746 AMEND ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 once you have got it declassified, then you have to go through it all over again, and every time you begin to apply the declassification you have to come up with the details and the agreement as to what you are going to do with it then? Mr. QUARLES. That is right, sir. Senator PASTORE. In other words, it is not a classification that you are talking about, you are actually doing the same thing twice. Mr. QUARLES. That is our problem. May I say, Senator Pastore, that when you say "declassify," to be sure we are understanding each other, I mean by that it is removed from restricted data. Senator PASTORE. And put over into military security? Senator PASTORE. That is how I mean it too. Mr. QUARLES. I have used the word "transclassified." which we coined for that process. Senator PASTORE. In other words, it is the second bite of the cherry? Mr. QUARLES. Yes, sir. Mr. STEMPLER. You would have to have. for example, top secret "blue star" to show this was once restricted data and as this data becomes integrated into something else, and then that document would have to become top secret, paragraph 3, “blue star." Representative DURHAM. Military security? Mr. STEMPLER. Yes. Chairman COLE. I think you should point out there would be no limitation on your free use of this as any other military information used in foreign countries. Mr. QUARLES. That is true, sir, but in order to keep control of the information, you will have to show this was a piece of information that formerly was restited data and watch it go through the channels. Chairman COLE. Let me ask if this proviso in 142 (d) is eliminated, and if the Commission and the Defense Department agree that information which is at the time of the agreement restricted data, no matter what it is-if they agree it need no longer be classified as restricted and may be classified by the military as defense information, it would be possible for the Defense Department to tell to anybody in the whole world, anybody that the Defense Department might want to tell it to, to give that information. Is that not correct? Mr. QUARLES. I am sorry I have to answer categorically. You say, "Would it be possible!" And I must say it would be possible. Your question, however, asked if it would be possible for the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in combination to take an act which would be imprudent and unwise. Chairman COLE. No, no. I am not saying that at all. Mr. QUARLES. Moreover, you asked if it would be possible thereafter for the Department of Defense to give it to anybody in the world, and I must say that it would be possible, but they would be in breach of our security laws if they gave it to certain people. Chairman COLE. I am not raising that question at all. I am just asking from the standpoint of the law, would it be legal for any information, however vital it may be, which the Commission and the Defense Department have agreed can be removed from the category of restricted data, would it be legal for the Defense Department to AMEND ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 747 give that information to anybody in the whole world that the Defense Department might feel justified in giving it to? Mr. QUARLES. The answer to that, sir, is "No." Chairman COLE. What would stop them from doing it? Mr. QUARLES. The security laws would stop them from giving it to people who are potential enemies of this country. Chairman COLE. That was in my question. I said if the Defense Department felt justified in doing that. Mr. STEMPLER. I think the same would be, Could we give our top secret war plans to anyone we want? Chairman COLE. Yes. Can you? Mr. STEMPLER. The answer is, within security restrictions and prudence of Chairman COLE. Prudence of what is best for the national interest? Mr. STEMPLER. Of course. Chairman COLE. In the exercise of a person's discretion and judg ment. Mr. STEMPLER. And the AEC could give restricted data to a number of people they consider-— Chairman COLE. That being so, if this provision is eliminated in section 142 (d), we might just as well forget about 144 (b). Without that proviso, it is possible for you to do everything that 144 (b) authorizes. As a matter of fact, you can go beyond the authority of 144 (b), because 144 (b) limits you to not telling our allies anything about the weapons excepting the outside part. But with this proviso eliminated, you can tell them about the inside part. And that I do not think the people are quite ready to do. Mr. QUARLES. A condition precedent, sir, for our telling them about the inside part of it would be a finding by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense jointly that the things about the inside part of it were not restricted data under this legislation. I cannot conceive of their making such a finding. It would be contrary to this law. It would certainly be contrary to the whole spirit of the administration of national security by both executive agencies. Senator PASTORF. Would it help the solution at all, if when the decision is made to take this out of the restricted data category, that agreement should come back before the joint committee to remain on the desk for 30 days before it can become effective? Would