self-asserting fraction of society, whether poor or rich, but with the multitude of thousands who are hard at work in supporting themselves and their families, have very little time or attention to give to politics and no direct personal interest in them, but who have a natural preference for right over wrong and a capacity of enthusiasm for striking personality, especially of a kind which commands their respect.

The nursing and development of this public opinion is the object of capital importance in popular government. It is the working force alone to be relied on for resistance to violence or intrigue, to the schemes of faction or private interest. It is the instrument for preserving order and security in time of peace, as the police force is in time of civil disturbance, or an army in time of war. It should be kept, therefore, in the highest possible state of discipline and efficiency. The component units should be provided with subjects of common interest, they should be made to feel that their own and the public welfare depends largely upon their individual action; to see direct results following from their efforts in the right direction; to have confidence that the action of one will be sustained by that, if not of all, at least of a majority of others; to cultivate that mutual reliance which makes each man in a trained regiment stand firm in battle in the confident assurance that his comrades will not fail him. We have seen that these results can only be obtained through individual personality, because it is that alone which does or can unite masses of men, especially those who can give only temporary and partial attention, can arouse their enthusiasm and make them work together. If, on the other hand, the multitude are appealed to through measures only, they will differ in small fractions, not only as to the relative importance of measures in themselves, but as to the details of those measures, will become confused and

VOL. II-M

uncertain, will lose their interest and gradually give up all effort, abandoning public affairs to those who will take the trouble to master them. We have found that these principles are directly violated in every department of our governments, national, State, and city, and have endeavored to trace the resultant evils to this violation.

As to the nature of existing evils there is hardly any dispute, the contention being as to the possibility and the means of remedying them. One most hopeful sign has been pointed out in the decreasing tendency to attribute them wholly to the perversity and indifference of the people, and in the disposition to seek their origin in defective arrangements which mislead and defeat the popular will. The remedies available may be sought in three directions: (1) The strengthening and concentrating of executive power; (2) the improvement of the character of legislative bodies; and (3) the readjustment of the relations between the two branches. The first of these has been tried to some extent in the case of mayors of cities, perhaps in some slight degree with the governors of States, but never at all with the President of the United States. The third point may be said to have never received any attention at all. It never seems to occur to any of the reformers that the root of the difficulty lies in the absorption of all the powers of government by the legislature; or if the idea does present itself it is treated as an insoluble fact against which it is useless even to think of contending. This conviction is greatly strengthened by the universal practice of looking to the legislature for the accomplishment of everything, whether in the making or the execution of laws, and the perfectly logical, if unacknowledged, conclusion that the legislature cannot be expected to abridge its own powers or increase those of the executive. The whole strength of effort towards reform, therefore, is directed towards raising the quality

of the legislatures and making them respond more closely to public opinion. Among the measures towards this, and the one which has received most attention, is that known as proportional representation. Of the many treatises on the subject, perhaps as clear and fair as any is the work under that title by Professor John R. Commons, of Syracuse University. We will take his book as summing up the arguments of all the advocates of proportional representation. It is worth noting, that he agrees almost exactly with the character of the evils described in this book, differing only as to the nature of the remedy. Thus as to the failure of legislative assemblies:

The American people are fairly content with their executive and judicial departments of government, but they feel that their lawmaking bodies have painfully failed.

Stated in another way, this might mean that they have paid very little attention to either executive or judiciary, but have concentrated the whole upon the legislature.

municipal,

This conviction pertains to all grades of legislatures, State, and federal. The newspapers speak what the people feel, and, judging therefrom, it is popular to denounce aldermen, legislators, and congressmen. When Congress is in session, the business interests are reported to be in agony until it adjourns. The cry that rises towards the end of a legislature's session is humiliating. The San Francisco Bulletin is quoted as saying: "It is not possible to speak in measured terms of the thing that goes by the name of legislature in this State. It has of late years been the vilest deliberative body in the world. The assemblage has become one of bandits instead of lawmakers. Everything within its grasp for years has been for sale. The commissions to high office which it confers are the outward and visible signs of felony rather than of careful and wise selection." Every State in the Union can furnish examples more or less approaching to this. Statements almost as extreme are made regarding Congress. Great corporations and syndicates seeking legislative favors are known to control the acts of both branches. The patriotic ability, and even the personal character of members, are widely distrusted and denounced.1

1 J. R. Commons, "Proportional Representation,” Chap. I., p. 1.

Still the legislature is and must be supreme.

