cil are reëlected or new nominations accepted without much difficulty. Behind all this is the fact which must be patent to every visitor to Great Britain, of the distinction of classes and the subserviency of the poor to the rich, so totally different from anything which exists in this country. Moreover, as a position in the government means a great deal of hard work, with nothing to get except social distinction, the struggle is not likely to be very severe; though undoubtedly one impelling force is parliamentary ambition, as illustrated by Mr. Chamberlain himself. The caucus system is not, however, unknown. A description of it was given by Mr. W. T. Marriott in the Nineteenth Century for June, 1882. The chief promoter appears to have been Mr. Harris, "a justice of the peace, and a man of great ability and respected by all who knew him."

Taking as their basis of operation the sixteen wards into which the borough is divided, they formed a committee in each ward, and each of these committees elected 35 of their number to be members of a large general committee of 594. The average number in the Ward Committees is 125, and of the 35 selected 30 are members of the General Committee alone, while 5-2 of whom must be the chairman and secretary of the Ward Committee - are not only members of the General Committee, but are also members of an Executive Committee of the association, which numbers 114. The 594 of the General Committee are made up of the 35 members selected from each of the sixteen wards, with 30 members nominated by the executive and 4 ex officio members; while the Executive Committee of 114 is made up of the 5 members elected by each of the sixteen wards, together with 30 members selected by itself, and 4 officers of the General Committee. There is then another committee called a Management Sub-Committee, consisting of 11 members, 7 of whom are chosen by the Executive Committee from their own number of 114, and the other 4 are officers of the General Committee.

It was, and probably now is, the boast of the founders of the association that its basis was essentially popular, and that the organization was merely a machine by means of which the populace could give articulate expression to their will; and there is no doubt that the primary Ward Committee of 125 members, or thereabouts, is elected at a public meeting of all the Liberals residing in the ward who choose

to attend; but here any pretence of consulting the vox populi Liberalis ends. To those who are accustomed to public meetings, called together for the purpose of transacting business, this consultation of the people must appear.little more than a pretence. Some few Liberals, who have a specific object in view, summon the meeting of Liberals in the district, and be the number that attend great or small, it is pretty certain that the majority are not prepared for action. The only people prepared will be those who have summoned the meeting, and they certainly will be ready with a proposal of names for the chairmanship and secretaryship of the committee, and probably also with the names of a large number of the committee. The committee once appointed, the power of the people ceases altogether, and it is filtered through the 594 members of the General Committee and the 114 members of the Executive Committee, till it solidifies in the hands of the Management Sub-Committee of 11, the 4 most powerful members of which are probably the 4 officers of the General Committee. If the president and secretary of the whole association are decently strong and able men and they work together, the chances are enormous that the whole power of this intricate organization will rest in their hands, and if the president is wealthy and ambitious as well, he will find it a most potent instrument for advancing his own ends.

It may be safely said that this whole organization of the Birmingham government is an exaggeration of the features which have had the worst effects in the United States, the absence of responsible executive power, and the control of administration by numerous and irresponsible bodies of politicians. Imagine Boston to be governed by a council of forty-seven men, or New York by one of twice or thrice that number, chosen for three years on party lines and by caucus methods like those described; that this council was to increase its number by one-third chosen for six years from its own active or retiring members; that the whole body was to choose yearly a mayor with no other functions but those of a presiding officer, and that the whole of the city affairs, the employment of labor, the making of contracts, and the appropriation and expenditure of money rested with the council and its committees. All the corruption we have yet seen would be trifling compared with what would speedily follow from

such a system as this. Mr. Shaw is of a different opinion, and, in fact, it was in accordance with his view that the plan for a "Greater Boston," referred to in Chapter XXIII., was brought before the legislature.

When essentials are considered, the American functionary who corresponds with the English mayor is the president or chairman of the common council. And even that comparatively unpretentious officer has greater power than the English mayor, for in many, if not in all, of the American cities he makes up the council committees according to his own fancy, and thus exercises a far-reaching influence upon the work of administration in the various departments; while the English law obliges the council itself to appoint its own committees. This is a matter of no trivial importance, as anybody at all conversant with municipal affairs will instantly understand.

