Mr. CURTIS. Did the subcommittee reach a decision as to whether we were to again request a member of the Bureau of the Budget to testify?

The CHAIRMAN. No; we did not come to any decision on it.

Mr. CURTIS. I would like to make a motion that the subcommittee ask the Bureau of the Budget to reconsider and have someone come before us and testify; I think it is quite important that they do. I don't see how we can make an intelligent decision without an opportunity of asking them a few questions. I understand they did have a letter that they sent us.

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to ask somebody from the Bureau of the Budget to come if the committee wishes it.

Mr. CURTIS. I thought the committee might do that if the committee sees fit.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a second to that motion?

Mr. DORN. I will second it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the committee will do that. Do you think it would be agreeable not to have further hearings until we get the full text of the Brookings report?

There is one question I wanted to ask Dr. David, and that was whether or not in your field investigation you consulted representatives of foreign governments with whom our agencies are dealing, or whether you consulted only the representatives of our Government? Dr. DAVID. There was a limited amount of consultation. We saw some of the people in the embassies here in town, and while we were abroad there was some discussion with people in the other govern

ments.

Mr. CURTIS. Did you consult with any of our American businessmen or groups that deal with our various agencies abroad?

Dr. DAVID. It wasn't intensive, certainly. I think I had a few casual social contacts, but there wasn't a systematic effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. David, we appreciate very much your appearance and the information you have given us. It clears up many of our questions about your report, and we will read the report with interest.

Dr. DAVID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until notification.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chairman.)

A COMMISSION TO STUDY OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES OF

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1951

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RELATIONS

WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES
IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee on Federal Relations with International Organizations met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 1501, New House Office Building, Representative Henderson Lanham (chairman), presiding.

Present: Representatives Lanham, Dorn, Brownson, Curtis, and Bush.

Also present: Franklin D. Rogers, Jr., Clerk.

Mr. LANHAM. The subcommittee will come to order.

The first witness is Mrs. Church, author of H. R. 3406.

Mrs. Church, did you want to make a supplemental or additional statement?

Mrs. CHURCH. Yes; I would like to, if I may.

Mr. LANHAM. We shall be glad to have you.

Mrs. CHURCH. It might be a little bit easier. May I read this statement, briefly? I shall give it to you, but I thought it might be a little quicker.

Mr. LANHAM. Whichever way you prefer, Mrs. Church.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF HON. MARGUERITE S. CHURCH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mrs. CHURCH. I wish to point out first that the previous testimony given before the subcommittee would seem to establish the actual need for adequately investigating the overseas activities of our Government. Mr. Robert L. L. McCormick of the Citizens' Committee for the Hoover Report; Edward A. Gaskin, president of Local 900, Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO; and also Secretary of Commerce Sawyer have all testified before you to the effect that the problem is great and the need for study urgent.

The testimony brought forth in earlier hearings seemed to establish the inadequacy for the purpose at hand of certain previous studies. The witnesses, if you will remember, discussed in some detail Gordon Gray's Report on Economic Policies, and the Rockefeller report, Partners in Progress. Opinion seemed to be unanimous that while

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these were both excellent studies, they were too limited in scope to provide the Congress, and this committee in particular, with the needed facts. The Gray report is primarily concerned, you will remember, with economic policy and devotes little attention to administration. The Rockefeller report is limited to the problems of underdeveloped areas.

Therefore, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the question with which we left the last hearing, and to which we return today, is whether or not the Brookings report, which was not available at the time of the previous hearings, forecloses the need for further study.

Since the last hearing, it was possible to secure in galley form the copies of the Brookings report. I think that perhaps it was my New England conscience that made me feel that it was not appropriate or honest to make a comment on the report without attempting to go through it with great care. I think you might find me rather vulnerable if you questioned me about all of the subject matter in it; but I do feel that I have gone through it and that I have made, to my own. academic mind, a sufficient survey to speak my own conviction on it.

I would submit, therefore, that the Brookings report does not satisfy the need for further study. If you will recall, Dr. Paul T. David, who was in charge of the Brookings study, stated in his testimony before the subcommittee that "the small staff of Brookings and the limited time made a complete study impossible."