However the executive may be chosen, he is properly only the agent of the legislature. As such he is not called upon to exercise discretion, which is the prerogative of legislators, but to execute laws exactly as their framers contemplated. He is, therefore, strictly speaking, not a party official but a non-partisan agent.1

And speaking of the ideal legislature reformed by proportional representation, he says:

-

It might then be expected that the legislature would resume its rightful place as the sovereign branch of government. Unquestionably its position is such that, no matter how degraded its character, unless restricted by the Constitution, it gradually absorbs supreme control of the other departments. It alone can grant and withhold financial support; and sooner or later this power subordinates the executive, the judicial, and the administrative branches. The national Congress, notwithstanding presidential vetoes and popular distrust, has drawn to itself the management of the details of administration. State legislatures and municipal councils would have done the same but for the increasing constitutional restrictions which have subordinated their financial powers to the judiciary and the executive. Could the Federal Constitution be readily amended, doubtless similar restrictions would be imposed upon Congress.2

The only restriction upon the legislature is the Constitution, which emanates directly from the people. Nothing is to be hoped for from the executive, which yet emanates just as directly from the people.

The legislature could then safely be made the sovereign organ of the government and the promoter of social reform. The executive would sink to its true position, that of an agent for carrying out the policy of legislation, and the judiciary, instead of annulling the laws, would simply apply them to concrete cases.

That is to say, government by the legislature alone is the foundation principle of our institutions. All that can be done is to improve the legislature.

How closely Professor Commons, up to a certain point, 2 p. 232.

1 Op. cit., p. 193.

8 p. 234.

agrees with the present writer is shown in the following passage:

If the people wish to bring to their legislatures intelligence, experience, ability, probity, and sympathy with popular aims, they should first develop those forms of government and that political machinery which will insure adequate security, support, and dignity to such qualities. . .

...

The American Speaker, unlike the English and Canadian, is a man of dictatorial power. In the national government he is ranked next to the President. He appoints the committees, lays down the rules, and controls legislation. He has a similar position in all State legislatures, and in many municipal councils. Leadership is essential wherever a body of men are compelled to act in council. But there are two kinds of leadership. One is that of debate, argument, and statesmanship, depending upon ability and enthusiasm, where the followers have confidence in their chief, accept his leadership, and act in concert with him voluntarily. This is the leadership of Gladstone in the House of Commons. The other is that of coercion, growing out of necessity and circumstance, where followers distrust the ability of any leader they may choose, where they distrust their own ability to follow, and therefore they consent to the abdication of selfgovernment and the elevation of a tyrant. This is the leadership of the American party Speaker. If the members should keep the control of affairs in their own hands, there would be wrangling and wirepulling over the appointment of committees, and then factions and mutiny on account of their final disposition. The only escape from this evil is the power of the Speaker. . . .1

Though the Speaker has a unique dominion, there is another power in American councils, legislatures, and Congress still more ominous, the lobby. It is the lobby which controls legislatures to-day. If any law demanded by the people at large, or even by a majority of the lawmaking body, is defeated or emasculated, its fate can be traced to the dominating influence of the lobby.

The lobby is a new feature of representative government. It is coincident with the very recent growth of large private corporations. It is organized by them. They have such immense interests at stake on the turn of legislation, that their lobby, with unlimited resources at its disposal, is almost irresistible.

But the lobby could not have acquired its powerful influence were it not for certain qualities in the legislative bodies themselves, which place them at its mercy. Corruption is not the only explanation. Legislators fall into the nets of lobbyists largely because of inexperi

1 Op. cit., pp. 43, 44.