polite have sometimes been addressed to him, has always responded to these invitations without contesting the right of the Parliament. The parliamentary committees have assumed in Italy an exaggerated importance to the detriment of ministerial influence. The Cabinet, far from finding in their members and their reporters devoted partisans, meets too often among them uncertain friends whose ambition and personal interests are not controlled by party discipline, or concealed adversaries always ready to inflict a check upon it. Sometimes the plans of the government come from their hands wholly transformed. Sometimes its plans find themselves in collision with counter projects, starting from entirely opposite principles. Sometimes the business of the committees is conducted with intentional delays, while the government and the chambers are powerless against this obstruction.1 The Italian ministries do not enjoy an authority either stable or strong enough to remain the sole directors of financial policy. It is especially in the discussion of the budget that their influence finds itself counterbalanced and compromised by the existence of the permanent committee which absorbs the consideration of all propositions. Powerful by the importance of its mission, as well as by the number and authority of its members, it uses its power not merely for closely checking and revising the plans which are submitted to it, but also for influencing the policy of the government and thrusting itself into the administration. It is seldom that the ministry can openly combat the conclusions of the budget committee and its reporter. Often it sees itself forced to accept compromises, of which the treasury almost always pays the expense. The ministry may have proposed, for example, an increase of some credit which they have thought necessary for the public service. The reporter, or, as we should say, the chairman, refuses it to them on the ground of strict economy, but yields at length, provided there is a corresponding increase in the credit destined to some establishment of interest to his province.2 The Italian chambers have used and abused the rights given them by the constitution, the laws, and the rules, to subject the Cabinet to a rigid and incessant control. Overwhelming the ministers with questions and interpellations, demanding from them extended reports of their action and numerous justifying documents, having recourse even to minute investigations, they do not cease from exercising over the affairs of the government a jealous and restless watchfulness. The ministry, deprived of the support of a stable majority, is continually exposed to receive a vote of want of confidence, and, conscious of its precarious situation, dares not oppose a serious and decided resistance.8 1 Dupriez, Chap. III., Vol. I., pp. 298-310. 8 Ibid., p. 319. All these elements of control have not appeared sufficient in connection with certain financial services, and the chambers have established several vigilance committees to keep an eye, for example, upon the administration of the public debt, the funds appropriated to public worship, the military chest. These committees assume, in the name of the Parliament, a lofty tone of control. On this ground they can make all the investigations and demand all communications which they think useful. Every year they make a report to the chambers.1 In brief, while the condition of the country and the people calls for exceptionally strong executive power, with the sole initiative in legislation and full control of finance and administration, subject only to criticism and veto by the legislature, these elements are conspicuously wanting. The effect of this complete dislocation of government is visible in almost every step of Italian history in the last thirty years. The submission to the Triple Alliance, with the consequent crushing burden of naval and military expenditures; the war with Abyssinia; the immense exodus of population to the United States and South America; the distress and suffering of those who remain; not merely the increase of taxation, but its fearful inequality and injustice; the anarchy, disorder, and misery of the provinces; the scandal and collapse of financial institutions, — all may be summed up in three words, failure of government. It seems evident that no improvement can be effected by a change in the composition of the legislative bodies, or the methods of voting, or any practicable restriction of the suffrage. The situation turns, precisely as in France and the United States, upon the relation of executive and legislative power. In the future, more or less remote, there are but two alternatives possible: the establishment of executive power, strong enough to govern, but held in strict responsibility to and control by public opinion; or else the seizure of power by an executive, also strong enough to govern, but only 1 Ibid., p. 324. responsible to itself or to the private and class interests surrounding it, and with entire disregard and contempt for the popular will. Nor does it affect the principle that the electorate in Italy, even with a common school education, has very little comprehension of or interest in public affairs, while in the United States the voters are much better informed and take a keener interest in the working of government. No doubt the chance seems small that the Italian king will make a direct appeal to the people, and nurse and educate public opinion into supporting him in a resolute though constitutional stand against the chambers. It