proper and good foundation for his making this profession, and so demanding these privileges. None will suppose, that he has good and proper ground for such a conduct, who does not believe another world, nor believe the Bible to be the word of God.

And then,

2. We must distinguish between that which nextly brings an obligation on a man's conscience to seek admission to a Christian ordinance, and that which is a good foundation for the dictate of an enlightened well informed conscience, and so is prop erly a solid foundation of a right in him to act thus. Certainly this distinction does really take place among mankind in innumerable cases. The dictates of men's consciences are what do bring them under a next or most immediate obligation to act: But it is that which is a good foundation for such a dictate of an enlightened conscience, that alone is a solid foundation of a right in him so to act. A believing the doctrine of the Trinity with all the heart, in some sense (let us suppose a moral sense) is one thing requisite in order to a per-son's having a solid foundation of a right in him to go and demand baptism in the name of the Trinity: But his best judg ment or dictate of his conscience, concerning his believing this doctrine with this sincerity, or with all his heart, may be sufficient to bring an obligation on his conscience. Again, when a delinquent has been convicted of scandal, it is repent ance in some respect sincere (suppose a moral sincerity) that is the proper foundation of a right in him to offer himself for forgiveness and restoration: But it is the dictate of his conscience or his best judgment concerning his sincerity, that is the thing which immediately obliges him to offer himself. It is repentance itself, that is the proper qualification fundamental of his right, and what he cannot have a proper right without; for though he may be deceived, and think he has real repentance when he has not, yet he has not properly a right to be deceived; and perhaps deceit in such cases is always owing to something blameable, or the influence of some corrupt principle: But yet his best judgment brings him under obligation. In the same manner, and no otherwise, I suppose that Christian grace itself is a qualification requisite in order

to a proper solid ground of a right in a person to come to the Christian sacraments. But of this I may say something more when I come to answer objections.

When I speak, in the question, of a being godly or gracious in the eye of a Christian judgment, by Christian judg ment I intend something further than a kind of mere negative charity, implying that we forbear to censure and condemn. a man, because we do not know but that he may be godly, and therefore forbear to proceed on the foot of such a censure: or judgment in our treatment of him: As we would kindly entertain a stranger, not knowing but in so doing we entertain an angel or precious saint of God. But I mean a positive judgment, founded on some positive appearance, or visibility, some outward manifestations that ordinarily render the thing probable. There is a difference between suspending our judgment, or forbearing to condemn, or having some hope that possibly the thing may be so, and so hoping the best; and a positive judgment in favor of a person. For an having some hope, only implies that a man is not in utter despair of a thing, though his prevailing opinion may be otherwise, or he may suspend his opinion. Though we cannot know a man believes that Jesus is the Messiah, yet we expect some posi tive manifestation or visibility of it, to be a ground of our charitable judgment: So I suppose the case is here.

When I speak of Christian judgment, I mean a judgment wherein men do properly exercise reason, and have their reason under the due influence of love and other Christian principles; which do not blind reason, but regulate its exercises ; being not contrary to reason, though they be very contrary to censoriousness or unreasonable niceness and rigidness.

I say in the eye of the church's Christian judgment, because it is properly a visibility to the eye of the public charity, and not of a private judgment, that gives a person a right to be received as a visible saint by the public. If any are known to be persons of an honest character, and appear to be of good understanding in the doctrines of Christianity, and particularly those doctrines that teach the grand condition of salvation,

and the nature of true saving religion,and publicly and seriously profess the great and main things wherein the essence of true religion or godliness consists, and their conversation is agreeable; this justly recommends them to the good opinion of the public, whatever suspicions and fears any particular person, either the minister or some other, may entertain, from what he in particular has observed, perhaps from the manner of his expressing himself in giving an account of his experiences or an obscurity in the order and method of his experiences, &c. The minister, in receiving him to the communion of the church, is to act as a public officer, and in behalf of the public society, and not merely for himself, and therefore is to be gov erned in acting, by a proper visibility of godliness in the eye of the public.

