There is a country rather less in size and rather larger in population than Vermont and Massachusetts taken together, a large part of the surface consisting of barren mountains. It contains little or no coal, no canals or navigable rivers, and no sea-front. It has no very large manufactures or large cities, and no great extremes of wealth and poverty. It is an emigrating and not an immigrating country, with a population perhaps as little changing as any in Europe. Its institutions have come down for several hundred years with little modification, even in external form, till little more than half a century ago, and in internal spirit even now. Evidently we must beware of analogies transferred

to the United States.

The ancient Swiss confederation was nothing more than a league, offensive and defensive, of sovereign states, with a Diet which was merely a diplomatic conference. The French Revolution and Napoleon attempted some changes, but the Congress of Vienna in 1815 substantially restored the old state of things. It was not till 1830 that the movement for a closer union between the cantons began, which found expression in the constitution of 1848. A complete revision took place in 1874, based chiefly on three points: first, the extension of the federal power, especially in relation to the army and private law; second, the introduction of the referendum; and third, the establishment of a federal tribunal as a permanent institution, and with largely increased jurisdiction, but without serious modification of the internal relation of executive and legislative power.1

The Americans, even while putting at the base of their constitutions the principle of popular sovereignty, found themselves strongly influenced by the monarchical traditions and individualistic tendencies of the Anglo-Saxon race. In founding their new republican system they took as a model a monarchical constitution, that of

1 Dupriez, Vol. II., pp. 167-169.

England; merely introducing the modifications made necessary by the nature of the government they wished to establish. Thus while suppressing heredity they preserved the unity of executive power. On the other hand, they maintained, strengthened, and developed the guarantees which the monarchical constitution provided against the arbitrary and abusive development of power. But they did all that by employing the same methods which their fathers had used and following the road which had been opened and more than half laid out in the political organization of England. It was thus that they enforced, perhaps excessively, the separation of powers, which they regarded as the best and final safeguard of individual liberty and rights. In Switzerland the principle of popular sovereignty did not find itself embarrassed by traditions of personal power. Everywhere it had as the sole basis the cantonal constitutions, of which several had even preserved direct government by the general assembly of citizens. It was, therefore, directly and solely upon the sovereignty of the people that the new political organism must inevitably repose.1

Accordingly the principle of the separation and reciprocal independence of powers was almost wholly neglected by the Swiss constitution. No doubt it created various organs and attributed to each of them a special domain. But it did not closely and systematically mark off their respective jurisdictions, and instead of placing them on a footing of mutual equality and autonomy it established between them perfectly defined relations of subordination. A writer has been able to say, not without reason, that the political constitution of Switzerland is distinguished by an organic confusion of powers.2

In other words, while in England and the United States the supremacy of the legislative power has been obtained by a long and sustained conflict with the executive, in Switzerland that supremacy was frankly and fully established from the start. As the legislature was the only organ emanating directly from the people—the executive and judiciary deriving from it—all real power was vested in the legislature. But as it soon became apparent that even the legislature must be held in check by some power, the popular referendum and initiative were resorted to. How far they have served as a substitute for executive control is a question of deep interest. 2 pp. 178, 179.

1 Dupriez, op. cit., pp. 177, 178.

Three distinct authorities take part in the government of Switzerland: the Federal Assembly, to which is especially confided the legislative power, and which is divided into two elective chambers, one representing the Swiss nation and the other the cantons; the Federal Council, elected by the Assembly to watch over the execution of its laws and decrees, and to direct the administration of the country; the Federal Tribunal, also elected by the assembly to form the supreme court of justice of the Confederation.

But this arrangement must be regarded as a simple assignment of functions to duly subordinated organs. There can be no question of finding separation and independence of powers. The principle of popular sovereignty - which in some points is divided between the Swiss nation and the cantons governs all the federal institutions. The people, unable to govern themselves, have delegated to the Assembly all the powers which they cannot exercise themselves, but have reserved with supreme authority very thorough rights of control over their agent. Thus the constitution of 1874, which cannot be revised without the consent of the people, guarantees to them through the institution of the referendum the power of annulling the deliberations of the Assembly, upon which the executive has no veto. On its part, as the Assembly is incapable from its very organization of providing for all the necessities of government, it must assign to the other political organs, under its authority and surveillance, the exercise of certain powers.1

Of these the Federal Tribunal enjoys a certain independence, inasmuch as its decisions cannot be reconsidered by the Assembly or influenced by its will, unless that will takes the form of a bill or resolution. But its subordination appears in its origin and composition, since its members are elected by the Assembly for six years, and are reëligible.

