Page images
PDF
EPUB

DISSERTATION

ON

MIRACLES.

PART I.

Miracles are capable of proof from testimony, and religious miracles are not less capable of this evidence than others.

SECTION I

Mr. Hume's favourite argument is founded on a false hypothesis, It is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if

admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a divine mission. His design is solely to prove, that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any religious system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believed on the testimony of others. "A miracle," says he, "supported by any human testimony, is more properly a sub"ject of derision than of argument."* Again, in the conclu sion of his essay," Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony, for any kind of miracle, can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." Here he concludes against all miracles. "Any kind of miracle" are his express

66

words. He seems however immediately sensible, that in asserting this, he hath gone too far; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in #he-beginning. "We may establish it as a maxim that no hu66 man testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, "and make it a just foundation for any system of religion.' In the note on this passage, he has these words. "I beg the † p. 202.

* Page 194.

[ocr errors]

"limitation here made, may be remarked, when I say, that a "miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a 66 system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may "possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of na"ture, of such a kind, as to admit of proof from human testi"mony.

[ocr errors]

So much for that cardinal point, which the essayist labours so strenuously to evince; and which, if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us, on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs; but will directly lead to this general conclusion: That it is impossible for God Almighty to give a revelation, attended with such evidence that it can be reasonably believed in after-ages, or even in the same age, by any person who hath not been an eye-witness of the miracles, by which it is supported.'

Now, by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out? Several topicks have been employed for the purpose by this subtle disputant. Among these there is one principal argument which he is at great pains to set off to the best advantage. Here indeed he claims a particular concern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, it is not my business to controvert; I confine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay before the reader, the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found; taking the freedom for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for illustration. To do otherwise would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the essay.

Experience,' says he, is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact*. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability; an uniform experience amounts to a prooff. Probability always supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence pro'portioned to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experiments, and deduct the lesser number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superiour evidence. Our belief or assurance of any fact from the re⚫port of eye-witnesses, is derived from no other principle than <experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our obp. 176.

* P. 174. † p. 175, 176.

+ ibid.

servation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superiour can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance, against the fact which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction, there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority*. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, instead of being "only marvellous, is really miraculous; if besides the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the 'strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imaginedt. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the ' lowest degree.' This, in my apprehension, is the sum of the argument on which my ingenious opponent rests the strength of his cause.

In answer to this I propose first to prove, that the whole is built upon a false hypothesis. That the evidence of testimony is derived solely from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not so incontestable a truth as he supposes it; that, on the contrary, testimony hath a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience, will, I imagine, easily be evinced. For this purpose let it be remarked, that the earliest assent, which is given to testimony by children, and which is previous to all experience, is in fact the most unlimited, that by a gradual experience of mankind, it is gradually contracted, and reduced to narrower bounds. To say, therefore, that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experience, is more philosophical, because more consonant to truth, than to say that our faith in testimony has this foundation. Accordingly youth, which is unexperienced, is credulous; age, on the contrary, is distrustful. Exactly the reverse would be the case were this author's doctrine just.

Perhaps it will be said, If experience is allowed to be the only measure of a logical or reasonable faith in testimony, the

* P. 179. † p. 180.

question, Whether the influence of testimony on belief, be original or derived? if it is not merely verbal, is at least of no importance in the present controversy. But I maintain it is of the greatest importance. The difference between us is by no means so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may appear. According to his philosophy, the presumption is against the testimony or (which amounts to the same thing) there is not the smallest presumption in its favour, till properly supported by experience. According to the explication given, there is the strongest presumption in favour of the testimony, till properly refuted by experience.

If it be objected by the author, that such a faith in testimony as is prior to experience, must be unreasonable and unphilosophical, because unaccountable; I should reply, that there are, and must be in human nature, some original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and of which therefore it is vain to attempt a rational account. I should desire the objector to give a reasonable account of his faith in this principle, that similar causes always produce similar effects; or in this, that the course of nature will be the same to-morrow, that it was yesterday, and is to-day: principles, which he himself acknowledges, are neither intuitively evident, nor deduced from premises; and which nevertheless we are under a necessity of presupposing, in all our reasonings from experience. I should desire him to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest informations of his memory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt, or to ex plain. Indeed memory bears nearly the same relation to experience, that testimony does. Certain it is that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected by ex perience. Yet should any person hence infer, that memory derives all its evidence from experience, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. For, on the contrary, experience derives its origin solely from memory, and is nothing else but the general maxims or conclusions, we have formed from the comparison of particular facts remembered. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience. When therefore we say that me mory, which gives birth to experience, may nevertheless in some instances be corrected by experience, no more is implied, but that the inferences formed from the most lively and perspicuous reports of memory, sometimes serve to rectify the mistakes which arise from such reports of this faculty, as

* Sceptical doubts. Part 2.

« PreviousContinue »