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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Acordingly, it is recommended that the prohibition be modified by excepting there from communication of such data relating to design and fabrication of atomic weapons as the President determines to be essential for accomplishment of the objectives of section 144 (b).

Chairman CoLF. It just seems as though every time we in Government come to a knotty problem that we cannot write down in words, we say we will let the President decide. And in this field the Congress is hesitant to open the door wide to the discretion of one person. I am not challenging the integrity or the discretion of the individual. But it does seem we can write into the law words that would describe and make possible the thing that you want to be done. We thought we were doing it when we said you can tell them about the weauons so far as how it looks. Why is it necessary for them to know what it is on the inside?

Mr. QUARLES. It is not necessary for them to know what it is on the inside, and we would not propose in any even to tell them what it it is on the inside. We do find though, sir, that if you say the three words "size, weight, and shape" and those are the only external characteristics of the weapon which we may transmit to our alliesyou have said things that are too restrictive to be practical and that do not meet the stated requiremens of he Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman COLE. By that then, your interpretation then is that you could not tell them there is a hook on the upper side of the case, if that is the fact?

Mr. QUARLES. There might well be.

Chairman COLE. Or that there is a ring 3 inches in diameter on the outside of the case toward the tail. You mean you could not tell them that?

Mr. QUARLES. I mean that there are things like that—and I think that is what you mean, sir--that it is necessary to tell them about the external characteristics of such weapons, that size, weight, and shape do not literally embrace.

Chairman COLE. My understanding of our intent in using this expression is that you can tell them anything you want them to know about how the thing looks on the outside, how many hooks, gadgets, or whatever it may be, but nothing about the inside.

Mr. QUARLES. If I may construe your word "looks" broadly enough and how it behaves on the outside, then you and I are talking about exactly the same thing, because we are only talking about the external characteristics of these things that are militarily important.

Chairman COLE. You suggested the word right there. Why cannot we put in "external characteristics" along with "size, weight, and shape"? Would not that meet your purpose!

Mr. QUARLES. I believe it would, sir, although I would like to study the word a bit more closely.

Representative DURHAM. Do you not think you could give them information under this provision as to how to detonate the weapon! Mr. QUARLES. No, I do not think I could give them information as to how to detonate the weapon under this provision.

Mr. DURHAM. You do not think so!

Mr. QUARLFS. That would be my judgment; yes, sir.

Senator PASTORE. Would it help any-I am merely thinking out.

83-362 0 - 81 - 34



loud and I do not know what repercussions my suggestion might have if starting with line 17:

Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons, except with regard to the external size, weight, and shape or the proper utilization thereof. In other words, is not the thing discussed here, that this language might not be sufficient to give you the effective utilization that you want to make!

Mr. QUARLES. That is exactly right.

Senator PASTORE. Now, if you edit the words in there "for the proper utilization thereof," would not that cure your objection without getting into this matter of fabrication and design!

Mr. QUARLES. If you said "with regard to the external characteristics or qualities" and left out the three specific external characteristics-the size, weight, and shape or use those merely as illustrations, then I think we are getting at our point; yes, sir.

Representative DURHAM. Let me pursue this a little further.

Chairman COLE. We are not going to settle anything right now. Representative DURHAM. See if you can answer my question categorically. I think it is important. Do you not think the word utilization" would cover the question I asked you in regard to definition!

Mr. QUARLES. It might very well do so, but I do not understand that 144 (b) gives us the right to transfer to allies utilization information that is restricted data.

Representative DURHAM. You do not think that does that!

Mr. QUARLES. I would have to read it perhaps more closely, but that is my understanding.

Representative DURHAM. All right. Perhaps I am wrong.
Chairman COLE. 143.

Mr. QUARLES. Passing now to section 143, which is on page 52, "Department of Defense Participation."

The last proviso of this section would require the Secretary of Defense to make a finding that the Department of Defense security procedures and standards are adequate and in reasonable conformity to the standards established by the Atomic Energy Commission. This section adds nothing to the existing statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense for the security of military secrets and in our recommendation should be deleted.