The typical American mayor is no part of the council or its organization. He is elected directly by the people. He is an independent, coördinate authority. He bears somewhat the same relation to the council that the President of the United States sustains towards Congress, or the governor of the State toward the legislature. The analogy falls short, however, in the very important practical fact that the work of Congress and the State legislature is principally that of legislation, while the work of the municipal councils is of necessity principally that of administration. The theoretical independence and distinct executive responsibility of the President and the governors is extremely difficult to maintain in practice, for the line between legislative and administrative work and authority is not at all distinct. Still more difficult is it in practice to apportion duties and responsibilities between an American mayor and the common council in such a way as to secure real efficiency on both sides. It is not easy to see where, in the nature of things, the proper functions of one authority end and those of the other begin. In the dispersion of authority definite responsibility too easily disappears. The mayor's veto upon ordinances passed by the council divides responsibility for the by-laws. The council's power of rejecting appointees nominated by the mayor very considerably diminishes his responsibility for the proper exercise of the appointing power. Where the control of the police is not taken out of the hands of both of these coördinate authorities and vested by the State in a separate board of commissioners, the police administra

1 Cf. Chap. XVII. as to the effect of this power, which is exercised equally by the Speakers of the federal and the State Houses of Representatives, and of the absence of this power and the election of committees in the United States Senate. 2 See Chap. XXIV.

tion is likely again and again to be a bone of contention between the mayor and council. The embarrassments growing out of this divided responsibility are among the principal causes of the comparative failure of city government in the United States. Many earnest and intelligent municipal reformers, especially in New York and the Eastern States, have advocated the plan of greatly increasing the authority of the mayor, so that he may be held more definitely responsible for the administration of the various executive departments. It is the plan of a periodically elective dictatorship. As a remedy for the evils that grow out of interference by the State and the farming out of certain departments such as parks or water supply-to special boards or commissions not responsible to the mayor, or the council, or the people, and further as a temporary measure of defence against untrustworthy and corrupt councils, this somewhat heroic plan of making the mayor a dictator, or, to use the Cromwellian euphemism, a "protector," seems to have a great deal in its favor. But it is unrepublican, and it does not at all solve the difficult problem of harmonizing the authority of the mayor and the authority of the council. The relation between the two cannot at best be other than that of a shifting, unprofitable, and illogical compromise.

It would seem a little strange that the one school of reformers should not have been earlier opposed by another which would advocate the concentration of authority and responsibility in the council. Logically, the mayor must eventually swallow the council or the council must swallow the mayor, if political forces are to be accorded some degree of natural play; and the one man power is on the decline everywhere in this age.2

Undoubtedly the one man power has disappeared in the methods of carrying on our governments by the legislature; but it has secured an ample revenge in the harvest of anarchy which it has left behind, while outside of the lawful machinery of government it is asserting itself with redoubled vigor. In most of our cities the council has swallowed the mayor. The later tendency seems to be for the mayor to swallow the council. Real progress will be made when both are compelled to disgorge and to limit themselves to their proper share of power, with the added

1 Note the discussion of this point in connection with the Brooklyn charter.

2.46 Municipal Government in Great Britain," Chap. III., pp. 61-63.

function of enforcing responsibility upon each other in full sight of the people.

A municipal government, elsewhere than in the United States, after having constituted a ruling body, does not erect a separate one man power and give it the means to obstruct the ruling administrative body, and to diminish its scope and responsibility. The mayor elsewhere is an integral part of the council. English, Scotch, and Irish municipal government is simply government by a group of men who are to be regarded as a grand committee of the corporation a corporation consisting of the whole body of qualified citizens. So far as these bodies have authority to pass by-laws at all, their authority is complete, and nobody obtrudes a veto. They appoint and remove all officials. They have entire charge of municipal administration, distributing the work of departmental management and supervision to standing committees of their own number which they organize and constitute as they please. If such a local government cannot be trusted, the fault is with popular institutions.1 It is quite certain to be as good a government as the people concerned deserve to have. The location of responsibility is perfectly definite. The taxpayers hold every member of council responsible for his vote. The system is as simple, logical, and effective as the American system is complicated and incompatible with harmonious and responsible administration. City government in America defeats its own end by its "checks and balances," its partitions of duty and responsibility, and its grand opportunities for the game of hide-and-seek. Infinitely superior is the English system, by which the people give the entire management of their affairs to a big committee of their own number, which they renew from time to time.2

It is not necessary to remark upon the sharp contrast which this reasoning presents with all the principles laid down in this work. As applied to cities it will be further discussed presently, but meantime some further light may be gained by an examination of the London county council, the latest development in this direction by the Local Government Act of 1888.

Each of the 57 parliamentary districts created by the reform bill of 1885 was accorded 2 members, while the city proper was allowed 4;

1 The issue taken in this work could not be more clearly defined. 2 Ibid.