not that simplify the procedure then? The reason why I am saying that is because there seems to be apprehension, which is quite justified, that the people are not being kept secure because the matter is being kept away from the joint committee of the Congress. Mr. QUARLES. Senator, it is our thought that in any event the transclassification of such information would be reported to the joint committee of the Congress in accordance with section 202 of this act. Senator PASTORE. We have gone all through that, have we not? Mr. QUARLES. And if you leave the 30-day filing in the act, then it would also come to this committee through the 30-day filing provision and would rest with this committee in accordance with that provision. Senator PASTORE. Just so we will understand ourselves better, as it stands now, utilization is classified data, but utilization can become 748 AMEND ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 unclassified data by a decision made between the Defense Department and the AEC. If there is any question there, it goes to the President? Mr. QUARLES. Right. Senator PASTORE. Now once that takes place, that is conclusive. Yet you have reached no point of effectiveness at all because you have got to come back and do it under section 123. That is what is disturbing you! Mr. QUARLES. It is disturbing us because it requires us to keep records of all the things that have been so changed. Senator PASTORE. If you could write in the law that once you get to the point of taking it out of restricted data that agreement would have to come back to the joint committee before it could become effective, would that not cure your problem? Mr. STEMPLER. Assuming the proviso were deleted! Senator PASTORE. Yes, assuming the proviso under 123 were deleted. Mr. STEMPLER. No, 142 (d). Senator PASTORE 142 (d), yes. We are doing the same thing twice, and I think we ought to eliminate that. But I do not see how you can exclude the compulsion of keeping the joint committee apprised. Mr. QUARLES. May I say, sir, that the Department of Defense would have no objection to informing the Congress of such transclassification of material. Senator PASTORE. I realize that. Mr. QUARLES. And would agree to do so and, in fact, if it is in the law we do it on a 30-day filing basis, we would comply with that. Senator PASTORE. I think that actually will cure the difficulty. Chairman COLE. I think I recognize the administrative problem you would have. If it were enacted the way it is now, it would be possible for our own military people to discuss a certain aspect of atomic weapons any place they may be in the world so long as it is between our own people, but it would be impossible for them to discuss that same thing with their field commanders, their counterparts, and with our allies? Mr. QUARLES. Right. Chairman COLE. They would have to stop and check up and say, "Is this defense information which I am authorized to tell to my colleague here, or is this a particular type of defense information which can be given only pursuant to an agreement!" Mr. QUARLES. That is the whole point. Chairman COLE. I think the suggestion Senator Pastore has made of submitting such proposals to the joint committee may resolve it. At least I am hopeful we can do something that would make it possible to avoid that administrative burden, which I see is difficult. But I still insist by eliminating that proviso entirely it negates 144 (b). Representative DURHAM. At the present time do we have such a category! Mr. QUARLES. No, sir, we do not. We have restricted data and we have military security, but do not have a category that says "This is now military security, but it used to be restricted data." And it is the business of identifying such a third category that bothers us. Representative DURHAM. I should think in dealing with all the items that you are dealing with at the present time in research and AMEND ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 749 development you would certainly have something in the same category. I do not see how you avoid it in dealing with the Allies. You are bound to have some items somewhere. Mr. QUARLES. We have no itens of that kind now, sir, because there have been no transfers from restricted data to military security of the kind that we are talking about that we need to follow in the manner that would now be prescribed by this bill. Chairman COLE. What are the mechanics used by General Gruenther? What is the extent of his authority to divulge, discuss, disclose defense information with General Jnin if he were still in command? Mr. QUARLES. His authority would be to make such disclosures as the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee has authorized our military forces to make to the military commanders of the French forces, to illustrate your point. This would be specific to that country, and it would be specific to certain categories of information. This is a very highly organized mechanism at the present time, and in our feeling in Defense is a proper and adequate means of controlling military security information. Chairman COLE. Let me ask you, do you anticipate and I want the answer to be rather deliberate that any of the information, any of the data which will be declassified by agreement