is much more likely that the confusion and anarchy will increase till some military despot is imposed upon the country from within or outside, and be welcomed by the people as the least of two evils. In the United States, on the other hand, we may hope that a periodically elected executive may find in the direct support of his constituency a peaceful and constitutional, and yet adequate, means of restoring the balance of power. We turn next to a very different scene, where in Prussia and the German Empire the conflict of powers in nominally representative governments has resulted almost wholly to the advantage of the executive. Before the French Revolution the struggle for existence in Germany left little room for anything but military despotism. The kingdom of Frederick the Great was not a good nursery of popular self-government. Although in the war against Napoleon the sovereigns were obliged to make an appeal to their peoples, the Confederation established in 1815 was nothing more than an alliance of princes for protection against foreign conquerors, against each other, and against their peoples. Their internal policy consisted in combined repression of liberal, or, as they called it, "demagogic," tendencies. In the next thirty years Prussia, with a view of taking the lead in Germany, coquetted with representative government; but it was not till the French Revolution of 1848 started the movement which swept over Europe that the king granted a constitution on the 5th of December. It was to be accepted by two chambers, created and organized by an electoral law also granted by the king, and having been accepted by them after some difficulty, was published on the 31st of January, 1850, and is that of the kingdom of Prussia to-day. The Prussian constitution took that of Belgium as its model. The articles describing the powers of the king, the competence of the chambers, and the functions of the ministers are almost exactly copied from the latter. But the basis upon which the two proceed is wholly different. The Belgian Congress had written at the head of its work, "All powers come from the nation." The king of Prussia in his constitution was far from recognizing the sovereignty of the people. The king preserves all the powers which are not expressly taken from him by the constitution, and his authority is unlimited in principle. On the other hand, the legislative chambers have no other rights than those expressly given them by the constitution. As to the functions of ministers, we have had to keep in view throughout the relation of legal theory to actual facts. If constitutional texts can easily enough regulate the organization and functions of the grand political powers, they cannot succeed in determining the real strength of each and establishing between them an impossible balance. In some constitutional monarchies the Parliament, or rather the popular chamber, has asserted an overwhelming strength and in different degrees invaded every department to make its irresistible influence felt. In Prussia the result of the struggle has been wholly different. Royalty, forced to abandon a part of its powers to the national representation, has known how to defend successfully all the rights which it has reserved; it has even had strength enough to cancel more than one restriction on its liberty of action. If the king is no longer absolute, he has maintained the first place in the state. Thus the centre of gravity of the political organization is found always in the Crown and not in the elective chamber. And from this principle flow out all the differences which profoundly separate the Prussian ministry from parliamentary cabinets.1 From the times when the rulers of Prussia were known as electors they had a privy council of notables called to their aid like that of the king of Great Britain. From that again was developed a cabinet, but instead of a body unknown to the constitution and developed from the Parliament, it was a body established by the sovereign and under his order, the head being a chancellor who was the medium between the king and the other ministers. After being several times in abeyance, this office was revived in its well-known form under Count Bismarck. By the constitution the "king appoints and dismisses his ministers," and in fact he exercises this right with entire freedom. He need not and does not trouble himself about the desires or the aspirations of either the upper or lower House. The parliamentary majority does not dictate his choice nor exercise any appreciable influence upon it.2 The ministers are entirely responsible to him. They have not been called to power by the Landtag, and whatever may be the distrust of that body towards them they all remain at their post as long as the royal power shall keep them there. It is true that the constitution expressly recognizes ministerial responsibility. "The ministers of the king are responsible," it says. "All the acts of the king, to be valid, must be countersigned by a minister, who by that fact becomes responsible for them" (p. 361). Unfortunately, the constitution omits to say to whom the ministers are responsible. No legal disposition requires the king to take them from the chambers. Nor is he limited in his choice by any practical necessity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ministers are mostly technical men, trained in the ranks of administration and well fitted for that purpose, but much less available as defenders of popular liberty. 1 Dupriez, Chap. III., Vol. I., p. 350. 2 p. 359. |