It is not my design, in holding the negative of the foregoing question, to affirm, that all who are regularly admitted as members of the visible church in complete standing, ought to be believed to be godly or gracious persons, when taken collectively, or considered in the gross, by the judgment of any person or society. This may not be, and yet each person taken singly may visibly be a gracious person to the eye of the judgment of Christians in general. These two are not the same thing, but vastly diverse; and the latter may be, and yet not the former. If we should know so much of a thousand persons one after another, and from what we observed in them should have a prevailing opinion concerning each one of them, singly taken, that they were indeed pious, and think 4he judgment we passed, when we consider each judgment apart, to be right; it will not follow, when we consider the whole company collectively, that we shall have so high an opinion of our own judgment, as to think it probable, there was not one erroneous judgment in the whole thousand. We all have innumerable judgments about one thing or other, concerning religious, moral, secular, and philosophical affairs, concerning past, present, and future matters, reports, facts, persons, things, &c. &c. And concerning all the many thousand dictates of judgment that we have, we think them every

one right, taken singly; for if there was any one that we thought wrong, it would not be our judgment; and yet there is no man, unless he is stupidly foolish, who when he considers all in the gross, will say he thinks that every opinion he is of, concerning all persons and things whatsoever, important and trifling, is right, without the least error. But the more clearly to illustrate this matter, as it relates to visibility, or probable appearances of holiness in professors: Supposing it had been found by experience concerning precious stones, that `such and such external marks were probable signs of a diamond, and it is made evident, by putting together a great number of experiments, that the probability is as ten to one, and no more nor less; i. e. that, take one time with another, there is one in ten of the stones that have these marks (and no visible signs to the contrary) proves not a true diamond, and no more; then it will follow, that when I find a particular stone with these marks, and nothing to the contrary, there is a probability of ten to one, concerning that stone that it is a diamond; and so concerning each stone that I find with these marks: But if we take ten of these together, it is as probable as not, that some one of the ten is spurious; because, if it were not as likely as not, that one in ten is false, or if taking one ten with another, there were not one in ten that was false, then the probability of those, that have these marks, being true diamonds, would be more than ten to one, contrary to the supposition; because that is what we mean by a probability often to one, that they are not false, viz. that take one ten with another there will be one false stone among them, and no more. Hence if we take an hundred such stones together, the probability will be just ten to one, that there is one false among them; and as likely as not that there are ten false ones in the whole hundred: And the probability of the individuals must be much greater than ten to one, even a probability of more than a hundred to one, in order to its making it probable that every one is true. It is an easy mathematical demonstration. Hence the negative of the foregoing question by no means implies a pretence of any scheme, that shall be effectu

al to keep all hypocrites out of the church, and for the estab lishing in that sense a pure church.

When it is said, those who are admitted, &c. ought to be by profession godly or gracious persons, it is not meant, they should merely profess or say that they are converted, or are gracious persons, that they know so, or think so; but that they profess the great things wherein Christian piety consists, viz. a supreme respect to God, faith in Christ, &c. Indeed it is necessary, as men would keep a good conscience, that they should think that these things are in them, which they profess to be in them; otherwise they are guilty of the horrid wickedness of wilfully making a lying profession. Hence it is supposed to be necessary, in order to men's regularly and with a good conscience coming into communion with the church of Christ in the Christian sacraments, that they themselves should suppose the essential things, belonging to Christian piety, to be in them.

It does not belong to the present question, to consider and determine what the nature of Christian piety is, or wherein it consists. This question may be properly determined, and the determination demonstrated, without entering into any controversies about the nature of conversion, &c. Nor does an assert ing the negative of the question determine any thing how particular the profession of godliness ought to be, but only, that the more essential things, which belong to it, ought to be professed. Nor is it determined, but that the public professions made on occasion of persons' admission to the Lord's supper, in some of our churches, who yet go upon that principle, that persons need not esteem themselves truly gracious in order to a coming conscientiously and properly to the Lord's supper; I say, it is not determined but that some of these professions are sufficient, if those that made them were taught to use the words, and others to understand them, in no other than their proper meaning; and principle and custom had not established a meaning very diverse from it, or perhaps an use of the words without any distinct and clear determinate meaning.

VOL. I.

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