Your letter of 21 September, in which you agreed that NSA sponsorship of unclassified research relating to cryptography would serve the public interest, was most welcome. This follow-up note is to ask how the homework you mentioned is proceeding. My own interest in this matter stems from a conviction that each agency with scientific and technological concerns has a need and responsibility for maintaining contact with pertinent research at every research level including basic research. Your own area, being of the highest scientific and technical nature, naturally leans heavily on such research. I appreciate the fact that your agency has assembled a formidable array of talent for your intramural effort, but there may be benefits to be derived from interaction with unclassified peripheral basic research, as we discussed at our meeting. From the management and administrative point of view, my offer to provide assistance to effect such a transition is hereby renewed, not only in the spirit of cooperation but also because it is perceived to be in the public interest with respect to our respective missions. Regarding your study on Government control of privately owned data, as explained to me by you during our telephone conversation on January 18, 1980, I am reporting the following relevant facts in my capacity as the Secretary of the Board of Governors of the IEEE Information Theory Group: Within the last three years, the IEEE Information Theory Group found itself involved in a controversy concerning its activities in the field of Cryptography. Some members of the Group whose research interests include Cryptography, discovered that by publishing theoretical results on the subject they could be challenged with violation of certain ITAR regulations. The Board of Governors of the IEEE Information Theory Group, appointed an adhoc committee to study the matter. The committee prepared a report which was appended to the minutes of the December 6, 1977 meeting of the Board. I am enclosing a copy of this report. It is clear from the enclosed report (I believe), that the IEEE Information Theory Group is seriously concerned about the possibility of strict Government control on the exchange of scientific results. I believe that I am reflecting the general consesus of the Group on the matter by expressing the opinion that extensive Government control can only deter scientific progress. Sincerely, Marahos P. Papantoni-Kazakos IEEE Information Theory Group PPK/ses Enclosures: IT-BOG report on the Cryptography controversy. Report on the Cryptography controversy Appended to the minutes of the December 6, 1977 meeting, the Board of Governors, the IEEE Information Theory Group. Adhoc Committee Report 1. Actions. Members of the committee conferred with Science reporter D. Shapley, a University of California professor of law, a legal counsel for NSF, NSF contract administrators scientists who have first-hand knowledge of NSA, an engineer who has had previous contact with J. A. Meyer, W. K. Gannet. The ITAR regulations were obtained and studied in detail. 2. Findings. It is our belief that the letter from Meyer to Gannet was the act of an individual and does not represent NSA policy. The legal issues raised by the ITAR Regulations are thorny and deep. It is impossible for a layman to say whether or not IEEE members routinely violate the Regulations in reporting the results of their research. The question hinges upon the interpretations of very broadly worded definitions in the Regulations. The lawyers we consulted (gratis, and not expert in this area) would not give an opinion on this matter, and they suspect that many parts of the Regula tions would be ruled out by the Courts. 3. Recommendations. i) the Group should request IEEE to get legal opinion regarding ITAR and its possible violation by IEEE members in the course of IEEE sponsored activities. ii) If IEEE fails to get such opinion or if the opinion leaves the issues unresolved, the Group should seek clarification through appropriate Government sources such as the President's Scientific Advisor, the Committee on Sciences and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, or suitable members of Congress. 4. Comment. A great many of the IEEE members we spoke to regard the whole issue as "a tempest in a tea pot" and advise that we take no action and continue all activities as before. When (and if) some Agency challenges an IEEE member with violation of ITAR, that is time enough to take action. This approach has much appeal, but seems to us to be morally irresponsible considering that we now know of ITAR. This is in response to your letter of April 22 to the Attorney General requesting a briefing on the Progressive Magazine Case and the status of a Criminal Division inquiry. As the Subcommittee is aware, the Progressive case is still pending before the district court in Wisconsin and, as a result, public comment would not be proper at this time. In addition, the case is approaching a crucial stage in settlement negotiations. In light of the status and sensitivity of those discussions, comment publicly on the handling of the case should be deferred. The Department is hopeful that the case will be concluded within several months and, at that time, the Department would be delighted to brief the Subcommittee regarding the civil litigation. May I suggest that in connection with any such session, the Subcommittee alert the Civil Division in writing of the questions that it would like answered. There are areas of inquiry in this case that involve sensitive national security information as well as advice and recommendations made as part of the deliberative process. If the Department knows beforehand the particular inquires the Subcommittee wishes to make, any problems can be resolved in advance. In connection with possible criminal prosecution of those who may have leaked, written about or published information containing restricted data, the Criminal Division is still conducting its analysis of the materials in question. We anticipate, however, that this assessment will be completed in the next several weeks. I regret that we are unable to answer your requests at this time, but we will respond at the appropriate time in the near future. Building 223 April 25, 1979 The Honorable John Glenn Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation Dear Senator Glenn: The Government has released classified information that identifies the nature of the design concept upon which U.S. thermonuclear weapons are based. The release occurred in the course of a legal proceeding to prevent publication of an article by Howard Morland about the H-bomb in the Progressive magazine. We ask for a Congressional investigation into why the Government has released classified information it claims to be trying to protect. The U.S. Government has alleged that publication of Morland's article would breach national security because it assembles certain facts about thermonuclear weapons that the Government regards as Secret/Restricted. During the course of the litigation, and in spite of efforts to alert the Government, several potentially sensitive affidavits were made public. The documents released by the Government collectively identify the design concept on which U.S. thermonuclear weapons are based, and reveal that this design concept is far superior to all other known configurations. It is now clear that the Government's management of this information has resulted in a breach of its own security. The Government's position is that information in the Morland article could significantly decrease the development time and effort necessary for a non-thermonuclear country to achieve thermonuclear status. The utility of this information, according to the Government's arguments, follows from the historical experience of the U.S. thermonuclear weapons program. In view of the large amount of relevant scientific information currently available, we doubt the correctness of the Government's argument. However, we will describe that argument in order to provide a framework for the discussion that follows. The successful detonation of any thermonuclear weapon, the argument goes, requires that a variety of competing processes be delicately balanced under physical conditions that are extreme even compared with those found at the center of the sun. There are many design ideas and concepts that can be aimed at achieving this delicate balance. Determining which of these design concepts work, how easy they are to implement, and how efficient they are relative to each other is a major activity in any weapons program. Since each design idea might itself require an enormous industrial and scientific effort, an identification of which design concept should be most favored could dramatically reduce the amount of redundant effort necessary to achieve a militarily useful weapon. |