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use his own words for an explanation) "them who at Corinth are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, to pronounce "and execute." And in his second epistle to the same church, (chap. ii. v. 6.) he says, in reference to the same delinquent, Sufficient to such a man is the censure which was inflicted by many;" in Two, by the community. And (v. 10.) "To whom ye forgave any thing," addressing himself always to the congregation, "I forgive also." We admit, with the learned Dodwell*, that in the censure inflicted on the incestuous person, the christians at Corinth were but the executors of the doom awarded by the apostle. Nor does any one question the apostolical authority in such matters over both the flock and the pastors. But from the words last quoted, it is evident that he acknowledges, at the same time, the ordinary power in regard to discipline lodged in the congregation; and from the confidence he had in the discretion and integrity of the Corinthians, he promises his concurrence in what they shall judge proper to do. "To whom ye forgive "any thing, I forgive also." Now, though in aftertimes the charge of this matter also came to be devolved, first on the bishop and presbyters, and afterwards solely on the bishop, yet that the people, as well as the presbyters, as far down, at least, as to the middle of the third century, retained some share in the decision of questions wherein morals were immediately concerned, is manifest from Cyprian's letters still extant. In his time, when congregations were become very numerous, the inquiry and deliberation were holden (perhaps then more commodiously) in the ecclesiastical college, called the presbytery, consisting of the bishop, the presbyters, and the deacons. When this was over, the result of their inquiry and consultations was reported to the whole congregation belonging to that church, who were called together on purpose, in order to obtain their approbation of what had been done, and their consent to the resolution that had been taken: for without their consent, no judgment could regularly be put in execution.

But this is quite a different subject of inquiry from questions merely in regard to right or property. The one is more analogous to a criminal, the other to a civil process. Two persons may differ in regard to the title to a particular subject, each claiming it as his, though neither accuse the other of injurious, or unchristian treatment; it is not because these pleas always spring from some malignity of disposition, that this amicable method of terminating them is recommended; but it is because there is an imminent hazard, that if long conti

De Jure Laicorum sacerdotali, c. iii. § 10.

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nued, and brought to publick view, they breed some malignity in the minds of the parties towards each other, and afford a handle to idolaters to blaspheme the good ways of the Lord. Now it is manifest, in the first place, that questions of civil right are not so much within the sphere of the multitude, as those which concern practical religion and morals; and secondly, that the apostle does not recommend it to the people to take such secular matters under their own cognizance collectively, but only to appoint proper persons to judge in them. "If then," says he, ye have judgment of things pertaining "to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the "church." In the epithet least esteemed, I imagine he couches an ironical reproof to the Corinthians, for their appearing to be at a loss in finding persons proper to discuss matters in themselves of very little moment compared with those with which, as christians, they were conversant. But to guard against being mistaken by too literal an interpretation of his words, he immediately subjoins, "I speak this to shame you. "Is it so, that there is not a wise man amongst you? No, not 66 one, that shall be able to judge between his brethren?" So that it appears extremely probable, that unless what was first only a civil controversy, afterwards became a scandal, by the improper behaviour of one or both of the litigants, the people did not intermeddle in the cause. They left it entirely to the arbiters, or wise men, whom they had nominated for the purpose and these, as was observed before, came at last univer, sally to be the pastors.

Time, the greatest of all innovators, though, when it operates by slow degrees, the least observable; (time, I say) which alters every thing, did, from the universality of the practice of committing this trust to the pastors, and from its continuance for a course of successions in their hands, at length, in effect, establish it as a right. As charity cooled, ambition, a very subtle passion, insensibly insinuated itself. This it would do at first more modestly under the guise of publick virtue, as a desire of being more extensively useful to the people, afterwards more boldly, as a commendable zeal for every thing that could be deemed a prerogative of the sacred order. When persecutions had ceased, the churches, as they grew in the number and the wealth of their members, produced, in proportion, more fruits of contention, and fewer of brotherly love. Every thing, then, that might give any sort of ascendancy over the minds of others, would be greedily grasped at: and this privilege of judging, in civil matters, would then be very naturally claimed by the bishops, as a part of their office. It must, however, be acknowledged,

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that though, in particular instances, this trust might be abused, it was, upon the whole, expedient for the christian brotherhood, and could scarcely be considered as dangerous sq long as it remained on the original footing, and was unsupported by the secular arm.

But when christianity came to receive the countenance and sanction of the ruling powers, the Roman emperours imagined they could not more effectually show their zeal for the cause of Christ, than by confirming every prerogative which had been considered as belonging to his ministers. It is, besides not unlikely, that the happy influence which the pastoral decisions, aided by the authority of religion, generally had in composing differences among the people, would prove an additional motive for their interposition in support of a practice seemingly so conducive to publick utility. But whatever be in this, so it was, that the bishop's power of judging, in secular matters, was not only ratified by law, but through an ill-judged indulgence, as soon appeared by the event, was further extended, backed by the secular arm, and rendered compulsory. Constantine, the first christian emperour, made a law, that the sentence of the bishop should, in every case, be final, and that the magistrate should be obliged to execute it; that if in any cause depending before the secular judge, in any stage of the process, either party, though in direct opposition to the other. party, should appeal to the bishop; to his tribunal, from which there could be no appeal, the cause should instantly be remitted.

