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viese instances show that not every revelation about cryptology 2sults in a change of code. N.S.A., however, likes to imply that that is the case. To a large degree, it seeks to protect the national interest. But it also has less disinterested motives. It wants to avoid Congressional and press probes into its efficiency, value, and blunders. The subcommittee should realize that the dangers of discussing or revealing cryptologic information are sometimes made to seem greater than they are.

I hope that this information eases the subcommittee members' minds about handling cryptology, so that they do not feel that any discussion of the subject automatically jeopardizes the nation's security.

2.

Admiral Inman said something to the effect that I erred in saying (in my article in Foreign Affairs in fall, 1979), that the N.S.A. had intercepted the telephone conversations of American citizens. My information comes from the United States Senate (94th Congress, 2d Session), Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III (Washington, 1976), which reEers on pages 741, 753, 756, and 764 specifically to such interceptions and which bases its statements upon information provided by N.S.A. Officials.

3. Admiral Inman said that I impugned his integrity. He was referring, he told me later, to a footnote in the Foreign Affairs article. I had and have no intention of impuging his integrity, of which I have no doubt. I view the difference noted in footnote 5 between the sources and him as a matter in which Feasonable men are differing in their views of the facts, not as one in which one party or the other is lying. I am confident that he will see this in the same light and will reconsider his remark, which does not conduce to the just resolution of the problem of non-governmental cryptology that we both seek.

Mr. PREYER. We have on the witness list two additional witnesses, one, Mr. Paul Vanstrum, the vice president of the Union Carbide Corp. Mr. Vanstrum was unfortunately caught in a snowstorm on the first day of spring in Denver, Colo., and will not be able to be with us. I hope that if we anticipate recalling the DOE witnesses we might be able to get Mr. Vanstrum at that time.

Our final witness is Dr. Richard Wagner who is the executive associate director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. We appreciate your patience, Dr. Wagner. We will hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD WAGNER, EXECUTIVE ASSO

CIATE DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CALIF.

Dr. WAGNER. I am here, Mr. Chairman, because the director of the laboratory, Dr. Roger Batzel, who had been scheduled to come, learned that he had a personal problem a few days ago that kept him from being here.

Mr. PREYER. He has submitted a letter which we will make a part of the record.

[The letter follows:

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY

March 17, 1980

Honorable Richardson Preyer
Chairman, Subcoumittee on Government

Information & Individual Rights
Coramittee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.c. 20515

Dear Mr. Preyer:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee. Although I
sincerely regret that a prior coram i tment prevents my attendance in person
today, this letter is offered to express some of my views on the importance of
protecting information that is determined by the Doe, under law, to be
Restricted Data.

I believe that the design and manufacture of nuclear explosives in the United
States by individuals or groups outside the government-cleared community
should remain unlawful and that the law should prescribe suitable penalties
for conducting or assisting these activities.
Those aspects of Restricted Data (as defined in the amended Atomic Energy Act
of 1954) that remain classified today pertain principally to nuclear weapons.
Much information concerning the history of the weapon program, the general
nature of nuclear weapons, and the materials and fabrication processes used
have been declassified. This is appropriate in our open society and indeed
facilitates this work.

On the other hand, it is the policy of our nation to limit the dissemination
of nuclear weapon design information. This task is aided by the legal
protection of Restricted Data. Thus, the present definition of Restricted
Data is necessary and workable today, but the law provides for no penalty
which can be imposed on the private citizen who attempts to publish Restricted
Data unless it can be proved that he has behaved in a traitorous manner. I
believe this constitutes a defect in the law and that some reasonable legal
way must be found to correct it.

Let me now comment on the question about prepublication requirements and
practices in the context of work done as part of a job assignment at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). All writings submitted for general
publication which will be released outside the Laboratory must go through a
formal review procedure. This serves several purposes including technical
supervisory review, check for patent disclosure, and compliance with security
classification guidance. This requirement is imposed and enforced by
Laboratory directives and formal procedures which result in documentation of
the review process.

University of California P.O. Box 808 Livermore, California 94550

Telephone (415) 422 1100

Twx 910-386-8339 UCLL LVMR

Of course, an LLNL scientist or engineer is not precluded from submitting writings for publication utilizing personal resources without an LLNL review. In that event, however, our employees are well aware that they must not include any classified information in such writings, and they are encouraged to consult with their supervisor if using any source material from their Laboratory efforts. A similar prohibition would probably apply to most scientists who are not affiliated with or supported by the government; i.e., most industrial employers would prescribe this kind of a review procedure. A truly independent scientist would have inhibitions prescribed only by law, such as the Atomic Energy Act. Even here, however, most of the technical journals to which submissions are made conduct reviews by peers, but without government sponsorship they are under no obligation to detect and correct breaches of security classification.

It is not clear to me that there are similarities between preclearances related to drugs and those related to nuclear weapon information.

I sincerely hope these opinions will assist you in your attempt to justly and effectively guide the course of our government in this area that is important to all of us.

Sincerely,

(signed) Roger Batzel

Roger E. Batzel
Director

Dr. WAGNER. I would like to read just a few excerpts from the letter and then make a couple of comments of my own. I will then be available for questions.

I would like to read the following paragraphs: I believe that the design and manufacture of nuclear explosives in the United States by individuals or groups outside the government-cleared community should remain unlawful and that the law should prescribe suitable penalties for conducting or assisting these activities.

