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terable. Now since, as was remarked above, the far greater part of this experience, which compriseth every age and every country, must be derived to us from testimony; that the experience may be firm, uniform, unalterable, there must be no contrary testimony whatever. Yet by the author's own hypothesis, the miracles he would thus confute, are supported by testimony. At the same time to give strength to his argument, he is under a necessity of supposing, that there is no exception from the testimonies against them. Thus he falls into that paralogism, which is called begging the question. What he gives with one hand, he takes with the other. He admits, in opening his design, what in his argument he implicitly denies.

But that this, if possible, may be still more manifest, let us attend a little to some expressions, which one would imagine he had inadvertently dropt. "So long," says he, "as the "world endures, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all profane history*." Why does he presume so? A man so much attached to experience, can hardly be suspected to have any other reason than, because such accounts have hitherto been found in all the histories, profane as well as sacred, of times past. But we need not recur to an inference to obtain this acknowledgment. It is often to be met with in the essay. In one place we learn, that the witnesses for miracles are an infinite number+; in another, that all religious records of whatever kind abound with themt. I leave it therefore to the author to explain, with what consistency he can assert, that the laws of nature are established by an uniform experience, (which experience is chiefly the result of testimony) and at the same time allow, that almost all human histories are full of the relations of miracles and prodigies, which are violations of those laws. Here is, by his own confession, testimony against testimony, and very ample on both sides. How then can one side claim a firm, uniform, and unalterable support from testimony?

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It will be in vain to object, that the testimony in support of the laws of nature, greatly exceeds the testimony for the violations of these laws; and that, if we are to be determined by the greater number of observations, we shall reject all miracles whatever. I ask, Why are the testimonies much more numerous in the one case than in the other? The answer is obvious: Natural occurrences are much more frequent than such as are preternatural. But are all the accounts we have of the pestilence to be rejected as incredible, because, in this *p. 174. † p. 190. #p. 191. Ggg

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country, we hear not so often of that disease, as of the fever? Or, because the number of natural births is infinitely greater than that of monsters, shall the evidence of the former be regarded as a confutation of all that can be advanced in proof of the latter? Such an objector needs to be reminded of what was proved in the foregoing section; that the opposite testimonies relate to different facts, and are therefore not contradictory; that the conclusion founded on them, possesseth not the evidence of the facts on which it is founded, but only such a presumptive evidence, as may be surmounted by the slightest positive proof. A general conclusion from experience is in comparison but presumptive and indirect; sufficient testimony for a particular fact is direct and positive evidence.

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I shall remark one other fallacy in this author's reasoning, before I conclude this section. "The Indian prince," says he, "who refused to believe the first relations concerning the "effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, which arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquaint"ed, and bore so little analogy to those events, of which he "had had constant and uniform experience. Though they "were not contrary to his experience, they were not conform"able to it*." Here a distinction is artfully suggested, between what is contrary to experience, and what is not conformable to it. The one he allows may be proved by testimony, but not the other. A distinction, for which the author seems to have so great use, it will not be improper to examine.

If my reader happen to be but little acquainted with Mr. Hume's writings, or even with the piece here examined, I must intreat him, ere he proceed any farther, to give the essay an attentive perusal; and to take notice paticularly, whether in one single passage, he can find any other sense given to the terms contrary to experience, but that which has not been experienced. Without this aid, I should not be surprised, that I found it difficult to convince the judicious, that a man of so much acuteness, one so much a philosopher as this author, should, with such formality, make a distinction, which not only the essay, but the whole tenour of his philosophical writings, shows evidently to have no meaning. Is that which is con trary to experience a synonymous phrase for that which im plies a contradiction? If this were the case, there would be no need to recur to experience for a refutation; it would refute itself. But it is equitable that the author himself be heard, who ought to be the best interpreter of his own words.

.* p. 179.

"When the fact attested," says he, "is such a one, as has "seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two "opposite experiences." In this passage, not the being never experienced, but even the being seldom experienced constitutes an opposite experience. I can conceive no way but one, that the author can evade the force of this quotation; and that is, by obtruding on us, some new distinction between an opposite and a contrary experience. In order to preclude such an attempt, I shall once more recur to his own authority. "It is "no miracle that a man in seeming good health, should die of "a sudden." Why? Because such a kind of death, though "more unusual than any other, hath yet been frequently ob "served to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life." Why? Not because of any inconsistency in the thing. That a body should be this hour inanimate, and the next animated, is no more inconsistent, than the reverse that it should be this hour animated, and the next inanimate ; though the one be common, and not the other. But the author himself answers the question: "Because that has never been "observed in any age or countryf.". All the contrariety then that there is in miracles to experience, doth, by his own concession, consist solely in this, that they have never been observed; that is, they are not conformable to experience. his experience personal or derived, he must certainly mean; to what he has had access to learn of different ages and coun tries. To speak beyond the knowledge he hath attained, would be ridiculous. It would be first supposing a miracle, and then inferring a contrary experience, instead of concluding from experience, that the fact is miraculous.