Then, indeed, began the episcopal judgment to be properly forensick, having compulsive execution by the ministry of the magistrate. Then, indeed, began the prelates, for the greater state and dignity, in their judicial proceedings, to adopt the model and appendages of civil judicatories, and to have their chancellors, commissaries, officials, advocates, proctors, registers, apparitors, &c. &c. Then originated these phrases unheard before, episcopal jurisdiction, episcopal audience, and other such like. When one considers the origin of ecclesiastical judicature, as deduced above, and the reasons for which some expedient of this sort was first recommended by Paul to the Corinthians, it is impossible to conceive any thing more unsuitable to his design, than the footing on which it was now established. One principal ground for which the apostle advis ed the measure, was to avoid the scandal which one christian suing another before a tribunal of infidels, must necessarily bring upon their religion." Brother," says he, "goeth to "law with brother, and that before the unbelievers." Now this evil was radically cured when christianity became the es

tablished religion, and the secular judges themselves were taken from the christian brotherhood. I acknowledge, however, that this is not the only ground of the apostle's recommendation: his other reason is, that to prevent law-suits entirely, by a compromise of any differences that might arise, or by a friendly reference to proper umpires, would be greatly conducive to the cause of charity, which is the common cause, by preserving peace among themselves: but no sooner is the bishop, or indeed any man, vested with legal and coercive authority, insomuch that people can be compelled to appear before him, and to submit to his sentence, than he ceases to be an umpire, his court is erected into a secular tribunal, and the procedure before him is as really a law-suit as that which is carried on before any other judge. All the weight, therefore, of the apostle's second reason from fraternal love, operates as strongly against suing an adversary in this court, as it does against suing him in any other.

It was not at first understood, or duly attended to, how great the change was, which this new arrangement of Constantine made in the constitution of the empire. It was, in effect, throwing the whole judiciary power of the state into the hands of the clergy. All the ordinary judicatories were now reduced to act solely in subordination to the spiritual courts, which could overrule the proceedings of the secular, whilst their own were not liable to be overruled by any. The civil magistrate who might be compelled to execute their sentences, but was not entitled to revise or alter them, was, in fact, no better than the bishop's sergeant. His office, in this instance, was by no means magisterial, it was merely ministerial and subservient.

It was in vain, at the period at which we are now arrived, to imagine, that in the same way as formerly, a sense of religion should operate on the minds of the people. This is a sentiment of too delicate a nature to be rendered compatible with the measures now adopted. From the moment the pastor was armed with the terrours of the magistrate, the power of religion was superseded, and the gentle voice of love was drowned in the clamour of commitments, forfeitures, and distress of goods. It deserves also to be remarked, that whilst matters remained on the primitive footing, there was the strongest tie on the pastors to a strict observance of equity, as it was thence only that their judgments could derive authority, or command respect. The power itself was of such a nature, as could not long subsist after being perverted: the case was quite different now. It appeared of little consequence to draw respect to a verdict, to which they could enforce obedience : and this could equally be effected, whatever were the sentence,

just or unjust, reasonable or absurd. Of the like pernicious tendency, as they flowed from the same cause, were the mea sures that were afterwards adopted to enforce ecclesiastical censures and excommunications, by the sanction of civil laws, inflicting pains and penalties. When so much depended on the dignitaries of the church, they could not fail to meet with all the adulation, and other seductive arts, by which the favour of the great and powerful is, through the influence of avarice, and other irregular desires, commonly courted by inferiours and dependents. Whether this would contribute to improve these shepherds of the flock in humility and meekness, may be submitted to the determination of every impartial and judicious hearer. One favourable circumstance, however, which perhaps inclined the people more easily to acquiesce in it, was, that it was the only considerable check which they had, for ages, on the too absolute power of the emperour. It is thus that Providence, in the worst of circumstances, is ever at work, bringing good out of evil, making usurpations on different sides balance and control one another, and rendering the greatest calamities reciprocal correctives.

But to proceed in our narration; the emperour Valens still enlarged the jurisdiction of the bishops, assigning to them the charge of fixing the prices of all vendible commodities, which was, it must be owned, a most extraordinary assignment. It is but doing justice to some worthy bishops to declare, that far from being gratified by these changes, they loudly complained of them. Possidonius relates concerning Augustine in particular, that though he gave attendance to this forensick business all the morning, sometimes till dinner-time, and sometimes till night, he was wont to say, that it was a great grievance to him, as it diverted his attention from what was much more properly his charge; that it was, in fact, to leave things useful, and to attend to things tumultuous and perplexed; that saint Paul had not assumed this office to himself, well knowing how unsuitable it was to that of a preacher of the Gospel, but was desirous that it should be given to others. Such were the sentiments of that respectable father of the church. But every bishop was not of the same mind with Augustine.

About seventy years afterwards, when this authority came to be very much abused, the law of Constantine was repealed by Arcadius and Honorius, who limited the bishops, in civil matters to those only which were referred to their judgment by the consent of both the litigants. But in some cities the bishops were already become too powerful, and too rich, to be so easily dispossessed. In Rome particularly, this new regulation had little or no effect, till Valentianus, about the middle

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