Those aspects of Restricted Data (as defined in the amended Atomic Energy Act of 1954) that remain classified today pertain principally to nuclear weapons. Much information concerning the history of the weapon programs, the general nature of nuclear weapons, and the material and fabrication processes used have been declassified. This is appropriate in our open society and indeed facilitates this work.

On the other hand, it is the policy of our Nation to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapon design information. This task is aided by the legal protection of Restricted Data. Thus, the present definition of Restricted Data is necessary and workable today. However, the law provides for no penalty which can be imposed on the private citizen who attempts to publish Restricted Data unless it can be proved that he has behaved in a traitorous manner. I believe this constitutes a defect in the law and that some reasonable legal way must be found to correct it.

I recognize the conflict between first amendment rights and the necessity to keep weapons of mass destruction from being built by other nations that do not already have them or by private groups. It is not an easy question.

I would like to offer a couple of observations from my point of view that bear on the issue.

The first one is a bit along the lines of the distinction that Admiral Inman just made between basic research and the applications of that research. The development, design, and manufacture of nuclear explosives is certainly based on fundamental physics concepts and sophisticated chemistry and engineering. However, the fundamental concepts—the properties of the nucleus and the

atom-have long been well known. They are unclassified. I do not believe that is the issue. The issue here involves a substantially more sophisticated engineering activity, one in which the intent is to take parts and put them together in a proper way so that they will "work" and produce nuclear energy.

I think there is not much ambiguity in one's mind when one is engaged in that type of engineering activity. You know what you are tying to do when you are determining the shape and dimensions of these parts as well as how they should be configured.

So there is, in fact, a clear and workable distinction between allowing the fullest range of basic scientific inquiry and limiting work which has an obvious goal of producing a nuclear explosive.

The other point that I would like to make is that in the arguments concerning this issue, it is sometimes said that all the inforation needed make a simple rudimentary nuclear fission explosive is already in the open literature. That is a little distinct from the question of the hydrogen bomb which was the matter at issue in the Morland and Hansen cases.

I believe there is more information that might be added to the open literature, generated by private individuals, which could be a substantial aid to someone who wants to effectively and safely build a simple nuclear fission explosive.

I have reviewed not all but many of the designs that have been proposed by Mr. Dimitri Rotow and others. I have read some of the quasi underground literature one can find in many places on how to build a bomb in a garage. I can say much of that is wrong in many of these designs. If an individual attempts to build some of them according to his plan, he would injure or kill himself simply in the process of assembling the device. There are a lot of details that are important and are not presently available in the open literature.

Without weiging the two sides of the first amendment issue and the need to protect the data, it seems to me that we should try to deter private individuals from developing data which pertains directly to the fabrication and design of nuclear explosives.

My last comment is simply one that comes from my 15 years of experience working with the classification and security system extablished by the Atomic Energy Act and implemented by various rules of AEC, ERDA, and DOE. It seems to me for the many things it is asked to do, not all of which have been identified here, it is a workable arrangement. It is not perfect.

In the case of the Progressive article, however, regardless if one believes the act was properly applied, in fact, it resulted in the dissemination of material which I believe will at some time be damaging to the security of the United States. While it may not have been to date, and one can never prove that, it may well be in the future.

Despite that, it seems to me that on the whole the present system does work. It might be desirable to try to develop some way of strengthening the act and the regulations so as to deter the private citizen from engaging not in the basic science, but in the distinct act of designing a workable nuclear device. I am not talking about going back and reclassifying science. I don't quite see the way to do that but I think it would be desirable.

Those were the only comments I have.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you. Your testimony has been very interesting. On the last subject you mentioned the declassification which you say is working reasonably well. That is something that I assume would take continuous review. How were you involved in that process and what is your responsibility as against the responsibility of DOE in declassifying?

Dr. WAGNER. The answer to your question, sir, is in some ways a complicated one and I am not sure I will get all of the regulations and processes exactly right but I will summarize it as best I can.

DOE publishes classification guidance, which generally has its origin many years in the past and is continuously reviewed as issues arise.

The laboratory itself maintains a classification office which interacts with the DOE classification office. In turn, it passes on the classification guidances to the scientists and the engineers working on the various projects.

The actual act of determining whether or not a particular piece of information generated within the laboratory is classified, is usually a collaborative effort between our local classification office and the experienced scientist or engineer who has been involved in nuclear weapons matters for some years.

The interaction is necessary in those cases where it is not fairly clear-cut and the classification officials can identify potentially consequences of a declassification.

For example, through the publication of specific information, a simple deduction may reveal very fundamental data one wants to protect. However, the scientist, based upon his experience, may reasonably believe that the logical jump between the revealed information and the data to be protected may be very difficult and unlikely to occur.

It is a very interactive process. The classification rules are, in fact, rather complicated, I should say. I am not sure whether I have been responsive to your question.

Mr. PREYER. On whether there is sufficient knowledge of a scientific program or concept that already exists so that classification is no longer necessary or feasible, who makes that judgment?

Dr. WAGNER. To the extent that there is a scientific issue involved, I believe it is true that the scientist plays a major part in making that judgment as it exists today. You know, we are not surrounded by an impenetrable bureaucracy in the classification offices. I think we are able to bring scientific judgment to bear on those questions.

I should say, in addition, that that judgment is on occasion brought to bear by people whose interests are not one sided with regard to classification or declassification. They may, in fact, be currently working on the applications of science to nuclear explosives or may have done so in the past. But in many cases they are also people who themselves publish in the open literature and have, I think, a reasonably healthy interest in maintaining the ability to publish their work.

Again, I want to come back to the distinction, though, between the fundamental science and those things which have to do with

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