Chairman COLE. You say it adds nothing. I assume by that you mean that that is what the Secretary of Defense is already doing, and if he is already doing it, then pray tell me what harm is there to put in the law that he shall continue to do it!

Mr. QUARLES. The law does not say he shall continue to do it; it says he shall find he is doing it. And it seems to us that this is expressing the thing in a way that is not appropriate, nor does it accomplish a useful purpose in the law.

Chairman COLE. What words do you suggest we use instead of "finding"!

Mr. QUARLES. My suggestion, sir, is that you omit the phrase altogether.

Chairman COLE. You said that before. I realize that.

Mr. QUARLES. I have no suggestion of a way to say this thought in a better way.


Id any real barm to public bodies and cotratives.

Secretary McKay's withdrawal of his Dertment's objections to a private company's tition to cam the Snake River on the Ore n-Idaho border is supported by considerble logic and legal precedent in favor of The Federal Power Commission's preemlnence in that feld.

The administration's contract policy in The Pacific Northwest is partially justified, at Jeast, by the peculiar circumstances of power production, distribution, and consumption out there. And the meaning and Implications of the so-called partnership plan for hydropower projects are neither easy to understand nor to express, pro or con, in simple terms.

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(100 Cong. Rec. A5316, A5331-A5332)
tunity to study the problem of security-
in terms of its statutory foundation, Its
procedural structure, and its effective-
ness in practice.

The point is that although the Elserower administration is politically vulnerable on the power sue, it is apparently trying recover from a bad start. And it has steppe. back to a middle-of-the-road position on some explosive questions enough to protect Itself against the crippling charge of "giveaway." An example of this is in the accelerated engineering studies to provide some Government dam construction on the moot Sanke River below the bitterly fought-over Hel's Canyon site.

Then along comes this clumsy effort to clamp down on any expansion of the VA

We do not agree with the adverse connotation in the President's now-famous epithet for the TVA as an example of "creeping socialism," and a "monstrosity." But assuredly the President is entitled to his opinion and to his proposal for a "study of TVA's future," as he indicated would be made in the future. But the Milwaukee Journal, commenting on the AEC-TVA deal, asked two questions which were made to order for Mr. LANGER and other critics of the administration's power policy:

"Isn't the strange order telling AEC to negotiate with the private combine preJudging TVA's place in the future? And even if one accepted the idea of TVA critics that the project is 'creeping socialism' and a 'monstrosity. Isn't the new proposal merely 'creating another 'monstrosity' supported by the creeping socialism' of full subsidy?"


Security Provisions of Atomic Energy Act





Friday, July 23, 1954

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9757) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss the security provisions of H. R. 9757.


I believe my colleagues in the House Are familiar with my interest in the broad field of security in all its varied aspects.

My experience in the Government service, in the military service, and in my service on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has given me an oppor

The joint committee has a Subcommittee on Security. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. JENKINS] and the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLFELD] both serve on this subcommittee. It has been my honor and privilege to serve as chairman of this subcommittee.


ator PASTORE and Senator CORDON are the
other members. We have given the
security aspects of this bill the closest
possible study. Every line has been
carefully gone over with the experts who
bave direct responsibilities in the field
of security.

More important than our study of the
bill, or at least of basic importance in
terms of our competence to judge this
bill, is the continuing review and close
scrutiny given to the practice of security
since the McMahon Act went into effect.
I have not served on the joint commit-
tee during this entire period, but I have
never ceased to give the matter my
closest attention.

Chapter 12 of H. R. 9757, composed of six sections, modernizes the security provisions of the existing act, passed in 1946 and reflecting the attitudes of that period as to the exclusiveness of America's position in the field of atomic energy.

Chapter 18, dealing with enforcement, makes more practical and realistic the provisions for effectively maintaining adherence to the security provisions of the hill, and establishes a better legal foundation for enforcing the security meas


As a matter of fact, the objectives of making practical and realistic the security provisions of the act characterize every change we have made from existIng law.