Field work done on the report was necessarily very limited. It did not include the Far East, the Near East, Latin America, South America, or North America.

I would therefore hold that the report was decidedly too limited in scope to offer us the material which this committee needs.

In addition, the Brookings report omits entirely from its consideration large segments of our overseas activities. Included in these omissions are: Regional arrangements for defense; territorial governments; protectorates; and military governments in occupied areas, et cetera. Furthermore, no attempt was made to examine the internal organization of the Department of State, or of the Executive Office of the President in their relation to the problem.

With these important omissions so patent, it is obvious that the Congress cannot rely on the Brookings report as a basis for consideration of possible legislation which may be necessary if our overseas activities are to be integrated.

I would like to interpolate at that point-and this is not in my written statement-that when I introduced this bill, there was absolutely no ulterior motive in mind. I was sincere in feeling that a study was necessary, but I have no plan in mind for future action and certainly no commitment to any such plan. And I would particularly urge that the question of whether a study should be made should be considered entirely separate from any preconceived idea of what might come out of the study.

I would like to feel that the committee, if it had results, would, of course, assume its natural independence of choice. But I would also like the committee to be doubly assured that I had in mind no plan whatsoever, nor really any basic idea as to what should be done. If I had such an idea-and if I thought I had evidence on which to base such an idea-I would not feel it so necessary to have a study.

Even considering the ground that the Brookings report did cover, in my mind it is too theoretical in its approach. Upon reading the report, the fear arises that the institute may have received only such information as the agencies involved cared to divulge.

Accordingly, the report is most general in its considerations and covers only such problems as are patent in the organizational arrangement as it now stands. In my opinion, therefore, the Brookings report will serve as an excellent jumping-off place for a thoroughgoing investigation, conducted by a bipartisan commission, armed with the time and authority necessary to make a complete and worth while study-a commission appointed by and responsible to the Congress, and incidentally, to this committee.

For considering the problem in another light, I am convinced that the Congress should have the benefit of its own nonpartisan investigation. That is good congressional policy. This is so, irrespective of the limitations of the Brookings study. If any good is to come of an investigation of our overseas activities or of any activity of the Government, the investigation must have the complete confidence of the Congress, the Executive, and the public. Any study which neglects this principle will fail in efficacy.

I would like, if I may, to quote the words of Mr. George A. Latimer, who is a former member of the Hoover Commission task force on foreign affairs, as he stated them before the Senate committee considering S. 1166, and I am quoting from Mr. Latimer at this point:

The normal reaction in industry as well as Government, is to look at organization suggestions very impersonally, logically, and soundly, if you are not affected. If you are, then it becomes a personal matter, and there are then a number of excuses why the most clear-cut, reasonable organization is impractical. I think that within the executive branch it would be difficult for anybody or any unit to reach anything but compromise on organization. It seems to me that the easiest solution to arrive at is the status quo, because nobody is forced to change and get out of what is, in a sense, their present rut.

For those general reasons, I think it is very difficult for a study of this broad nature to be made within the executive department alone.

That is the end of the quotation from Mr. Latimer.

I certainly feel that the Congress should not rest on the Brookings report. It is not sufficiently complete. It was made at the behest of the Bureau of the Budget, and was reviewed by the various departments affected; and it has been said that changes were made after criticism. Such a report cannot command the confidence which is so necessary if desired results are to be achieved.

It therefore seems to me that the Congress, and this committee in particular, may subject itself to just criticism if it does not provide for an adequate investigation. Failure or refusal to so provide might lay us open, I think quite justly, to the charge that we feared the results of thorough study. An investigation certainly can do no harm. The cost, considering the need and the results obtainable, is negligible.

The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, of which I am proud to be a member, is charged with unique responsibilities for efficiency and economy in Government operations. To refuse investigation, under our aegis, of this vast problem of overseas activities of the Government is to refuse to accept our responsibility courageously.

I hope that the bill will be reported out favorably.
That concludes my statement.