But it is especially in the relation between the legislative and executive organs that the constitution has established a complete confusion of powers. It has placed the Federal Council under absolute dependence upon the Assembly. The latter elects the members of the Council for a term of three years and can reëlect them indefinitely. Having once conferred the office the Assembly cannot legally withdraw it or shorten the term. Nevertheless it possesses an indirect means of arriving at the same result, and it could with as much facility as the English Parliament or the French Chamber

1 Ibid., p. 179.

render government impossible to the federal councillors, and give itself up to the game of upsetting ministries. It is true that it does not use and never has used this power; but this is a result mainly of the political traditions, of the temper and moderation of the Swiss people, and perhaps also of the subordination legally established, and in fact respected, of the ministers towards the assembly. Never can the will of the first prevail against the authority of the other. The ministers have not even the choice between submission and resignation; they submit and obey with a good grace.1

But

The Federal Council consists of seven members, who, though chosen for three years, divide the different departments among themselves at the beginning of each year. No more than one member can come from one canton, nor can there be relatives in direct line or as near as first cousins. The ministers are forbidden to hold any other office, federal or cantonal, or even to pursue any private profession. They cannot be members of either assembly, though almost always chosen from one or the other. though they have no official seats or votes they are in no wise excluded from either chamber. According to the Constitution, "The members of the Federal Council have a consulting voice in the two branches of the Federal Assembly as well as the right of submitting proposals." Sometimes they assist the chambers in the execution of their mission, by presenting plans of laws, of decrees, and of budgets, or give their opinions upon all subjects under discussion. Sometimes, on the other hand, they submit to control by the Assembly through reports, questions, and interpellations.

Although the election of the Federal Council is intrusted to a political assembly, the choice is not always dictated by considerations of party, and the majority does not pretend to reserve all the seats for its adherents. In fact, the general feeling is, that this council ought to represent all the large fractions of the Assembly. Ac

1 Dupriez, op. cit., p. 181.

cordingly, notwithstanding any changes of parties, the terms of ministers are generally renewed. Of the seven members who formed the first Federal Council in 1848, two still remained twenty years afterwards, four died in office, the seventh had been displaced at a time of renewal by a younger rival, supported by the radicals. During more than forty years it has happened only twice that a member of a preceding administration has been rejected. The most hostile political groups await the voluntary retirement or the death of a member before seeking a change.1

How does it happen that certain ministers consent to remain in an administration of which the majority is hostile to their ideas, to promote the execution of a policy which they disapprove? That pertains to a certain spirit of patience, of submission to law and to the principle of the preponderance of majorities, quite peculiar to the Swiss people, with complete forgetfulness of all feeling of egotism and personal vanity. Each one yields with good grace before the will of his colleagues, and does not think his dignity suffers because he gives way to the decisions of the majority. The most grave differences of opinion may be publicly manifested between the members of the Council. Sometimes they are seen divided even in the sessions of the Assembly, and sustaining with the utmost vigor against each other completely opposite ideas. The struggle ended, whatever the result may be, conquerors and conquered resume their occupations and continue to join in a friendly way in conducting the affairs of the State. It is rare, moreover, that the majority abuses its strength by imposing its will: the differences which arise lead generally to compromises accepted by all.2

The federal councillors know nothing of the political responsibility which keeps the ministers of a cabinet government at the mercy of the caprices of a parliamentary majority. The chambers, may adopt motions of want of confidence or censure against their conduct, reject the propositions which they have submitted, vote measures which they have combated, without their feeling obliged to resign. Whatever happens they finish their term of office, 1 Ibid., pp. 184-186.

2 p. 189.