I would like to recall to your minds, since I am sure my colleagues have gone over the report accompanying this billReport No. 2181-the discussion of this all-important security problem appearing on page 23 of the report.

I want to touch briefly on each section of this chapter, but before doing so, I would like to summarize the security accomplishments of this bill. I say "accomplishments" advisedly, not only because of the very merit of the proposed language but also because of the improvement effected in the Commission's security operations. The new language will give the Commission needed flexbility in specific fields, and assures the American people that the expansion of the whole business of atomic energy-in both domestic and international aspects can be carried out with adequate protection for the security interests of the United States.

A major accomplishment of H. R. 9757 is to clear up a situation which has plagued both the Commission and all of the military services since the passage of the act. We have made several attempts In the past to cure this problem by legislation Nearly 8 years of experience underlie these changes. The problem has been acute during the last 4, as the military services have intensified and expanded their competence, their train

Ing effort and their preparedness in the field of atomic weapons. What was once a unique and limited weapon for ne only under conditions of very high and very narrow policy determinations due to scarcity is now a central item of ordnance in the total complex of weap ons systems

Let me give you an example of why the changes proposed in H. R. 9757 are so important, This is a hypothetical case, of course, but not necessarily 0.

Put yourself in the position of an orc nance technician employed by a Depart ment of Defense contractor developing a guided missile. One of the speclications, set up by the Defense Depart ment, is that the missile must be able to carry an atomic warhead.

Can you go direct to the nuclear weapon designers, who are employees of the Commission's contractors in the weapons field? They have a so-called top-secret clearance and so do you. You need to know about the shape and size and weight distribution of the nuclear warhead which your missile is to carry.

The present law says you cannot talk to the Commission's contractor unles you have been Investigatea by the FBI or the Civil Service Commission and cleared by the Commission. Not Just cleared by the Department of Defense even though you may have been investi. gated 8 dozen times and tested by every personnel-security procedure known to the Department of Defense, You may have handled the most sendtive information in the Nation's hole defense setup, for years but, unless you have also been through the paralel channels of clearance established by law for AEC contractors, you cannot talk to your fellow weapons expert in the AEC setup. H. R. 9757 clears this matter up. The Commission's contract employer can talk to you upon receipt and notification to your employer of the Department of Defense certification as to your clear


As matters stand now, this type of information could be given to you only through a third party officially cleared by both of the contracting agencies. The awkwardness and waste in such a procedure is obvious, for the duplication of investigations and clearance actions is costly and unnecessary.

The safeguards surrounding the exchange of information with our allies are of vital importance. But they are realistic. As matters stand now, General Gruenther, when wearing his hat as Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, cannot tell his British chief of fighter aircraft-assuming he has a British chief directing fighter-aircraft operationsGeneral Gruenther cannot even tell Elm the basic weapon effects needed in the employment of the types of atcm'o bombs which fighter aircraft can carr. When the general put on his hat es com. mander of the American forces, he can talk freely to his American staff about the things the field-operations cmanders need to know.

The proposed bill will assist the NATO commander in this regard. It permal's the transmission, under rigid safeguards, of the information required for the m tary employment of the weapon. It se


CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, APPENDIX, HOUSE, JULY 24, 1954 (100 Cong. Rec. A5332-A5333, A5342-A5343, A5345-A5346)

cifically forbids, since there is no need for transmission of such information, all data about the design and manufacture of the weapon and the nuclear materials involved.

