There is a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

IN this section I propose to consider the reverse of the question treated in the former. In the former I proved that there is no peculiar presumption against religious miracles; I now inquire whether there be any in their favour.` The question is important, and intimately connected with the subject.

The boldest infidel will not deny, that the immortality of the soul, a future and eternal state, and the connexion of our happiness or misery in that state, with our present good or bad1 conduct, not to mention the doctrines concerning the divine unity and perfections, are tenets which carry no absurdity in them. They may be true for aught he knows. He disbelieves them, not because they are incredible in themselves, but be-> cause he hath not evidence of their truth. He pretends not to disprove them, nor does he think the task incumbent on him. He only pleads, that before he can yield them his assent, they must be proved.

Now, as whatever is possible, may be supposed, let us suppose that the dogmas above-mentioned are all infallible truths; and let the unbeliever say, whether he can conceive an object worthier of the Divine interposal, than to reveal these truths to mankind? and to enforce them in such a manner, as may give them a suitable influence on the heart and life. Of all the inhabitants of the earth, man is incomparably the noblest. Whatever therefore regards the interest of the human species, is a grander concern, than what regards either the inanimate or the brute creation. If man was made, as is doubtless not impossible, for an after state of immortality; whatever relates to that immortal state, or may conduce to prepare him for the fruition of it, must be immensely superiour to that which concerns merely the transient enjoyments of the present life. How sublime then is the object which religion, and religion only, exhibits as the ground of supernatural interpositions! This object is no other than the interest of man, a reasonable and moral agent, the only being in this lower world which bears in his soul the image of his Maker; not the interest of an individual, but of the kind; not for a limited duration, but for eternity: an object at least in one respect adequate to the majesty of God.

Does this appear to the essayist too much like arguing a priori, of which I know he hath a detestation? It is just such an argument, as, presupposing the most rational principles of Deism, results from those maxims concerning intelligent causes, and their operations, which are founded in general experience, and which uniformly lead us to expect, that the end will be proportionate to the means. The Pagans of Rome had notions of their divinities infinitely inferiour to the opinions concerning God, which in Christian countries are maintained even by those, who, for distinction's sake, are called DEISTS. Yet such of the former as had any justness of taste, were offended with those poets, who exhibited the celestials on slight occasions, and for trivial purposes, interfering in the affairs of men. Why? Because such an exhibition shocked all the principles of probability. It had not that verisimilitude which is absolutely necessary to render fiction agreeable. Accordingly it is a precept, with relation to the machinery of the drama, given by one who was both a critick and a poet, That a god must never be introduced, unless to accomplish some important design which could not be otherwise effectuated*. The foundation of this rule, which is that of my argument, is therefore one of those indisputable principles, which are found every where, among the earliest results of experience.

Thus it appears, that from the dignity of the end, there ariseth a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles, as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

SECTION VI.

Inquiry into the meaning and propriety of one of Mr. Hume's favourite maxims.

THERE is a method truly curious, suggested by the author,

for extricating the mind, should the evidence from testimony be so great, that its falsehood might, as he terms it, be accounted miraculous. In this puzzling case, when a man is so beset with miracles, that he is under a necessity of admitting one, he must always take care it be the smallest; for it is an axiom in this writer's DIALECTICK, That the probability of the fact is in the inverse ratio of the quantity of miracle there is in "I weigh," says he, "the one miracle against the other,

it.

* Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit.

HORAT.

"and according to the superiority which I discover, I pro66 nounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle*?" Now, of this method, which will no doubt be thought by many to be very ingenious, and which appears to the essayist both very momentous and very perspicuous, I own, I am not able to discover either the reasonableness or the use.

First, I cannot see the reasonableness. A miracle,' to adopt his own definition, implies the transgression,' or rather the suspension, of some law of nature; and that either by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of 'some invisible agent t.' Now, as I should think, from the principles laid down in the preceding section, that it would be for no trifling purpose, that the laws of nature would be suspended, and either the Deity or an invisible agent would interpose; it is on the same principles, natural to imagine, that the means, or miracle performed, should bear a proportion in respect of dignity and greatness, to the end proposed. Were I therefore under such a necessity as is supposed by Mr. Hume, of admitting the truth of a miracle, I acknowledge, that of two contradictory miracles, where all other circumstances are equal, I should think it reasonable to believe the greater. I shall borrow an illustration from the author himself." A mira"cle," he says, may either be discoverable by men or not. "This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a "house or ship into the air is a visible miracle; the raising of 66 a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requi"site for that purpose is as real a miracle, though not so sen"sible with regard to ust." Surely if any miracle may be called little, the last mentioned is entitled to that denomination, not only because it is an undiscoverable and insensible miracle, but because the quantum of miraculous force requisite, is, by the hypothesis, ever so little, or the least conceivable. Yet if it were certain, that God, angel, or spirit, were, for one of those purposes, to interpose in suspending the laws of nature; I believe most men would join with me in thinking, that it would be rather for the raising of a house or ship than for the raising of a feather.