between the Commission and the Defense Department, and therefore transferred from the category of restricted data to the category of defense information, will consist of information other than what is contained in 144 (b), which has to do with restricted data affecting the development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the employment and defense against atomic weapons, and the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons? Mr. QUARLES. Admiral Radford, sir, gave a very explicit statement to this joint committee in its executive session about the character of the information that we would propose to transfer. As I shall bring out in discussing 144 (b), we feel that in its exact words, as it now stands, it does not give us the latitude to make available to our allies all of the information required to be made available to them. So the literal answer to your question is that as 144 (b) now stands, we would propose to go beyond it in some minor respects, but we would propose it to be amended and we would not propose to go beyond the amended form. Chairman COLE. Even for disclosures among our own military people? Mr. QUARLES. I thought you asked me about General Gruenther disclosing to General Juin. Maybe I misunderstood you, sir. Chairman COLE. I was trying to find if the authority contained in 142 (d), without the proviso, did not enlarge the area of information which might be reclassified from restricted data to defense information in an area way beyond the area contained in 144 (b). The authority unquestionably is there, and it enlarges the area that information might be reclassified. But my question is whether in the exercise of that authority the Defense Department would go beyond the limitations set out in 144 (b) with respect to the area of information. Mr. QUARLES. I will try to be responsive to your question, sir. It is a little bit complicated. Chairman COLE. Yes it is. It is still early in the morning. 750 AMEND ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 Mr. QUARLES. It is still early in the morning. 142 (d) would authorize the Commission and the Department of Defense in their point judgment to transfer information relating primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons to military security. 144 (b) contemplates that information relating primarily to utilization of atomic weapons would, as a general category, be the kind of information we would need to give to our allies in order to make their work effective. So as well as I can answer your question in this off-thecuff manner, I would say that the latitude given us in 142 (d) to put this utilization information over under military security would not put over under military security more information than one would need at one time or another to give one's allies in order to work effectively with them. Senator PASTORE. Would you say 144 (b) is an extension of the area of utilization, or would you say it is more or less the same thing said in different words! Mr. QUARLES. 144 (b) relates primarily to utilization. I would say that, sir. But it deals-144 (b), deals both with restricted data and with military security and sets up provisions for the transfer of both kinds of information to allies. Correction, just restricted data. But I mean to say it is implicit; there are other arrangements not under 144 (b) for transferring military security information to our allies. Senator PASTORE. But in order to crystallize it on the record, you do not see yourself being given any more leeway under 114 (b) than you would have under the strict definition of the word "utilization for military purposes?" I mean, is not that your complaint! Mr. QUARLES. We would operate under 144 (b) regardless of whether the proviso is left in 142 or is deleted, and therefore I can not directly relate the question of leaving the proviso in or taking it out to operation under 144 (b). Representative DURHAM. I understood you to say, of course, this would not meet the requirements, the military requirements in the cooperation with the allies, as I understand your statement. Mr. QUARLES. 144 (b) will not do so exactly as it stands, and I should like to comment on that, sir. I have not come to that. Chairman COLE. That is your next one. Why do you not go ahead! I think we can work out something. Mr. QUARLES. We can come back to this if you may wish to. Representative DURHAM. I did not want to move him on, Mr. Chairman, except he did bring in the word "requirement" in the state ment. Mr. QUARLES. Then addressing ourselves, if we may, to section 144 (b), which appears on page 54 of the print, under "International Cooperation." As Admiral Radford testified before your committee in executive session, there is a body of information which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary to transfer to NATO in order to support our common efforts in that area. While there is no intention of transferring omportant secrets of how atomic weapons are made much of the needed information might relate in some degree to design and fabrication of atomic weapons, Section 144 (b) would limit the disclosure of restricted data to information relating to external size, weight, and shape only. This is too restrictive to meet the expressed requirements |