The bill provides the same flexibility in connection with the operations of our own forces. It permits the removal, as the Commission and the military may agree, the removal from the statutory restraints of restricted data of that information relating to the size, weight, shape, and ballistic characteristics of atomic weapons and provides for the continuing protection of such data under military security regulations. Just as the restricted data security requirements provide for one kind of protection of research and development and manufacturing operations, the military security regulations provide protection of another kind to meet the differing conditions of military operations. Heretofore, we have tried to impose the Commission's statutory security standards on information of military operations with respect to information primarily of importance to the military. Needless to say, both the Commission and the Department of Defense are very anxious to have this matter cleared up. We are assured that the language in section 142 will do this. Should it be necessary for me to speak later in more detail on these sections of this bill which deal with the operations of the security system, I will do so, but in order to expedite the business before the House, I suggest you first check the report. I believe you will find it very complete on this point.

The last point I will touch on is the authority given to the Commission to make a determination as to the degree of sensitivity of various types of restricted data. Again, an example might help.

During the building of one of the gaseous diffusion plants, there comes a stage when enough equipment is on the floor that a competent engineer or sclentist in the field of isotope separation by gaseous diffusion could gain some knowledge of the output of such a plant. That is, he could see the size of the motors and compressors and examine the layout of the plant to get some idea of the volume of flow of the gases. Of course, he would have it for only the one bay, or wing, of the plant. Now, under the present law, the expert welders who have to put this vast system together, but who do not see any plans, specifications, production data, nor do they get anywhere near nuclear materials, and who work under the closest possible and Very vital technical supervision and direction-these people have to go through the same security procedure as the top scientists who design the weapons themclves. The cost in time and dollars is obvious


I want to assure my colleagues of the dequacy and effectiveness of the pro'ective features of the bill. But there

one more item of major importance. The joint committee has long been of he opinion that the most effective secu

rity is attained only if the areas of information requiring protection are held down to include only that information which positively needs protection.

H. R. 9757 constitutes an unequivocal directive to the Commission to maintain continuous review of all classified information and to declassify and publish scientific and technical data which can be published without undue risk to the common defense and security.

The bill, of course, continues, and I believe improves, the policy declarations with respect to the Commission's obligations to control of information in such manner as to assure the common defense and security, and with respect to the dissemination of technical information essential to scientific and industrial progress and public understanding and to expand and enlarge the Nation's reservoir of scientific knowledge available to all our teachers and research workers.


AEC as Power Broker







PRICE Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I include an editorial from the Washington Daily News of July 13. It is presumed that this editorial not only expresses the opinion of the Daily News but of all other newspapers in the Scripps-Howard chain:

AEC AS A POWER BROKER Protests against the President ordering the United States Atomic Energy Commission to aign a 25-year contract with a private power syndicate to buy electricity for the Tennes Bee Valley Authority have now provoked the administration, and some of its Democratic and Republican friends, to hurry to Mr. Eisenhower's defense.

We still thlak it is wrong for the Prestdent to use the AEC in this fashion aMA power broker for another agency which is itself the biggest integrated power operator in the world.

And those who so loudly try to defend or explain the President's error in this case have not yet got to the heart of the issue.

The beart of the issue is that a majority of the United States Atomic Energy Commisalon 3 Commisioners out 5 was against the contract the President wants signed.

Commissioner Henry D. Smyth and Eugene M. Zuckert, then one of the AEC Commissioners, wrote to the Budget Bureau last April 16. Among other things they said:

Under this proposal the Atomic Energy Commission would be used as a vehicle for the supply of 600.000 kilowatts of power in the Memphis area. ... The propoerd ac tion involves the AEC in a matter remote from its responsibilities. The present proporal would create a situation whereby the AFC would be contracting for power not one kilowatt of which would be used in connection with the Commission production activities. The creation of such a contractual relationship would place upon the Commission a continuing responsibility during the 25-year life of the contract for

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Then Commissioner Murray added: "Since our program is not advanced by these nego tiations and the subsequent administration of this 25-year contract, I do not belleve that it is desirable for the Atomic Energy Commission to perform a function that another agency of Government could perhaps more logically perform."

We stand with those three Atemle Commissionera. We belleve they were right when they took their stand against the idea of AEC becoming a power broker for the TVA.

We believe they are still right. The country-indeed, the whole world depends upon our atomie might



The Atomic Energy Commission administers our atomic program.