But though the maxim laid down by the author were just, I cannot discover in what instance, or by what application, it can be rendered of any utility. Why? Because we have no rule, whereby we can judge of the greatness of miracles. I allow, that in such a singular instance, as that above quoted from the essay, we may judge safely enough. But that can be of no practical use. In almost every case that will occur, I may

* p. 182.

Ib. in the note.

ib. in the note.

warrantably aver, that it will be impossible for the acutest intellect to decide, which of the two is the greater miracle. As to the author, I cannot find that he has favoured us with any light in so important and so critical a question. Have we not then some reason to dread, that the task will not be less diffi cult to furnish us with a measure, by which we can determine the magnitude of miracles; than to provide us with a balance, by which we can ascertain the comparative weight of testimo nies and experiences?

If leaving the speculations of the essayist, we shall, in order to be assisted on this subject, recur to his example and decisions: let us consider the miracle which was recited in the third section, and which he declares, would, on the evidence of such testimony as he supposes, not only be probable, but certain. For my part, it is not in my power to conceive a greater miracle than that is. The whole universe is affected by it; the earth, the sun, the moon, the stars. The most invariable laws of nature with which we are acquainted, even those which regulate the motions of the heavenly bodies, and dispense darkness and light to worlds, are violated. I appeal to the author himself, whether it could be called a greater, or even so great a miracle, that all the writers at that time, or even all mankind, had been seized with a new species of epidemical delirium, which had given rise to this strange illusion. But in this the author is remarkably unfortunate, that the principles by which he in fact regulates his judgment and belief, are often the reverse of those which he endeavours to establish in his theory.

I am

Shall I hazard a conjecture? It is, that the word miracle, as thus used by the author, is used in a vague and improper sense, as a synonymous term for improbable; and that believ ing the less, and rejecting the greater miracle, denote simply believing what is least, and rejecting what is most improbable; or still more explicitly believing what we think most worthy of belief, and rejecting what we think least worthy. aware, on a second perusal of the author's words, that my talent in guessing may be justly questioned. He hath in effect told us himself what he means. When any one," says he, "tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, "I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more "probable, that this person should either deceive or be de"ceived, or that the fact he relates, should really have hap"pened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and "according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce "my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the "falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than

"the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he "pretend to command my belief or opinion*." At first indeed one is ready to exclaim, What a strange revolution is here! The belief of miracles then, even by Mr. Hume's account, is absolutely inevitable. Miracles themselves too, so far from being impossible, or even extraordinary, are the commonest things in nature; so common, that when any miraculous fact is attested to us, we are equally under a necessity of believing a miracle, whether we believe the fact, or deny it. The whole difference between the essayist and us, is at length reduced to this single point, Whether greater or smaller miracles are entitled to the preference. This mystery however vanishes on a nearer inspection. The style, we find, is figurative, and the author is all the while amusing both his readers and himself with an unusual application of a familiar term. What is called the weighing of probabilities in one sentence, is the weighing of miracles in the next. asked, For what reason did not Mr. Hume express his sentiment in ordinary and proper words? I could only answer, I know no reason but one, and that is, To give the appearance of novelty and depth to one of those very harmless propositions, which by philosophers are called identical, and which, to say the truth, need some disguise, to make them pass upon the world with tolerable decency.

If it were

What then shall be said of the conclusion which he gives as the sum and quintessence of the first part of the essay? The best thing for aught I know, that can be said, is, that it contains a most certain truth, though at the same time the least significant, that ever perhaps was ushered into the world with so much solemnity. In order, therefore, to make plainer English of his plain consequence, let us only change the word miraculous, as applied to the falsehood of human testimony, into improbable, which in this passage is entirely equivalent, and observe the effect produced by this elucidation.

"The

plain consequence is, and it is a GENERAL MAXIM, worthy of our attention, That NO TESTIMONY IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A MIRACLE; UNLESS THE TESTIMONY BE OF SUCH A KIND, THAT ITS FALSEHOOD WOULD BE MORE IMPRO"BABLE, THAN THE FACT WHICH IT ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH." If the reader thinks himself instructed by this discovery, I should be loth to envy him the pleasure he may derive from it.