even from a share in the veto, nor anything to do with, or any responsibility for (apart from the very indirect one of confirming the governor's appointments), administration. In fact, there is no pretence of any other function of the council than that of tying the governor's hands, much as a horse in a pasture is sometimes hobbled to prevent his running away. A place in the council is therefore an elegant sinecure, with the pleasing exhilaration of holding a bridle upon the governor, and is almost always determined by considerations of party; so that a governor in accord with the party majority may have comparatively an easy and comfortable position, while one not so in accord will find it very much the reverse. The late Governor Russell was driven by such experience to say that there were ten governors instead of one.

One function the governor can apparently fulfil without the aid of the council.

ARTICLE VII. The governor of this commonwealth, for the time being, shall be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of all the military forces of the State, by sea and land; and shall have full power, by himself, or by any commander, or officers, from time to time, to train, instruct, exercise, and govern the militia and navy; and, for the special defence and safety of the commonwealth, to assemble in martial array, and put in warlike posture, the inhabitants thereof, and to lead and conduct them, and with them to encounter, repel, resist, expel, and pursue, by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, within or without the limits of this commonwealth, and also to kill, slay, and destroy, if necessary, and conquer, by all fitting ways, enterprises, and means whatsoever, all and every such person and persons as shall, etc.,

the same sonorous rhetoric continuing for nearly a page. The key to it is, however, found in Article X.:

The captains and subalterns of the militia shall be elected by the written votes of the train band and alarm list of their respective companies; the field officers of regiments shall be elected by the written votes of the captains and subalterns of their respective regiments; the brigadiers shall be elected, in like manner, by the field officers of

their respective brigades; and such officers, so elected, shall be commissioned by the governor, who shall determine their rank.

The apex of the system was differently provided for.

The major-generals (an office at present in abeyance) shall be appointed by the senate and house of representatives, each having a negative upon the other, and be commissioned by the governor.

What sort of a military command is that in which all the officers are elected by subordinates separately from and wholly independent of the commander-in-chief, and under no necessity of obedience in the spirit at least if not in the letter, even his power of removal being subject to the act of the legislature?

Apparently the confirmation of the governor's appointments by the council did not furnish sufficient security against executive usurpation, since, either by the original constitution or subsequent amendments, all the chief executive officers of the State-the secretary, treasurer and receiver-general, auditor, attorney-general, sheriffs, registrars of probate, clerks of court - are elected by the people, either as a whole or in fractions, separately from and independent of the governor and of each other, so that there is no common superior or link between them. As a former governor publicly said, if he were to go to the State treasurer and suggest any policy, the latter would be quite justified in telling him it was none of his business.

It appears, therefore, that with the exception of his military staff and his private secretary there is no State officer to whom the supreme executive magistrate can give an order with any adequate means of enforcing it, being thus as powerless for executive as for legislative work. When we consider that four hundred thousand voters are asked to turn out every year to elect a complete figurehead like this, is it any wonder if they become apathetic and contemptuous, and that the vote at a

State election is always much smaller than at a national? As in the case of the religious ceremonies of the ancient augurs at Rome, that government and people are in a perilous condition whose most solemn political exercises are in reality nothing more than a meaningless sham.

Of the character and effect of the veto upon legislation, in the hands of the chief executive, enough has already been said, and it is equally applicable to the President of the United States, the governors of the States, and the mayors of cities.

Is it not evident that men of first-class ability will not seek or even accept such a position; that the candidates must either be unable to comprehend its real meaning or must seek it for other reasons than rendering effective service to the State?

While, however, the governor of a State even more than the President of the United States has very little power for good he has infinite possibilities for evil. By intrigues with the legislature, by playing upon the spirit of party, by appointments on the commissions to be presently noticed, he can seriously injure both the material and the moral condition of the State, though the existence of the council is a check to positive evil-doing which does not exist in the case of the President of the United States. We have here also an explanation of the fact referred to in Chapter XVIII., that it is not regarded as proper for any man openly to seek the governorship, because, like any other public office, it is not a place of something to do but of something to get. It is a direct and immense credit to the people of the State and a triumphant defence of universal suffrage, at least as regards them, that, to go no farther back than the war, our governors with hardly an exception have been honorable and high-minded men, doing the best they could for the service of the State with the means at their command. Even though the nominat

ing conventions have fallen under the control of party managers and politicians, yet the two sets of these know well that if in their competition they are to hope for success with the people of the State, they must put forward only men of honor and integrity. It is one of many proofs that so far from the defects of our politics being chargeable to the people, it is the people who save us from much worse evils than we now have to bear.

Again, an executive system in which the head has no authority over the members; in which the chiefs of the different subdivisions are elected separately and are all independent of each other and of their common head, is fatal to any effective administration. It is the negation of government and is certain to bring it to a deadlock. As has been said, during the half-century succeeding the formation of the constitution very little government was needed; a comparatively few general laws only were sufficient, the people obeyed them and the local system of town government did the rest. But towards the middle of this century it became apparent that a much more efficient system was necessary. An account of the steps taken by the legislature to provide this must be preceded by an analysis of the legislature itself, but mention may be here made of a clause in the constitution which forms a curious comment on the subsequent history.

Article XXX., and the last of the Declaration of Rights, runs thus:

In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial power, or either of them the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial power, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive power, or either of them.

It is curious that there is nowhere any definition of the limits thus peremptorily ordered to be observed. The functions of each branch are laid down in a general way

which is far from containing any exact division of them. It may be, and often is, said that this was not possible. But then what was the use of putting in the injunction? It was certain that there would be a conflict of powers, and certain, also, that the strongest of them would prevail, and these words merely recognize that certainty with a mild deprecation of the conflict itself thoroughly characteristic of the view which was taken of the new government coming into existence.

But the climax of the article is in the concluding clause, "to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men."

Since the world began has anybody ever heard of or can anybody imagine a government of laws alone without the intervention of men? Of course it is plain enough that what was meant is that it should be a government under a system of law and not by the arbitrary caprice of individuals, but the words themselves have been constantly used to justify the exclusive government of the legislature, because an impersonal body makes laws and puts them in operation, while to intrust any real power to the executive would be to introduce the forbidden government of men. The same idea is expressed in the words, "measures, not men," which is so often dwelt upon as the fundamental principle of our institutions, and of which the fatal effect is becoming more and more apparent.

In analyzing the legislature we find almost an exact repetition of what we have seen in Congress and which exists also in all the other States. There are two bodies, one of 240 and the other of 40 members, all precisely equal. The senate of Massachusetts differs from that of the United States in that whereas the members of the latter are elected by the State legislatures, and so on a different basis from the representatives, the senate of Massachusetts is elected by the whole people, only that