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Now, I insist, that as far as regards the author's argument, a fact perfectly unusual, or not conformable to our experience, such a fact as, for aught we have had access to learn, was ne ver observed in any age or country, is as incapable of proof from testimony, as miracles are; that, if this writer would argue consistently, he could never, on his own principles, reject the one and admit the other. Both ought to be rejected or neither. I would not, by this be thought to signify, that there is no difference between a miracle and an extraordinary event. I know that the former implies the interposal of an invisible agent, which is not implied in the latter. All that I intend to assert is, that the author's argument equally affects them both. Why doth such interposal appear to him incredible ? Not from any incongruity he discerns in the thing itself. He doth not pretend it. But it is not conformable to his experience.

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"A miracle," says he, "is a transgression of the law of na ❝ture*." But how are the laws of nature known to us? By experience. What is the criterion, whereby we must judge, whether the laws of nature are transgressed? Solely the conformity or disconformity of events to our experience. This writer surely will not pretend, that we can have any knowledge a priori, either of the law, or of the violation.

Let us then examine by his own principles, whether the King of Siam, of whom the story he alludes to, is related by Locket, could have sufficient evidence from testimony, of a fact so contrary to his experience as the freezing of water. He could just say as much of this event, as the author can say of a dead man's being restored to life. • Such a thing was ⚫ never observed, as far as I could learn, in any age or country.' If the things themselves too are impartially considered and independently of the notions acquired by us in these northern climates, we should account the first at least as extraordinary as the second. That so pliant a body as water should become hard like pavement, so as to bear up an elephant on its surface, is as unlikely in itself, as that a body inanimate to-day should be animated to-morrow. Nay, to the Indian monarch, I must think, that the first would appear more a miracle, more contrary to experience than the second. If he had been ac quainted with ice or frozen water, and afterwards seen it be come fluid; but had never seen nor learned, that after it was melted, it became hard again, the relation must have appeared marvellous, as the process from fluidity to hardness never had been experienced, though the reverse often had. But I believe nobody will question, that on this supposition it would not have appeared quite so strange, as it did. Yet this supposition makes the instance more parallel to the restoring of the dead to life. The process from animate to inanimate we are all acquainted with; and what is such a restoration, but the reversing of this process? So little reason had the author to insinuate, that the one was only not conformable, the other contrary to experience. If there be a difference in this respect, the first to one alike unacquainted with both, must appear the more contrary of the two.

Does it alter the matter, that he calls the former " a fact "which arose from a state of nature, with which the Indian "was unacquainted?" Was not such a state quite uncon formable, or (which in the author's language I have shown to be the same) contrary to his experience? Is then a state of

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nature which is contrary to experience, more credible than a single fact contrary to experience? I want the solution of one difficulty: The author, in order to satisfy me, presents me with a thousand others. Is this suitable to the method he proposes in another place, of admitting always the less miracle and rejecting the greater? Is it not, on the contrary, admitting without any difficulty the greater miracle, and thereby removing the difficulty, which he otherwise would have had in admitting the less? Does he forget, that to exhibit a state of nature entirely different from what we experience at present, is one of those enormous prodigies, which, in his account, render the Pentateuch unworthy of creditt? "No Indian," says he in the note, "it is evident, could have experience that "water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature “in a situation quite unknown to him, and it is impossible for "him to tell a priori, what will result from it." This is precisely, as if, in reply to the author's objection from experience against the raising of a dead man (suppose Lazarus) to life, I should retort: Neither you, Sir, nor any who live in this century can have experience, that a dead man could not be restored to life at the command of one divinely commissioned to give a revelation to men. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to you, and it is impossible for you "to tell a priori what will result from it. This therefore is not

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contrary to the course of nature, in cases where all the cir• cumstances are the same. As you never saw one vested ⚫ with such a commission, you are as unexperienced, as ignorant of this point, as the inhabitants of Sumatra are of the frosts in Muscovy; you cannot therefore reasonably, any "more than they, be positive as to the consequences.' Should he rejoin, as doubtless he would, This is not taking away the ⚫ difficulty; but, like the elephant and the tortoise, in the ac • count given by some barbarians of the manner in which the earth is supported, it only shifts the difficulty a step further back. My objection still recurs. That any man should be endowed with such power is contrary to experience, and therefore incredible :' Should he, I say, rejoin in this man. ner, I could only add, 'Pray, Sir, revise your own words lately quoted, and consider impartially whether they be not as glaringly exposed to the like reply. For my part, I can only perceive one difference that is material between the two cases. You frankly confess, that with regard to the freezing of water, besides the absolute want of experience, there would be from analogy a presumption against it, which ought to weigh with a

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