It should not be saddled with extraneous duties and responsibilities which have no relation whatever with its primary task.

To force these duties and responsibilities upon the AFC is in our opinion, dangerous to our national defense.


Amending Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as Amended






Friday, July 23, 1954

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9757) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word for the


purpose of inquiring from my friend, the distinguished constitutional lawyer the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAHAM) what his opinion is of this situation.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have a very distinct recollection of the time a number of years ago, 7 or 8 years ago, when Hon. Fritz Lanham, chairman of the Committee on Patents, consulted with us on the Committee on the Judiciary on this subject and Hon. Hatton Sumners chairman of my committee, assigned me as one of those to go into


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The intent of Congress in the definitions as given in this section shall be construed from the words or phrases used in the denitions rather than from the choice of words or phrases defined

The gentleman from Texas και promised that he would have an explanation of this later. I had hoped that he would take the time himself when we reached this point in the bill, but apparently he is not on the floor at the moment. Being interested, also, in getting an explanation of that language, I have requested this time in the hope it may be clarified.

I looked in the report to see if it explains that rather ambiguous language, and the only thing I found in the report which has to do with that particular section or that wording reads as follows:

Those portions of the definitions which require substantive action bave, in most cases, been separated from the definitions and have been put into the approptrate section of the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I lay no claim to any great wisdom or intelligence; in fact, I

(100 Core. Rec. A5346-A5347)

confess to being dull, but if this can possibly be explained to me in terms and language I can understand, I hope that some member of the comittee will do so. I will gladly yield to any member of the comittee who may desire to explain this language. Now if this were not such a serious matter, I would think this kind of language to be amusing. But, this is a serious matter-perhaps, the most serious piece of legislation we have considered this year. I do hope some member of the committee, and I will be delighted to yield, will give me an explanation which I will be able to understand because I cannot understand even what you have in the report.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I shall undertake to give him an answer. I am sure he will be able to understand it, but I am not so sure it will be acceptable to him. The gentleman referred to the statement in the committee report with respect to definitions in which it is sald that those portions of the definitions which require substantive action have in most cases been separated from the definition and been put into appropirate sections of the bill That has to do with portions of existing law where words are defined. Those are now brought forward into this single section under the title "Definitions" so that all of the expressions used frequently in the latter portions of the bill, which might have a variety of interpretations, are defined in this section under the heading "Definitions." With respect to the language used in the opening part of section 11, the effort there was to declare a direction to whoever it might be who would be called upon to interpret these words which have a special meaning, at a later time, to look to the definition itself in interpreting the meaning of the word rather than the word which was selected to be defined. Now to me that is perfectly clear. It may not be to the gentleman, but it is perfectly clear to

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what the limitations are or where the controls rest. This is an example of the great weakness, as I see it, of this tu To carry it out as the gentleman intends to carry out the provisions of the bill is one thing but it is not tight enough to guarantee that will be done, and thea we find section 162, It says point blank that the President can walve the kea requirements, as to contracts if he wan's to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.


Amending Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as Amended





Friday, July 23, 1954

The House in Comunittee of the Wbcie House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9757) to arcend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas Mr. Chair. man, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to addres this inquiry to the gentleman from New York, the author of the substitute. Is it his purpose to leave to the President the power in the atomic-energy Geld that be exercises in other areas?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is exactly right, subject to the constitutional limitations with respect to treaties and international agreements

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I listened very carefully to what the gentleman from New York, the chairman of the committee, had to say in general debate and I sensed in his comment on the President's power that he shares the view that the President's power should not be circumscribed. As a matter of fact there is little difference between us on this principle. All the thoughts that have been expressed seem to converge at least at this point, that we would be eager to preserve the President's consttutional power. Now, that is not plat tudinous in the present world situation. I agree with the gentleman regardir.g the President's position. His address to the newspaper editors and later the address to the United Nations Assembly inspired millions throughout the world And, the gentleman knows my attitude

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