If they secure the highest average of happiness, then, and then only, the claim is good. But it will not do to beg the question. Thus probably the highest point of intelligence, or, to define that strictly, of intellectual power as applied to government, is found in the first Napoleon, yet it did not prevent his rule from being, regard being had to the then state of the world, one of the most arbitrary, oppressive, and cruel in history. It is not shown that intelligence or education offers any safeguard against the most selfish abuse of class power. Nor is intelligence, again, a necessary adjunct of property. The highest intellectual and moral qualities are often developed in narrow circumstances and are quite as legitimate fruits of struggle and sacrifice as of ease and luxury, or even of the acquisition of wealth. As Mr. Lecky himself says:

Class bias often does more to distort than education to expand the intellect, and rectitude of moral judgment is by no means proportioned to intellectual development.1

Property itself is no more a matter of abstract natural right than voting. Experience shows that the average welfare of humanity is best promoted by securing the individual right of property in accumulation, possession, and transmission. If it could be demonstrated-which as the world is made it evidently cannot be that the institution of private property is injurious to the permanent and average welfare of the mass of mankind, and that a corresponding benefit could be obtained from a community of goods, then there is no law human or divine which should prevent the distribution.

1 "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," Vol. III., Chap. XI., p. 233.